Western Perspective on war, peace, media and elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina : a case study of American foreign news reporting by Schumann, Britt
Western Perspectives on War, 
Peace, Media and Elections in 
Bosnia - Herzegovina 
A Case Study of American Foreign News Reporting 
Britt Schumann 
 
Hovedoppgave i Sosiologi (Cand. Polit. 1992) 
Institutt for sosiologi og samfunnsgeografi 
UNIVERSITETET I OSLO 
May 2007 
 2 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
”A secure nation requires a free press, even one that is 
cantankerous, obstinate and ubiquitous”.  
(Judge Murray I. Gurfein , 
 The Pentagon Papers case – the U.S. vs. The New York Times)  
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Prelude 
To my landlady in Sarajevo 
 
Dobro jutro,  Baba 
Your intense dark eyes 
Smiling 
Waving your arms 
Begging me to stay 
 
Moja Baba 
You who served me coffee 
Cleaned and ironed my clothes 
Who looked after me 
When I needed a mother 
 
Cuj Baba 
How I wish I could speak to you 
Hear you talk about your life 
Tell me your experiences 
You talk to me all the time 
I try to understand 
 
Dobar dan, Baba 
You say you saw in the paper 
That all the foreigners would stay longer 
Even though the elections are over… 
And you ask me why I have to go… 
 
Draga Baba 
The foreigners are still here…. 
Dovidenja, Baba. 
 
Tvoja Britt 
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Summary 
The main objective of the thesis is to analyze the media debate evolving around the run-up to 
the first elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement which 
ended a three and a half year long war in November 1995.  These elections took place on 
September 14, 1996 and were considered the “most complicated elections in history” by the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and all other international 
bodies involved with organising the elections. To make the three former enemies cooperate 
and form a well functioning, governing body together, proved to be a long and painful 
process that is not at all completed more than ten years after.  
The United States played a decisive role in bringing about the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. High international profile and a lot of political prestige were connected to the 
fact that it was the U.S. and not the EU or other European negotiators who managed to bring 
peace to Bosnia. For the U.S. a lot of prestige was therefore also put into the 
accomplishment of the peace accords the way they were formulated, word by word, almost 
as a bible.  
The primary data for analysis in the thesis is mainly material from the American 
newspaper The International Herald Tribune during the months May through September 
1996. It is considered a liberal, independent newspaper, and the material showed that it 
performed an independent coverage of the elections and its preparations in Bosnia in 1996. 
The media debate during the run-up to the elections evolved around whether the 
conditions for holding the elections were met or not. The agreement on elections of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement are set down in Annex III, and Article I makes a list of the 
conditions that had to be met for these elections to be free and fair. The list of conditions 
included: a political neutral environment, the right to vote in secret without fear or 
intimidation, freedom of expression and of the press, freedom of association, freedom of 
movement. In the period analysed, both reports and experience on the ground documented 
over and over again that conditions were not met.  
Based on a discourse analytical approach, the main focus of the analysis is: In what 
way does the newspaper coverage of the run-up to the elections reflect the question:  
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- Were the conditions met for holding the elections on September 14, 1996?  
- How did the expressed position to this question reflect whether the press showed 
support for or had an independent/critical stand towards the policies of the U.S. 
administration?  
 
All articles in the period June – September (the material from May was not complete) 
were defined within three codes, based on whether they had a positive, neutral or negative 
position to holding the elections on the prescribed date according to the Dayton Peace 
Accords.  The analysis shows that the majority of the articles (73% of a total of 80 articles) 
did not favour holding the elections under the circumstances. This reflects that the U.S. 
press, and in particular the International Herald Tribune, had an independent, critical and at 
times oppositional position towards the politics of the U.S. government at the time. This is 
contrary to an assumption that the U.S. press mainly tends to support the policies of U.S. 
governments in its foreign news reporting. The overall perspective of the analysed material 
is a U.S. perspective, although the subject matter should be the situation in Bosnia. The 
analysis also shows that the dominating and hegemonic position of the U.S. as a leading 
power of the world is not challenged as a presupposition for the news coverage.  
The method chosen for analysing the material is Discourse Analysis, inspired by the 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) developed by Norman Fairclough. Stuart Hall’s article 
about “Encoding/decoding” (Hall 1992) is another inspiration for the analysis, as well as 
Van Dijk’s way of analysing news discourse. ( Van Dijk 1988). Concepts like the Western 
‘Self’ and the Balkan ‘Other’ as developed by Hansen ( Hansen 2006) are other inspirations. 
Within the dominating election discourse, certain other basic discourses are defined, for 
instance a ‘Balkanization discourse’ relating to all that is defined in the West as negative 
about the Balkans: violent, tribal, ethnically divided, characterized by nationalism and 
conflict etc.    
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Introduction 
The scope of analysis for this thesis is the press coverage of the preparations for the 
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. These were the first elections after the Dayton 
Peace Agreement had put an end to the three and a half year long war in the middle of 
Europe.  
The agreement on elections of The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) . Annex III, 
Article 1 of the Agreement, (see Annex 1) makes a list of the conditions that had to be met 
for the elections to be free and fair. This list of conditions included a politically neutral 
environment, the right to vote in secret without fear or intimidation, freedom of expression 
and of the press, freedom of association, freedom of movement.  
The press reporting during the run-up to the elections (May-September 1996) which is 
the period of this study, evolved around the question whether conditions to hold elections 
were met or not.  Concerning the planned elections in Bosnia, the expectation would be that 
U.S. media would report favourably about the planned implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Accords through holding elections at the prescribed time. One of the main questions for the 
analysis is how the press reflected the important question: 
- Were conditions met for holding the elections on September 14, 1996? 
 
     - How does the expressed position to this question reflect whether the press shows 
support for or is critical/shows independence to the policies of the U.S. administration at the 
time?  
The issue was not whether elections should be held at all, but whether they should be 
held at the exact time – September 14 was the ultimate time limit if the elections should be 
held within the deadline set by the Dayton Peace Agreement. For the United States, keeping 
the time seemed to be a decisive issue for several reasons. The United States had put a lot of 
prestige into bringing about the DPA. The U.S. had managed to negotiate the peace for 
Bosnia, after innumerable failures by the EU and other European negotiators. One reason 
was that the DPA was considered to be such an important document, that the fulfilment of 
the agreement was interpreted to be almost as important as fulfilling a law, or abiding to it as 
if it were a holy book, a bible so to speak. Secondly the U.S. had 60 000 troops in Bosnia 
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(within the NATO- led IFOR, later SFOR). The U.S. government had promised to bring 
these troops home by the end of the year, and the Elections were one of the important 
conditions to be fulfilled before the troops could be pulled out. Thirdly there were U.S. 
elections coming up – set for November. For President Bill Clinton so much prestige was 
connected to the Dayton Peace Agreement and the fulfilment of it, that “breaking” it by not 
holding elections within the time limit as promised, seemed impossible.  
During my period of working in the Press Office of the OSCE (Organisation of Security 
and Cooperation in Europe), the organisations assigned by the Dayton Peace Agreement to 
organise the elections, I did my best to try to understand how the Americans were thinking. 
Since they were so powerful and dominating, both in our little mission and in world politics 
both then and now, this became the point of departure for this study.  
During my six-month stay from April to October, I was astonished by the coverage of 
the preparations for the elections by the U.S. press, the main outlet of access being The 
International Herald Tribune. Copies from this paper were circulated to the OSCE staff on a 
daily basis, and these original copies from 1996 have become the basis for the analysis of 
this study.  
 The coverage seemed more negative and oppositional to the U.S Foreign policies and 
the Bosnia politics of the Clinton administration than I had expected. This negative reporting 
actually led to the fall of the OSCE Head of information, the Dutch diplomat Ms Joanna Van 
Vliet. From one day to another in late August 1996, just a few weeks before the elections, 
she was replaced by an American diplomat, presumably to tone down the negative reporting 
of the U.S. press related to the planned elections on Bosnia. That incident contributed to the 
main focus of this thesis:  
- Is U.S foreign affairs reporting “following the flag”  in the sense that any reporting 
on U.S foreign policy is affirmative and accepting of the premises and results of 
these policies, or can foreign affairs reporting in U.S. media also be independent, 
critical and even oppositional when the media sees it necessary?  
- How does the press deal with U.S, foreign policy interests – is it really concerned 
about what is going on in the world, or are the politicians’ concern with domestic 
politics interfering foreign policy – and how is this reflected in the foreign policy 
reporting?   
 
An important indication of the answer to this question is the fact that almost 73  % of the 
articles covering the elections preparations from my material expressed a negative position 
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to holding the elections at the time enforced by the U.S. government. This shows both 
independence and ability to keep up the ideals of a free and independent press even in 
foreign policy reporting.  
For a closer understanding of how this type of reporting is conducted, I have chosen 
to do a discourse analysis of a selected number of articles from the material. These articles 
are selected because I find them representative of the type of reporting which dominated the 
U.S. coverage at the time. The International Herald Tribune as such appears to be a very 
objective, balanced newspaper, liberal and conservative at the same time. It is  based on very 
traditional American press principles, and the way they are performed by their owners at the 
time, The Washington Post and The New York Times.  
I chose Discourse Analysis as the method for analysis because I wanted to see if it 
was possible to trace underlying, ideological meanings behind the press coverage. The 
majority of the articles that are analysed are news reports, with the particular properties 
characterizing such reports. For instance such reporting is supposed to be neutral and 
objective. Still I did not have any problems dividing them into the three codes that I chose 
for the analysis: positive, neutral or negative.  These codes relate to the main position to 
holding the elections on September 14 1996 that can be interpreted from the articles.  
Critical Discourse Analysis, the way it is presented by Norman Fairclough inspires 
the analysis.  Critical Discourse Analysis applied on journalism is a way of trying to 
understand how journalistic texts are composed by different social factors, and how they 
contribute to sustain institutional norms and practices. Other inspirations are Van Dijk’s 
analyses of news texts ( Van Dijk 1988) and  Stuart Hall’s article “Encoding/decoding” (Hall 
1992). Hansen’s discourse analysis of texts about the Bosnian conflict has been another 
influence for the analysis (Hansen 2006).   
The fairly detailed historical background in Chapters 1 and 2, with descriptions of the 
war and the long process of international attempts at peace negotiations, which mostly 
failed, is meant to give a thorough understanding and explanation of the U.S position and 
why the Dayton Peace Process became so important for the Clinton administration at the 
time. In discourse analytical terms it is meant to provide background and context for the 
analysis.  
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Chapter 3 is meant to contribute to a reflection over different aspects of the role of 
the press in modern societies, particularly in relation to politics and specifically related to 
foreign politics. An important observation is that U.S. foreign affairs reporting tends to cover 
U.S. foreign relations primarily, and that the reporting normally is predictable and in 
accordance with the priorities of the U.S. government, it is “following the flag.” This is one 
of the assertions I am trying to challenge with my study of the press coverage of the first 
elections in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Agreement. The chapter also gives a presentation 
of the main objective for observation, The International Herald Tribune, its background and 
owners at the time of the study, The New York Times and The Washington Post.  
Chapter 4 discusses different aspects of Discourse Analysis with particular emphasis 
on the approaches of Van Dijk in analysing news and Norman Fairclough’s approach to 
Critical Discourse Analysis.  
In Chapter 5 the main focuses of the analysis are outlined, including the definition of 
the codes positive, neutral and negative as a tool for understanding the main position of the 
analysed articles towards the administration’s insistence on holding the elections at a certain 
time. The ‘basic discourses’ in my analysis are also defined. 
Chapter 6 presents a Critical Discourse Analysis of six selected articles from the 
International Herald Tribune’s coverage of the preparations for the elections in Bosnia in 
1996.  
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Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
(Source: University of Texas Map Libraries/CIA Political Map 2002) 
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Background 
The war in Bosnia & Herzegovina which started in April 1992 and ended with the signing of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA, also known as the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace, GFAP) in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995,  is considered one of the worst wars 
in modern history only second to World War II. The fact that this was a war on the European 
continent and that it was fought between peoples who formerly had lived together as 
peaceful neighbours, created massive worries and seemingly endless attempts at peace 
negotiations on behalf of the International Community (IC). 1  
It was a war characterized by arbitrary killings, forced expulsions and mass rape, 
with endless civilian suffering. It was a war fought on the European continent, 
geographically close to important EU-member states like Germany, Austria, Italy  and 
Greece. Numerous attempts at negotiations and peace treaties kept failing during the three 
and half years of war – neither threats nor economic blockade had much effect on the 
warring partners.  
What was particularly remarkable was that this became the TV-war of the nineties. It 
became the Vietnam war of the generation growing up at the time, dominating the daily 
news coverage of TV stations all over the world. The international media coverage portrayed 
the conflict as “deep rooted, tribal and impenetrable” (Thompson 1999:xi). The conflict was 
created, nurtured and encouraged by competing political forces.  Mark Thompson 
(Thompson 1999) and others have documented that domestic media played a major role in 
manufacturing the conflict. The leaders of the conflict were very much aware of the role of 
media – control of public opinion was just as important as control of the battlefield. All sides 
deliberately worked to mobilize and manipulate public opinion. Thus the media did not just 
comment on the war – they became a vital part of the front line. But influence and control of 
                                              
1 The term IC includes UN, EU-member states, NATO-member states and neighbouring Eastern European 
states as Russia, and OSCE-member states, including USA and Canada. In cold numbers the net result at the 
time of the signing would amount to 200 000 persons killed and approximately 1 million refugees had left the 
country.  
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public opinion did not just apply to domestic media. To the combatants, foreign public 
opinion also played a crucial role. All sides in the conflict needed intervention of external 
powers to succeed, none of them were strong enough to win by their own force of arms. 
Winning the media war, controlling the perception of the conflict also in international media 
became a crucial objective to the warring parties (Thompson 1999:2).  
Just like the conflicts themselves, the role of the media in the conflicts is rooted in 
the structure of Former Yugoslavia. Each of the Republics that formed the federation 
controlled the media. They were controlled by each republic’s league of Communists, and 
thus became an easy prey to the tide of ethnic nationalism which started to sweep the 
country from the time Slobodan Milosevic became leader of the Serbian Communist party 
(1986) and President in 1987.  One important step for Milosevic in order to achieve the 
degree of control of the masses that he wanted was to gain complete control of the mass 
media. According to Bennett, Serbian society was systematically purged, all opposition was 
crushed and the media were brought firmly under political control. “As early as 1987, four 
years before the shooting began; the Serbian media were already on a war-footing, spewing 
out a barrage of ethnic hatred” (Bennett 1995:10). This propaganda offensive was so intense 
that ordinary Serbs started to believe that they were permanently threatened and that they 
were surrounded by enemies, whose ultimate goal was to wipe them out. Bennett remarks 
that “the media always had played a critical role in Yugoslav society but had, hitherto, been 
employed to bring Yugoslavia’s peoples together in the Titoist spirit of ‘brotherhood and 
unity’, and to smooth over national disputes” (Bennett 1995:10). 
The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) did not contain provisions concerning media. 
But the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was 
responsible for implementing the elections provided for in the DPA, shortly after starting to 
operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina installed a body responsible for Media Development. 
The main concern was to ensure that the media coverage of the first elections after the DPA 
would contribute to free and fair elections. The issue of “hate speech” and unfair press 
coverage was a constant topic for discussions with media representatives from all sides in 
the former conflict, although the media of Republika Srpska was overrepresented concerning 
“hate speech” in the cases treated by the so called Media Expert’s Commission. Developing 
democratic media from a situation of conflict and mutual suspicion is not done over night.  
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My personal background for choosing the topic for this dissertation is that I spent six 
months in Sarajevo from 1 April to 1 October 1996, just as the preparations for the first 
elections after the DPA were under way.  I was seconded to work as a Press Officer at the 
Press Office of the OSCE headquarters in Sarajevo. I dealt on a daily basis with journalists, 
very many of them were American. 
It would have been interesting to study the Bosnian media coverage of the elections. 
Unfortunately, my knowledge of the Bosnian-Croatian-Serb language is not good enough for 
an in-depth study of media. Although we had access to translated material of the most 
relevant articles for the election coverage, I decided to leave that part to persons more 
knowledgeable of the language, translations do not necessarily do justice to the real content 
and do not give a good enough basis as primary material for a discourse analysis.  
During my stay I was able to gather copies of a substantial amount of press material, 
both from local and international media, of which I have chosen to analyse the International 
Herald Tribune.  My data consists basically of these press clippings. As a background for 
the total analysis is of course a lot of other material that I gathered during the period, 
including my personal observations from my position in the OSCE Press Office.  
There were several factors that led me to the idea of studying the U.S. press coverage 
of the elections preparations. One of them was my own experience with my U.S. colleagues 
in the OSCE mission and how they handled their national media. The other major factor was  
the U.S. government’s direct and heavy   involvement with the elections preparations due to 
its prestigious brokering of the Dayton Peace Accords. The feeling of being “run by 
Washington” was not fictitious – it was materialized as an important part of reality when my 
immediate superior, the OSCE Head of Information (a Dutch diplomat) was told to leave 
from one day to the other, just a few weeks before the elections, and replaced by a team of 
U.S. diplomats sent directly from U.S. State Department. Their more or less overt mission 
was to try to turn the tide, try to convince the U.S. press to produce more positive reports 
about the elections.   
As elections approached, we realised more and more that this was a futile business. 
For U.S. journalists, changing the spokesperson was not enough to change their mind about 
the elections. Most of them knew Bosnian issues very well from having reported from the 
country for several years during the war. As the analysis shows, they reported on an 
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independent basis, if the process leading to the elections did not seem to go well, this was 
what they reported, no matter what the U.S. government was trying to tell them. In other 
words, they were doing their job.  
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Chapter 1 
Historical background 
Western powers and the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
For an introduction to the background and the dramatic events, which eventually led to the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Accords and the following elections, I think it is appropriate to 
present a timeline of main events before and during the war and the Western responses to 
these events.   
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the World expected to take a deep breath of 
relief – the Cold War was over, the scenarios of the possibility of an atomic war and other 
wars between the two Superpowers and their allies dissolved. Nations on both sides of the 
former Iron Wall could re-orientate and start thinking about de-arming and détente. But the 
calm did not last long.  
On 27 June 1991 hostilities broke out in Slovenia, and from then on and until the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on 21 November  1995, the conflicts resulting in the 
break-up of   Yugoslavia dominated the news headlines all over the world. The conflict 
dominated the international news to the degree that Balkan leaders have become “household 
names the world over” (Bennett 1995: 1). The term “ethnic cleansing” which originates from 
the Serbo-Croat etnicko ciscenje has passed to English and many other languages to express 
the brutality of a conflict with the principal aim to erase all traces of alien culture. Bosnia-
Hercegovina became synonymous with killing, cruelty and human suffering to a degree only 
comparable to the suffering during World War II.  
Yugoslavia formally ceased to exist on 15 January 1992 when all the twelve member 
countries of the European Union officially recognised Slovenia and Croatia as independent 
states. On 6 April the EU recognised Bosnia – Herzegovina as an independent republic. The 
day after (7 April 1992) the U.S. recognised Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. At 
this stage hostilities, conflicts and fighting had been going on for a year.  
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The US recognition signified a major shift in U.S. policy towards the former 
Yugoslav republics. The then Secretary of State, James Baker, had visited Belgrade ten 
months earlier and made his country’s position clear: ‘the U.S. would not recognise Slovenia 
and Croatia under any circumstances’ (Bennett 1995:2). The U.S. did not want to see 
Yugoslavia disintegrate; fearing the future stability of the Balkans was at stake. Hansen 
remarks that the American foreign policy agenda at the time (1991) was preoccupied with 
the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War. (Hansen 2006: 116-117) 
The international community became directly involved in the Yugoslav conflict as 
soon as war broke out in Slovenia, when the European Union set itself as mediator. As war 
reached Croatia three months later, the United Nations joined the search for settlement.   But 
diplomacy alone had no impact on the bloodshed, and fighting continued to escalate along 
with increasing reports on atrocities. International recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was 
unthinkable without the war. As cease-fires came and went without results, the pressure to 
recognise the two republics increased – they were both seen as victims of aggression. When 
the European Community member states finally recognised Slovenia and Croatia, they were 
realising the inevitable – Yugoslavia did not exist any more. 2  
In April 1992 Serb forces launched an offensive on Bosnia-Hercegovina to make sure 
the republic remained part of the rump –Yugoslav state, irrespective of the wishes of the 
republic’s non-Serb majority and much of the Serb population. The offence laid waste much 
of the republic and massacred untold numbers of innocent and defenceless people simply 
because they had the “wrong” national origins. Survivors of the original Serb offensive were 
herded into concentration camps where their sufferings continued. During the months of 
April, May, June and July 1992 thousands of Bosnians were systematically raped, tortured 
and executed. According to Christopher Bennett (Bennett 1995:3) this level of killing might 
have continued much longer unless a handful of courageous journalists had exposed some of 
                                              
2 Much of the historical description of the war in the thesis is based on the thorough and comprehensive report 
prepared by the Dutch Institute of War Documentation  called “Srebrenica – a ‘safe’ area -  Reconstruction, 
background, consequences and analyses of the fall of a safe area,” ,  Nederlands Instituut voor 
Oorlogsdocumentatie (NIOD) Amsterdam 2002, www.niod.nl,)   
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the horror, which led to public outrage throughout the world.  The International Community 
chose not to intervene to protect the victims, and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not 
over until the signing of the Peace Agreement at the end of 1995.  
UN peacekeepers began arriving in Croatia in March 1992 after the 17th cease-fire of 
the Croatian war had been held for two months. The so-called UNPROFOR forces (United 
Nations Protection Forces) came as a part of a peace agreement, which had been signed in 
Sarajevo on 2 January 1992 (the Cyrus Vance peace plan.) 
According to Bennett the decision on part of the Western powers to recognise 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was a major step towards apportioning war-guilt. 
This recognition implied that Serbia was actually to blame for the conflict, whereas Serbia 
itself claimed to be fighting to hold Yugoslavia together. Serbia has repeatedly been singled 
out for condemnation in the many reports on the war compiled by international organisations 
(Bennett 1995:9).  
The Director of the Dutch Institute of War Documentation, professor J.C. Hans 
Blom, said when the Srebrenica Report 3 was launched, that the fact that conflict broke out 
in former Yugoslavia was mainly due to “…nationalist leaders who seemed willing to 
achieve their objectives by brute force, and to the population’s sense of insecurity and fear, 
that led to the acceptance of violence as the only means of defence. Yugoslavia’s collapse 
was the result of a multi-facetted process where President Milosevic of Serbia played a 
decisive role by embracing nationalism in an attempt to sustain his position of power.” The 
nationalism of leaders elsewhere in Yugoslavia was also influential, and particularly that of 
President Tudjman of Croatia. Blom stated :  “While Croatia entered into a state of war with 
the Yugoslav army and Serbian paramilitaries, Tudjman was still drawing up agreements 
with Milosevic about the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina where only a mini-Muslim state 
would be allowed to remain”.  He went on to clarify that the war in Bosnia did not break out 
because of the premature recognition of the European Union, as has often been claimed, 
rather that it was generated by the parties within the region itself. Mr Blom claimed that 
“…the West could only exert a limited influence on the chain of events in former Yugoslavia, 
and this was certainly true for as long as there was no preparedness to intervene on a 
                                              
3 (http://www.srebrencia.nl/en/content_aanbiedingstoespraak.htm 
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massive scale.” The cease-fire agreements, viewed by the West as diplomatic successes, 
were simply consciously chosen breathing spaces for the warring factions that allowed them 
to prepare for the next phase of conflict. “The peace plans of the West frequently intensified 
hostilities. The West mainly attempted to limit the conflict and to provide humanitarian aid. 
But negotiations and humanitarian aid also limited the possibility for actual intervention: 
armed action could thwart peace talks and could result in a suspension of aid. The West 
became a hostage of its own approach and ended up in a scenario of ‘muddling through’. 
The UN’s attempts at impartiality meant that the peacekeeping troops were hated by all 
sides in the conflict”, according to Hans Blom.  
War breaks out 
In February 1992 Milosevic had told the US ambassador to Bosnia, Zimmermann, that in 
contrast to Croatia the Serbs in Bosnia only made up 35 ( in fact 31) per cent of the 
population, but owned 64 per cent of the land. According to NIOD the real purpose of this 
remark was to get the American ambassador used to Serbian claims for two thirds of 
Bosnian territory. At the same time Milosevic constantly referred to the Bosnian leader Alija 
Izetbegovic as a dangerous Muslim fundamentalist.  (http:// 
312.222.3.6/Srebrenica/toc/p1_c05_s001_b01.html) 
On this background the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 24 January dealt with 
the issue of referendum on the independence of Bosnia –Herzegovina. It was a requirement 
from The European Commission to hold a referendum before they could proceed with 
recognition of Bosnian independence. The Bosnian Serb leaders opposed a referendum, 
which would lead to independence, while Izetbegovic and his supporters were in favour. The 
Croats were divided between moderates who advocated a multi-ethnic Bosnia, and radicals 
who wished that a part of Bosnian territory should join Croatia. The Referendum was to take 
place on 29 February and 1 March. The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic declared that 
the Bosnian Serbs would not participate in the referendum, with the result that only Muslims 
and Croats went to the polls.  
On the second day of the referendum, the evening of 1 March, an incident in the old 
Muslim quarter of Sarajevo, Bascarsija, became an illustration of the tension which was 
building up between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs. During a wedding celebration, 
the Serb wedding guests were waving Serb flags. Suddenly shots were fired at the wedding 
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party. The father of the bridegroom was killed and an orthodox priest was wounded. This 
attack on the wedding guests proved to be the spark that lit the keg. Numerous 
commentators consider these shots fired at the wedding guests the overture to the war in 
Bosnia. 4 
Immediately after this incident supporters of the SDS set up roadblocks around the 
old quarter of Sarajevo. In a television speech from Belgrade Radovan Karadzic warned 
that the siege of Sarajevo would not be lifted until preparations for the independence of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were stopped. In Sarajevo peaceful demonstrators by unarmed groups 
in favour of an undivided Bosnia were shot at. On 3 March Izetbegovic declared the 
independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
The Cutilheiro Plan 
Prior to the referendum in Bosnia the EC had started discussions about Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
During the Portuguese chairmanship the Portuguese diplomat Jose Cutilheiro had taken over 
the leadership of the reactivated Yugoslavia Conference, now concentrating on Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  The principles for an agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina would have to satisfy 
two conditions: the inviolability of the external borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the 
acceptance of the existence of three separate ethnic groups, each with their own interests. 
Both Serbs and Croats favoured the basic proposal from Cutilheiro which involved the 
division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into cantons based on a Swiss model. After a lot of meetings 
and discussions back and forth, the so-called Cutilheiro Plan was signed on 17 March 1992. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina should be divided in cantons where each of the three nations were 
given regions with a large degree of local authority, whereas foreign-, security- and 
monetary policy would remain the prerogative of the central government and the parliament 
of Bosnia. Each of the three ethnic entities would be assigned an equal number of delegates 
in the upper house of the parliament, decisions on important issues would be passed if 80 per 
cent of the delegates voted in favour. A special tribunal would be created to settle disputes 
                                              
4 However, according to the Dutch Srebrenica report, which cites the French author Bougarel, a Muslim had admitted on 
the radio that he fired the shots. His name was Ramiz Delalic, with the nickname Celo, who was a well known criminal 
who had spent eight years in prison on a charge of rape. Delalic was a member of the so called ‘Green Berets’, a militant 
Bosnian militia. He went underground, and did not appear again until a few weeks later, when he, alongside several other 
Bosnian criminals led the defence of Sarajevo. For further reading: http://213.222.3.6/srebrenica(top/pl_c05_s002_b01.html 
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between the central authority and the cantons. The tribunal would consist of one member of 
each of the cantons and four foreigners.  
The plan left the difficult question of authority over the army and police unresolved. 
More discussion was also needed about the map on which the internal borders were drawn. 
According to the provisional map there would be two Muslim areas, four Croat areas and 
seven Serb areas. The Muslims would control 45 per cent, the Serbs 42.5 per cent and the 
Croats 12.5 per cent of the Bosnian territory. The difficulty of dividing up Bosnia-
Herzegovina into ethnic areas was demonstrated by the fact that according to this map 50 per 
cent of the Bosnian Serbs would live outside the areas of their own ethnicity, while the 
corresponding figures for Bosnian Croats were 59 per cent and for the Bosnian Muslims 18 
per cent.  
Immediately after the plan was signed, Karadzic’s comment was that it was ‘a great 
event in the history of Bosnia’, according to him this now ‘saved the country from civil 
war.’(http://213.222.3.6/srebrenica/toc/pl_c05_s003_b01.html) 
But a week after the end of the talks, on 26 March, Izetbegovic withdrew his acceptance of 
the plan.  
The day after the Bosnian Serb parliament declared the independence of the Serbian 
Republic of Bosnia – Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, which had previously been declared 
autonomous on 9 January. That same day the Bosnian government appealed to the UN to 
send peacekeeping troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This request was in vain, the UN said that 
because of budgetary problems the number of crisis areas where the UN could be active had 
to be limited.  
In principle through the Cutilheiro Plan, the European Community had accepted a 
division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into separate ethnic communities, as long as these would be 
held together by a coordinating central authority. Karadzic realised that Izetbegovic and his 
government could not count on a lot of support neither from the UN nor the EC if the 
Bosnian Serbs were to press ahead with their aims. Shortly it became clear that he was ready 
to fulfil the threats of a bloodbath he had launched during the talks on the Cutilheiro plan.  
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Recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
On 7 April 1992 the ministers of the EC declared that they would recognise Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and from the same date the USA did the same. In total 72 states recognized 
Bosnia-Herzegovina on that date. But it took some time before Western governments 
actually established diplomatic contacts with the government of Sarajevo. The West and the 
UN neglected to enable or to organise the defence of the new state. Already from the 
beginning of the year the CIA had warned that in the event of recognition of Bosnia a major 
international effort would be needed to counter Serb aggression and to keep the state 
together. However, the new state was affected by the UN arms embargo, which had been 
imposed in September 1991 on all areas of the former Yugoslavia.  The maintenance of this 
embargo prevented Bosnia from defending itself from external aggression, a right actually 
granted to each state under Article 51 of the UN Charter. But the West also abandoned 
Bosnia-Herzegovina morally by strengthening the nationalist leaders in Bosnia and Serbia 
by conducting negotiations exclusively with them. The West ignored the democratic forces 
that were striving for multi-ethnicity and had hoped for help from the West. 
(http://213.222.3.6/srebrenica/toc/pl_c05_s004_b01.html) 
Already in the last week of March fighting had started between JNA and Serb 
militias on the one side and Croat and Muslim militias on the other in several towns both in 
the north, in the centre around Mostar and in Neum in the south of Bosnia. On Sunday 5 
April 1992 fighting broke out in the suburbs of Sarajevo. But still a lot of people in the 
Bosnian capital resisted the growing ethnic tensions. Between 60 000 and 100 000 
demonstrators gathered in front of the Bosnian parliament to show their rejection of the 
nationalist parties. They demanded new elections, waved portraits of Tito and chanted 
slogans at the ‘murderers’. But the demonstration was brutally disrupted by gunmen from 
the SDS party shooting at them from the top of their headquarters at the Holiday Inn hotel. 
Several demonstrators were killed. The night between the 5-6 April the JNA took Sarajevo 
airport.  
On 7 April 1992, the day the European Community and the United States recognised 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb parliament decided definitively to implement the 
Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was to be based in Pale, a ski resort just outside 
Sarajevo. The SDS withdrew its two members, Koljevic and Plavsic from the collective 
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presidium of Bosnia, and asked all other functionaries still active in Bosnian political bodies 
to follow their example.  
Between March and June the Bosnian Serb forces, supported by the JNA and 
paramilitaries from Serbia, took control of a large part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
territorial goals of the Republika Srpska were Northern and Western Bosnia, Eastern Bosnia, 
Eastern Herzegovina and the valley of the Sava river known as the Posavina Corridor. 
According to the census of 1981 the population mix in the north –west of Bosnia was 63% 
Serb, 15% Muslim and 10% Croat. The Eastern part of Bosnia bordered on Serbia and 
would form a buffer zone for the Serbian motherland. Throughout the whole war there was 
continued fighting in the Posavina Corridor. 
Apart from this area, the interests of the Bosnian Croats were located chiefly in west-
Hercegovina ( the area west of the river Neretva). Thus it was possible to divide the general 
spheres of interest in Hercegovina with the Serbs, except the town of Mostar. Mostar was on 
the river Neretva and became the object of really heavy fighting that broke out in April 1992 
and all three ethnic groups were involved. The fighting in Mostar lasted for almost two 
years.  
The Siege of Sarajevo 
Sarajevo is situated in a valley, and the defence of the city was difficult. Serb troops 
surrounded the city and occupied most of the hills around. The firepower of the Serbs was 
superior to the Muslims. The first heavy bombardments took place on 21 April. Serb troops 
then started attacks on the suburbs Ilidza and Grbavica, but the defenders managed to keep 
this territory. On 2 May 1992 Bosnian Serb troops penetrated into the suburbs of Sarajevo, 
in the weeks that followed heavy house-to house fighting took place. In the early phase of 
the war the defence of Sarajevo relied on a group called the Green Berets with strong links 
to the government of Sarajevo and ABiH. Several of the leading figures of the Green Berets 
were former criminals, who committed repeated breaches of the Geneva Convention. These 
elements were not dealt with until the new government of Haris Siladjiz took office in 1993. 
(http://213.222.3.6/srebrenica/toc/pl_c05_s005_b01.html) 
The JNA tried to penetrate further into the city in the following weeks. Due to lack of 
Serb infantry the offensive came to a stop right at the centre of the city. The forces around 
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Sarajevo confined themselves by weakening the population through a state of siege and 
artillery bombardment. But the government army did not manage to break through the 
surrounding Serb forces either. The result was a stalemate, which lasted for three and a half 
years, and led to miserable conditions for the population constantly attacked by mortar and 
artillery bombardments and the well-known sniper fire. During the siege a considerable 
proportion of the population continued to comprise both Croats and Serbs. Meanwhile the 
Bosnian Serbs pressed for a permanent solution for division of the city, either by a green line 
like in Nicosia, or with a wall like the one in Berlin.  
According to Udovicki and Stitkovac the Serbian offensive in the first phase of the 
war had two objectives, besides reducing Sarajevo to ruins. One aim was to conquer the 
eighteen-mile wide strip along the Serbian-Bosnian border, which was marked by the Drina 
river. The second aim was to consolidate Banja Luka as the proclaimed capital of Republika 
Srpska (Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997: 184). 
Ethnic cleansing  
The attention of the West was mainly concentrated on the developments in and around the 
capital Sarajevo at the beginning of the war. But during the months of April through June, 
Serb paramilitary groups were very active in other parts of Bosnia, mainly in the north-west 
and east. These groups were reluctant to let journalists or international aid groups enter the 
areas, and as telephone and telex links were broken, at the beginning very limited 
information came out apart from accounts from Displaced Persons. According to the 
Srebrenica report the paramilitary groups were not independently operating warlords, they 
were systematically employed by the Serb leadership, operating within the existing power 
relationships, and the “…sign points towards Belgrade, in particular to President Milosevic.” 
(http://213.222.3.6/srebrenica/toc/pl_c05_s006_b01.html) 
As an example how ethnic cleansing was performed we can take a closer look at the 
siege of the town Zvornik in eastern Bosnia on the Drina river. Originally the town had 60% 
Muslims. The town was considered to occupy a strategic position both on the Belgrade-
Sarajevo line and the Belgrade-Tuzla line. The paramilitary troops were led by the extreme 
nationalist leader Vojislav Seselj. Already in late March his units had arrived in Zvornik, 
and gave the Muslims  ten days to hand in their weapons. On 7 April units of Seselj, with 
other paramilitary groups arrived in the neighbouring village Grabavci and killed Muslims 
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who had not handed in their weapons. The next day, the JNA, together with military units 
and supported by the Serb territorial defence force, attacked Zvornik. During the fighting it 
was not possible to make any clear distinctions between the groups. A Muslim unit managed 
to defend the town for several days, but due to lack of ammunition, they had to give in to the 
artillery bombardments, which mostly came from tanks on the Serbian side of the Drina.  
After the fall of the town, the paramilitary groups were given a free hand while the 
JNA kept the town surrounded. Seselj’s group were called the Chetniks, and other 
paramilitary groups were led by Marko Pavlovic, reportedly a member of the Serbian state 
security service. The members of the notorious Arkan’s so called Tigers committed the 
worst crimes. Torture, rape and murder became the order of the day for more than a week. 
Houses belonging to Muslims were plundered and set on fire. Similar and worse stories are 
told from towns like Banja Luka,  Prijedor, Bjeljina, Modrica and several more.  
Mosques were a much sought after target. According to the Yugoslav Islamic 
Community no less than 430 mosques were destroyed. Several were shelled and bombed 
during the fighting, but many were destroyed as mere terrorist acts by extreme Serbs aimed 
at adding pressure on the Muslim community. Many of the destroyed mosques would date 
back to the 15th century. (Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997: 208).  
Descriptions of eyewitness accounts and many of the atrocities appeared in Serbian 
newspapers and magazines, such as Borba and Vreme. Udovicki and Stitkovac write:  
“The manifold instances of terror included public executions, torture, concentration 
camps and rape, all conducted as a sort of public blood sport.” (Udovicki and 
Stitkovac 1997: 188-189).  
The practices of ethnic cleansing during the war in Bosnia have often been compared to the 
German extinction of Jews during World War II. But Donia and Fine say that ethnic 
cleansing differs from the systematic, quiet extermination procedures used by the Germans 
against Jews, Gypsies and other.  
“The Germans set out to kill people without creating public furore; the ethnic 
cleansers of Bosnia use killings and other atrocities to sow fear and panic and to 
induce flight.” (Donia and Fine1994: 247) 
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Eyewitness accounts 
The highest representative of UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in 
former Yugoslavia, José Maria de Mendiluce, happened to pass through Zvornic on his way 
from a meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade to Sarajevo, exactly at the peak of the 
paramilitary activities. The Serb and JNA forces were furious to find an outsider who could 
witness what was going on, and Mendiluce was detained. His description of the situation is 
referred in the book “The Death of Yugoslavia” by Laura Silber and Allan Little, later the 
basis for a BBC television series.  
‘ I realised I was at serious risk. I could see trucks full of dead bodies. I could see 
militiamen taking more corpses of children, women and old people from their houses 
and putting them on trucks. I saw at least four or five trucks full of corpses. When I 
arrived the cleansing had been done. There were no people, no-one on the streets. It 
was all finished. They were looting, cleaning up the city after the massacre. I was 
convinced they were going to kill me.’ (Silber and Little 1995: 246) 
He was released, and crossed at a speed of 140 km an hour into Bosnian-held 
territory. In a narrow valley he found victims of the cleansing. Five thousand people were 
trying to find shelter.  
‘When I arrived in the car I was surrounded by 1000 people. They were all over me, 
begging “Save us! Save us!” with such despair that I stayed there for an hour trying 
to calm them down. There were lots of dead people, wounded children on the floor 
looking terrified – absolutely terrified – and we could hear the sound of mortar fire 
approaching.’ 
  Mendiluce’s impression that both Serbian paramilitaries and JNA units were taking 
part in the capture of Zvornik is confirmed by the accounts of Vojislav Seselj. He said that ‘ 
The Zvornik operation was planned in Belgrade.’  
‘The Bosnian Serb forces took part in it. But the special units and the best combat 
units came from this side [Serbia]. These were police units – the so-called Red Berets 
– special units of the Serbian Interior Ministry of Belgrade. The army engaged itself 
to a small degree – it gave artillery support where it was needed. The operation had 
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been prepared for a long time. It wasn’t carried out in any kind of nervous fashion. 
Everything was well-organized and implemented.’ (Silber and Little 1995: 247)  
More U.S. involvement? 
As the news about the atrocities of the Bosnian war reached the American public, the U.S. 
leadership started to change its policies towards the parties in the war. On 20 May the U.S. 
government withdrew its military attaché from Belgrade and ordered the Yugoslavian 
colleagues in the U.S. to leave the country, including closing the Yugoslavian consulates in 
New York and San Francisco. The Secretary of State, James Baker, spoke about a 
‘humanitarian nightmare’ in Bosnia which the world could not ignore. The indecision of the 
EC was referred to as ‘intolerable.’ On 24 May, during an international conference in Lisbon 
on aid for countries of the former Soviet Union, Baker issued an urgent appeal to the rest of 
the world to call for a halt to the bloodshed in Bosnia. Baker and diplomats close to him 
gave the impression that the US government was prepared to provide logistical support and 
air cover for humanitarian convoys, on the condition that other countries should be prepared 
to bear the greater part of the burden of such an international operation. At a press 
conference Baker made implicit references to the extermination of Jews during World War II 
when he spoke about ethnic cleansing. At the same time he also directed implicit accusations 
to the EC, or ‘those who were seeking reasons not to act’. Baker referred to figures like 2225 
deaths in Bosnia the previous month, 7600 wounded and 2500 missing. (The Washington 
Post 25 May1992). 
It is too far fetched for this dissertation to go into all the details of the further 
development of the war. So far the description should give an introduction and a background 
to the further process of negotiations and attempts at peace negotiations on behalf of the 
International Community.  
Since media played an important role in the war and is an important part of this 
thesis, I will give a more detailed description of an incident that is a good representation of 
the complications of the war in Bosnia, the so called Bread Queue Massacre in Sarajevo. 
The Bread Queue Massacre 
On 27 May in Sarajevo, almost as an answer to Baker’s speech, a mortar attack took place 
on a crowd of people queuing for bread. Eighteen people were killed and 160 were wounded. 
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When this was broadcast on western television only fragments of the footage were shown, 
western viewers were spared the details of severed body parts.  
But this bread queue massacre became a media issue. The Bosnian Serbs claimed that 
the attack was the work of Muslims, and actually Mc Kenzie, the Canadian Chief of Staff of 
UNPROFOR supported the view. This was the first major incident in the Bosnian war, 
which raised doubts as to whether the Bosnian Muslims had possibly fired on their own 
people.  Under the conditions, doubts were easy to throw out, truth was almost impossible to 
ascertain.  
The issue is extensively discussed in the Srebrenica report. According to military 
sources, Muslims repeatedly provoked fire from the Serb units, not only on military 
positions, but also on civilian targets, in order to mobilize international public opinion 
against the Serbs. Also considering Izetbegovic’s strong focus on obtaining American 
intervention, it would make sense to stage “Serb aggression” which in reality was Bosnian 
troops firing on so-called “friendly targets”.  
The aim would be to keep up the international attention on Sarajevo, to provoke an 
international intervention. Each time a lot of Bosnians were killed by a mortar in Sarajevo, 
Western governments asked the UN soldiers to do “crater analysis” to find out which side 
had fired bombs or mortars.  
It is interesting to observe the media coverage of the event. The American journalist Peter 
Maass covered the war in Bosnia for The Washington Post, and wrote: 
“Crater analysis” is not an exact science, and the UN soldiers had a hard time 
pinning the blame; the incoming direction of the shell could be determined, but not 
the precise position from which it was fired. If Karadzic denied responsibility, and if 
the United Natios could not prove scientifically that the Serbs were responsible, then 
we should hold off on punishing them, right? Right. Thankfully we have not always 
been so circumspect, and did not demand, during World War II that Winston 
Churchill provide proof that the bombs exploding in London were German rather 
than British. (Maass 1996: 161) 
Mark Thompson in the book “ Forging War” mentions the Bread Queue massacre in 
his description of the Serb newspaper Politika’s transformation from a prestigious, reliable 
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newspaper, to a strong mouthpiece for Serb nationalism as it developed in the Milosevic era.  
Thompson writes:  
How to deny with any plausibility the overwhelming likelihood that the Serb side had 
perpetrated this atrocity? The answer took a day to locate, maybe because it was so 
obvious; the enemy’s advantage had to be turned on its head. How could the Bosnian 
TV cameraman have filmed the effect of the mortar blasts unless the atrocity had 
been planned? Politika, on 28 May, led with top-level JNA and Bosnian Serb denials 
of Serb responsibility; no Bosnian government source or opinion was quoted.  
Thompson goes on, quoting Politika which refers to the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA:  
“SRNA has concluded that the massacre was stage-managed by Muslim militia and 
paramilitary units “, the article continued. “Most of the victims were Serbs, 
moreover, but in order to maximize the propaganda, Serb corpses were swiftly 
swapped for Croats and Muslims wounded earlier elsewhere in the city.” 
And finally: 
On 30 May Politika went further: “There is evidence that the Serb side was not 
responsible  for the massacre. However, no evidence was presented. The paper 
demanded an international inquiry. (Thompson 1999: 75&76) 
Mark Thompson’s account of the coverage of Serbian Radio-Television (RTS) is 
particularly intriguing, since RTS became the most notorious mouthpiece for the Milosevic 
regime. Up to the Bread Queue massacre RTS had never mentioned that Serb forces were 
bombarding Sarajevo. That is, RTS did not deny that a siege was taking place; it was just 
that it was turned upside down. Mark Thompson quotes an article in the magazine Vreme: 5 
                                              
5 Journalists from Vreme and the Belgrade newspaper, Borba, along with media researchers and social 
scientists, had closely monitored the evening news of RTS from the beginning of the outbreak of the war in 
Bosnia. (Thompson 1999:88) 
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“The Muslim authorities are holding Sarajevo under siege from within”, said 
reporter Dana Djokic, adding, “The Serb continue to defend their centuries-old  hills 
around Sarajevo.” (Thompson 1999: 88-90) 
According to Vreme magazine it was only until 31 May, a few hours before the UN Security 
Council imposed sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, that RTS admitted that Serb forces 
were bombarding Sarajevo. But still, the presentation was wrapped as a defence for this type 
of action, since “nobody can stop Serbia helping its people in Bosnia”, and the 
bombardments were part of the Serbs “struggles for freedom and self-determination”. At the 
same time, the “hysterical, methodical campaign by foreign media to Satanize Serbia and 
Slobodan Milosevic” was denounced. (Thompson 1999:90)  
The Bread Queue Massacre led to a trade embargo by the European Community 
against Serbia and Montenegro on 28 May. Two days later the UN Security Council passed 
the resolution 757 which imposed heavy sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro. Import and 
export, as well as transport to and from Serbia and Montenegro were forbidden. Financial 
transactions were forbidden, all scientific, cultural and sporting contacts were broken off and 
the level of diplomatic representation was drastically reduced.  
 
War and Western Diplomacy 
The Washington Agreement 
Overt hostilities between Croats and the Bosnian government ended after cease-fire 
negotiations in Washington in February-March 1994. This led to the signing of a loose 
Bosnian-Croatian federation. The so-called Washington Agreement became the first 
successful Bosnian initiative of the Clinton administration. The new U.S. negotiator, Charles 
Redman, meant that a key to the success of any diplomatic efforts would be to end the 
Muslim-Croat conflict. This conflict complicated all peace negotiations in two important 
ways. Firstly, having three rather than two parties made it a lot more difficult to reach a 
settlement. Secondly, the Muslim-Croat conflict had left the Serbs with a decisive military 
advantage and little incentive to concede territory during negotiations. The Washington 
Agreement managed to isolate the Serbs at the negotiating table. (Daalder 2000: 27).  
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At the beginning of 1994 the role of the UN was becoming gradually more difficult; 
the UNPROFOR was given the mandate to defend themselves, but only if they were 
attacked. 
The marketplace massacre 
On 5 February 1994 a grenade thrown at the Markale Marketplace in Sarajevo killed 68 
persons and wounded 200. Again the Serbs charged that the Muslims were responsible 
themselves, which has never been proven. However, the Marketplace –massacre created 
important international attention, and led to the UN Security Council ultimatum to the Serbs 
to withdraw their heavy weapons from Sarajevo and stop shelling the city. For 22 months the 
Serbs had been bombarding Sarajevo from the hills around the city, killing more than 10 000 
civilians, among them 1500 children. For the first time during the war, on February 28, 
NATO shot down four Serbian planes which were defying the no-fly zone over Bosnia. 
(Mønnesland 1999:301, Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997:212) 
Another important outcome of the Sarajevo ultimatum was the U.S. decision to 
become actively involved in the diplomatic negotiations over Bosnia. Up to then the United 
States had distanced itself from the European negotiation efforts on the basis that the 
territorial divisions of the European proposals legitimized ethnic cleansing. President Bill 
Clinton’s administration was more willing to engage the Bosnian government in discussions 
on the arrangements the Muslims reasonably could get out of any negotiations. (Daalder 
2000:26). 
The Contact Group Peace Plan 
In the summer of 1994, the newly formed Contact Group pressed for a peaceful solution. 
(The Contact Group consisted of representatives from the United States, Great Britain, 
France, Germany and Russia).6 The plan, which largely was based on the efforts of EU-UN-
negotiators David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, would mean a division of Bosnia where 
                                              
6 The Contact Group was formed in April 1994, mainly to ensure that Russia would be included in the 
negotiating process. But the arrangement also offered particular advantages for each of the members. For the 
Europeans, it was a way to ensure that the U.S. would not move to far ahead of the prevailing consensus. For 
the U.S., the Contact Group provided the possibility to avoid complex processes that would involve all EU 
members and the UN-system. At this stage the U.S. administration did not find the UN trustworthy any longer. 
For Russia, the group offered a way to confirm its strong international standing. (Daadler 2000:28). 
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49% of the territory would go to the Serbs, whereas 51 % was meant for the Muslims and 
the Croats. The plan was presented as an ultimatum, “accept it or beware of the 
consequences” was the slogan, under threats of bombardment of Bosnian Serb positions and 
annulment of the weapons’ embargo towards the Bosnian government (Nilsen 1996: 63).  
But by the deadline of the new peace plan on 19 July, the Bosnian Serbs refused to accept it.  
At this stage Slobodan Milosevic wanted the sanctions against Serbia lifted, and 
sealed the borders along the Drina river and cut off the lifeline between Serbia and 
Republika Srpska. Nevertheless, in August and September 1994 the Serbs conducted a wave 
of ethnic cleansing in Bijeljina, Rogatica and Banja Luka, and cut off the supply routes to 
the UN declared “safe areas” such as Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde, with the aim to starve 
the local population.   
Despite these advances, there were strong signs of fatigue among the Serb troops. 
This did not only apply to fuel and parts, but the morale of the infantry had dropped to an 
unprecedented low. Recruits to the army were more or less forced to fight. There are 
accounts of the military police in Republica Srpska catching people at home late at night, 
forcing them into vehicles parked in front of the house, and forcing them to sign a statement 
that they joined the army voluntarily. Those who refused to join the army were beaten, 
called deserters and sent to the trenches. (Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997:195).  
On the other hand, the Bosnian army made important advances during the summer of 
1994. Bosnian forces managed to recapture the strategically important area of Bihac from 
the renegade Bosnjak businessman and politician Fikret Abdic, forcing 30 000 of his 
supporters out of the area. The offensive spread from there to the Grabec plateau, and with 
the Croatian troops, the Bosnians recaptured the town of Kupres in central Bosnia forcing 
the Bosnian Serbs living in the areas to flee.  
Srebrenica – a turning point 
Realizing that further assaults from the Bosnian-Croatian Federation Army and that 
Republika Srpska was likely to suffer added losses, General Ratko Mladic mobilized his 
forces in July 1995 to secure what had been the war aim of the Serbian side from the 
beginning of the war – the continuous thirty-kilometre-wide band of territory along the 
western bank of the Drina river, including the “safe areas” of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde.  
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The advance towards Srebrenica started on 6 July, on 11 July they stopped two kilometres 
from the centre. The Bosnian troops withdrew from the town, abandoning the civilians. The 
civilians had divided into two large groups, one tried to escape into the Dutch battalion base 
in Potocari. However the peacekeepers in Potocari made it clear they could not protect the 
civilians. Instead, they were evacuated from the base overseen by Bosnian Serb authorities. 
On 12 July General Mladic arrived in Potocari with a TV crew and promised the Dutch 
representatives that the civilians would be treated fairly. Still he ordered all males above 
sixteen years of age to be separated from their families and taken to Bratunac, and 
afterwards to Karakaj where they were massacred.  
During the night between July 11-12 the other group of about 15 000, including 3500 
Bosnian army troops, tried to escape toward Tuzla through the forest, across rivers and 
minefields, carrying children and their old and feeble ones. In Bulje they were ambushed, 
and hundreds were killed. The group splintered into two and one group, mainly soldiers, 
reached Tuzla safely. The other was taken over by a number of ambushes. Some 
surrendered, assured by the Bosnian Serbs that nothing would happen to them. All of them 
were liquidated on the spot. (Udovicki and Stitkovac 1997: 196) 
According to the Srebrenica report, 7500 Bosnian Muslims went missing after the 
attack on Srebrenica, all of them most likely killed. At least six thousand of them were 
slaughtered in mass executions.  The report comments on the so called “safe areas” that they 
were in no way safe. The designed areas were not demilitarized, the surrounding Serbian 
troops had not withdrawn to a safe distance, and the peacekeeping force that was stationed in 
these enclaves was too small either for protection or defence. According to the report, the 
Safe Areas had less to do with the reality of Bosnia & Herzegovina than with the need to 
achieve a compromise in the Security Council. It also had to do with the wish to diminish the 
tension that had arisen between the United States and Europe over how to deal with the 
conflict. (http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/content_aanbiedingstoespraak.htm) 
The Serb forces (VRS) led by General Mladic turned their artillery on Zepa and the 
town was captured on July 25. 12 000 Muslims had to flee or were deported. Gorazde would 
be next in line.  By the end of July Croatian forces started  an offensive on Serb areas in 
Western Bosnia, and by 6 August Krajina and Western Slavonia is conquered, and 120 000 
Serbs leave the provinces. With a new grenade attack on the central market in Sarajevo, 
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killing 38 people and leaving 90 injured, the U.S. and the rest of  the international 
community said stop. On August 30 1995, NATO started bombing Serbian artillery posts, 
antiaircraft positions, ammunition depots and arms factories.  This weakened the VRS to the 
degree that the plan to attack Gorazde was abandoned. During August, September and 
October the Bosnian and Croatian army made advances which again redrew the map and 
reduced the areas the Serbs had conquered, actually advancing only 12 kilometres away 
from Banja Luka.  This created a new wave of refugees by the thousands, of Serb origin this 
time, riding whatever vehicle they could come across: trucks, overcrowded cars, horse-
drawn-carts and  tractors, trying to find refuge in Banja Luka and Omarska and further on to 
Serbia. Republika Srpska lost on the ground the territories it had refused to grant the 
Bosnian government around the negotiating table. Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic 
needed a peace plan to be able to keep what was left.  
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Chapter 2 
Change in international policy 
Bosnia becomes a key issue in American politics 
From the beginning of the 1990s the wars that resulted from the break-up of Yugoslavia had 
occupied a central space in U.S. foreign policy. But American policy was characterized by a 
deep fear to get too deeply involved. Neither the Bush nor the Clinton administration wanted 
to get drawn into what was seen as a likely quagmire. But by 1995 it was no longer possible 
to ignore the conflict in Bosnia from an American perspective. The Srebrenica massacre and 
the endless TV images of the horrors in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia became a too 
heavy load on the Clinton administration and the policy of containment had to end.  The 
question now was not whether, but how, the U.S. should get involved.  
From the outset of the violence in early 1991, the major Western powers had 
appealed to European institutions and the United Nations to deal with the problems in the 
multi-ethnic state in the heart of South-Eastern Europe. Still thinking that the end of the 
Cold War meant detente and peace, the international institutions sought to prove their 
relevance in the new world order. But all efforts at cease-fires, peace negotiations or mutual 
agreements of any kind were failing when conducted on behalf of the international 
institutions like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 
European Community (EC) or the United Nations (UN). The European Community had been 
able to negotiate an agreement to end the violence in Slovenia, but was not able to do the 
same thing in Croatia. The United Nations secured a fragile peace in Croatia and deployed 
more than 10 000 UN troops to supervise this truce. But the UN was not able to act in a 
preventive manner in Bosnia, which erupted in untold violence. Several thousand UN 
peacekeepers were sent to Bosnia to try to mitigate the worst humanitarian consequences of 
the war. NATO had pledged to conduct air strikes to defend the peacekeepers as well as the 
six isolated “safe areas” inhabited by the strongly weakened Muslim population. But the 
conflict between the UN and NATO over when and to which extent to use force effectively 
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prevented NATO’s possible deterrent effect and threatened the credibility of the military 
alliance.  
Many factors led to the collective failure of the international institutions in dealing with the 
disintegration of Bosnia.  
According to Daadler, the reasons for the policy change of the Clinton administration 
were to be found in the specific policy context the administration was facing.  Four 
developments led to the decision of the summer of 1995: (Daadler 2000: 119) 
- It was expected that UNPROFOR would collapse following the humiliation of the hostage 
crisis 
- Bosnia meant a threat to the vitality, if not continued viability of NATO. 
-The prospect of having to deploy U.S. troops both to rescue UN forces and to sustain the 
alliance’s credibility 
- There was a heavy pressure from the U.S. Congress to lift the arms embargo against 
Bosnia.  
- Last, but not least:  under girding all these reasons was the upcoming re-election campaign 
which would start just in a few months.  
The first issue relates to the hostage-taking of U.N. blue-helmet troops in May by 
Bosnian Serbs. The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 10 000 troops was meant to help out.  
According to the U.S. administration, as long as it was supposed to operate under UN  rules 
of engagement, which under the dictates of the UN secretary general and the chief civilian 
and military representative in the Balkans, put the safety of UN personnel ahead of the 
mission they were supposed to perform, the U.S. believed that the RRF also was forced to 
fail in its destined task.  
The second important factor contributing to the U.S. decision to engage in Bosnia 
was the need to defend NATO credibility. For more than three years the issue of what to do 
in Bosnia had divided the allies and put a strain on transatlantic relations. The issue had 
dominated every NATO meeting, but none had concluded on any consensus on how to 
proceed.  NATO’s failure to end a brutal war at its doorsteps had a profound impact both on 
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the alliance’s viability and the credibility of the United States. Several European leaders, 
headed by Jacques Chirac, questioned both the U.S. leadership of the alliance and NATO’s 
ability to safeguard European security.  
With the collapse of UN’s credibility in Bosnia and the future of NATO very much in 
doubt, during the summer of 1995 the Clinton administration faced the very unwelcome 
prospect of having to deploy 25 000 U.S. soldiers to fulfil the commitment of the allies to 
contribute to the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR if that was requested. But the idea of 
having to send American troops to Bosnia was not very welcome by officials in Washington. 
On the one hand U.S. officials were worried that the key assumption of U.S. policy – that 
troops should be deployed only to implement a peace agreement – could be changed as a 
result of a decision made by others rather than as a deliberate decision made by Washington. 
(Daalder 2000:164). 
Some argued that if U.S. troops were to go to Bosnia, it should be conducted by an 
effort to convince UNPROFOR to stay, no matter the inefficiency and lack of credibility the 
UN force had at that stage. The argument that president Clinton found the most persuasive 
was that if U.S. troops should go in, they should do so on U.S. terms and at a time and for 
reasons that were chosen by the Administration in Washington.  
Another factor that influenced the decision to become more fully engaged in Bosnia 
concerned the domestic context within which America’s Bosnia policy was being framed. In 
the three first years of the war, the American debate on the policy towards Bosnia had 
oscillated between arguments for both engagement and disengagement. Some found 
Washington’s inaction appalling, facing the policy of genocide performed by the Bosnian 
Serbs. Few argued for sending American ground troops, many favoured air strikes to support 
the Muslim forces and thought that the least that could be done would be to lift the arms 
embargo that deprived the Bosnian government of its right to self-defence. Again others 
underscored that this was a civil war among peoples who had fought each other for many 
years. Any interference from the outside would risk getting the United States into a 
quagmire like the one in Viet Nam. This group also argued that Bosnia basically was a 
European problem that had to be solved by Europeans.  
These arguments had been going back and forth for many months and years; by July 
1995 the group arguing in favour of doing something was increasing. With the horrifying 
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images emerging from Srebrenica, the U.S. Congress challenged the Clinton administration 
to change course by passing an overwhelming vote to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. 
The administration had long opposed a unilateral lift. It feared the precedence this would set 
in the UN Security council, of fear that it would allow Russia and perhaps France to abandon 
the critically important sanctions regime against Iraq. The administration also believed that 
such a step would precipitate the withdrawal of allied forces and force a choice between 
assisting the allies’ departure by deploying thousands of U.S. troops on the ground or having 
to abandon a solemn commitment to NATO.  
These four factors – the UN’s loss of credibility, the threat to NATO, the prospect of 
U.S. troop deployment, and the congressional vote on lifting the arms embargo – became 
evident during the summer of 1995 at the same time as the presidential campaign was about 
to start. It was likely that the opposite candidate would be the republican Senate majority 
leader Robert Dole, who for a long time had been a vociferous critic of the president’s 
Bosnia policy. (Daalder 2000: 165, 166).  
Daalder does not want to go as far as to suggest that the prospects of elections alone 
were what drove the administration to act, but it is clear that at this stage Bosnia represented 
a significant problem for the president. Clinton’s political future seemed to be dependent on 
the events in the Balkans. President Clinton had a powerful incentive to reduce Bosnia’s 
potential to disrupt his campaign. A prospect that was easier to talk about than to do 
something about. It seemed clear that the politically easiest way to get out of the problem 
was for America to wash its hands and blame the UN and the Europeans for the mess. But 
there was a well-founded fear that such an attitude would backfire, either because the war 
would intensify (with the television images of the horrors which accompanied it), or because 
the allies would insist that Washington fulfilled the commitment to assist in the UN’s 
withdrawal. On the other hand a decision to take a leadership role in Bosnia also implied 
grave risks; success would mean spending a lot of money and deploying thousands of 
American troops.  
Clinton decides to engage 
But in August 1995 President Clinton decided to engage in Bosnia.  
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In the shaping of the new policy two main actors emerged: the UN ambassador Madeleine 
Albright and the national security advisor at the time, W. Anthony (Tony) Lake.  
Madeleine Albright had at several occasions argued that America’s inability to 
address the Bosnia issue was putting at risk the credibility of the entire foreign policy of the 
administration. In a meeting of the foreign policy team in June 1995 she said: “When U.S. 
leadership is questioned in one area, it affects our leadership in others. French President 
Chirac’s recent statement that ‘the position of leader of the Free World is vacant’ has been 
chilling my heart for weeks. The strategy we have now makes the President look weak. We 
need to get ahead of the game.” (Albright 2003: 186) 
After the massacres of Srebrenica had become known at the White House, the Vice –
President had made an impassioned plea that the U.S. should not “acquiesce in genocide”. 
Madeleine Albright had argued the need to be firm with the allies. While she was thinking of 
earlier failures, she had insisted: “We need to tell them this is it”. Accompanied by a 
nodding President Bill Clinton she had said: “We need to press the French and British to go 
our way.” (Albright 2003:187) 
According to Madeleine Albright, three main factors ended the Bosnian war:  
The first was that the Bosnian Serbs were overreaching their capacity. For years they had 
been counting on the vacillation of the West, but they did not know when to say stop.  
The second factor was the changing military situation. In early August 1995 Croatia had 
launched an offensive to reclaim territory seized by the Serbs. This offensive was successful, 
and sent a message to the Bosnian Serbs that they were not invincible, and that they even in 
a crisis could not always count on the support from Milosevic.  
The third factor, according to Albright, was Bill Clinton’s willingness to lead.  (Albright 
2003: 189) 
In early August 1995 Madeleine Albright presented with Tony Lake a new so called 
“End Game” strategy for the U.S. Bosnian policy. She argued that U.S. troops would have to 
go to Bosnia sooner or later, and that it would make more sense to send them “on our terms 
and timetable”.(Albright 2003:189). She underscored that Europe had failed to resolve the 
crisis and, in the process, had diminished both NATO and the U.N. The U.S. reluctance to 
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take charge had weakened its own claim to leadership. She argued that the Bosnian Serbs 
should be forced to agree on reasonable terms or face a rollback of their military gains. If a 
negotiated settlement seemed difficult to gain, the U.S. should urge withdrawal of the UN 
mission and train and equip the Bosnian military behind a shield of NATO air power. 
At this decisive moment President Clinton spoke up in support for Madeleine 
Albright and Tony Lake, and said: “We should bust our ass to get a settlement within the 
next few months. We must commit to a unified Bosnia. And if we can’t get that at the 
bargaining table, we have to help the Bosnians on the battlefield.” (Albright 2003:190). The 
road to Dayton was being paved.  
The Long and Winding Road 
Richard Holbrooke was now on board as Assistant Secretary of State for Eureopan and 
Canadian Affairs. He was appointed chief negotiator and immediately started his well known 
shuttle diplomacy with his team of hand-picked U.S. diplomats and military advisors.  
The first step of the mission was interrupted by the tragic death of three of the team-
members in a car accident on the steep, narrow and dangerous road on Mount Igman on their 
way to Sarajevo, by Holbrooke designated “The Most Dangerous Road in Europe”. 
(Holbrooke 1999:7).  
New meetings in the Balkans were not resumed until August 30 1995, while  Bosnian 
Serb installations were being bombed by NATO airplanes in the operation named Deliberate 
Force.  
The first meeting was with Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade, who announced that he 
was to represent the Bosnian Serbs in the negotiations, after extensive negotiations with the 
leaders in Pale. He referred to the so-called “Patriarch Paper” which stated that Slobodan 
Milosevic was to lead the negotiations on behalf of Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia. It was 
called the Patriarch Paper because the meeting where it was agreed had been overlooked by 
the leader of the Serb Orthodox Church, Patriarch Pavle, who had also put his signature on 
it. Earlier the Americans had clearly expressed that they would not deal with the war crime 
indicted leaders Karadzic and Mladic. What is apparent from Holbrooke’s accounts from the 
meetings with Milosevic is that he had direct access to them, and could contact and discuss 
with them any time. The next important issue to discuss was the stop in the siege of 
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Sarajevo, which was agreed to directly with Mladic through a messenger from Milosevic on 
the conditions that the NATO bombing was stopped. Negotiations had started.  
The second important phase of the real negotiations was a meeting in Geneva where 
the foreign ministers of the three countries met with the negotiating team, representatives 
from the Contact Group and the EU representative at that time, the former Swedish foreign 
minister Carl Bildt. This was the first meeting where the three warring parties had met on a 
diplomatic level in more than two years. The meeting resulted in an agreement, the Joint 
Agreed Principles, approved by the representatives of the three parties.  
After new rounds of bombing, on 15 September 1995, finally an agreement is 
reached with the Serbs to lift the siege on Sarajevo, and on 21 September UN declared that 
the Serbs had withdrawn their heavy weapons from Sarajevo and the bombing is suspended. 
On 26 September an agreement is reached between the three parties on the future of Bosnia, 
which paved the way for further negotiations.  The signing of the Dayton Agreement was 
reached after 20 days of negotiations at the Wright –Patterson Air Base at Dayton, Ohio. The 
negotiating team with the involved partners – locked up until they reached an agreement, has 
in Holbrooke’s own words become a shorthand for a certain type of diplomacy – to do a 
“Dayton”. The ambitious goal of turning the cease fire into a permanent peace and gain an 
agreement for a multiethnic state, the agreement was reached on 21 November 1995, and 
made final in Paris on 14 December the same year, signed by the three presidents 
Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milseovic.  
The Dayton Peace Agreement 
The Dayton Peace Accords consisted of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and eleven annexes setting forth obligations by the parties and the 
international community to implement the agreement.  
The annexes of the text contained provisions dealing with military aspects of the peace 
settlement, regional stabilization, elections, human rights, refugees and displaced persons, 
and even a new constitution. The annexes also described the role and responsibility of 
international military and civilian agencies to assist in the implementation of the Accords’ 
provisions. The essence of the Accords was contained in the Contact Group Plan, and 
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reaffirmed in agreements on basic principles the parties had negotiated in September 1995. 
These included the following provisions:  
- Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to exist as a single state within its current, 
internationally recognized boundaries;  
- Bosnia will consist of two entities, The Muslim-Croat Federation and Republica 
Srpska, which respectively occupy 51 and 49 percent of Bosnia; 
- The central government will consist of a popularly elected three-member presidency 
and parliamentary assembly, which will reflect the multiethnic character of Bosnia 
and guarantee minority rights; 
- The central government will have authority over foreign relations and trade, customs, 
monetary policy immigration, international communications , and inter-entity 
transportation; 
- All powers not specified as belonging to the central government will be retained by 
the entities, including authority over defence and fiscal policy as well as the right to 
establish “parallel special relationships” with neighbouring countries so long as these 
are consistent with Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
- Refugees and internally displaced people have the right to return to their homes or to 
be compensated for their loss of property. 
(The Dayton Peace Accords, http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379, p1,2, 
Daalder 2000:137,1389) 
According to Holbrooke, the Dayton agreement was a good agreement – on paper. It ended 
the war and established a single, multiethnic country. “But countless peace agreements have 
survived only in history books as case studies in failed expectations. The results of the 
international effort to implement Dayton would determine its true place in history”. 
(Holbrooke 1999:335) 
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Chapter 3 
Press coverage as election discourse 
The material at hand 
The main material of this analysis is data collected during my stay in Sarajevo in the period 
from beginning of April to 1 October 1996. This was the period when the activities of the 
OSCE was fully focused on organising the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, often 
named the most complicated elections in history. To comply with the Dayton Peace Accords, 
the elections had to be held within six months after entry into force of the Agreement. If a 
delay would be necessary, no later than nine months after entry into force. Thus the election 
date was set to 14. September 1996, barely within the nine months’ deadline.  
During my period of stay I had a unique opportunity to study the development of the 
elections preparations at close range. At the same time from my position in the OSCE Press 
Office I also had the opportunity to get an overview of the media coverage of the elections. I 
had access both to local news (although translated) as well as international news such as 
satellite TV and clippings form international News Agencies and newspapers. I tried to 
collect in a more or less systematic manner all the material I could get related to press and 
press coverage during my six months stay. 7  
The material chosen for this thesis is a selection of articles from the International 
Herald Tribune. Because of the nature of the data I choose to use Discourse Analysis as 
method.  
The time lag since the event (the elections in 1996) makes interviews with any actors 
difficult. My personal situation has made it difficult to go back to Bosnia at a later stage to 
update my data and experience. Therefore I try to keep the 1996 experience as authentic as 
                                              
7  I was lucky to get it all transported to Norway by an NGO (Network for Peace) which organised bus-trips  going back 
and forth between Norway and Bosnia & Herzegovina for refugees who wanted to visit their country and see what the 
conditions were.  
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possible. I choose to use it as an example of a tendency in international and local media, 
which other researchers and observers have documented at a later stage: the context of the 
New World Order and the way it influences media of our times. (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 
2000) This World Order has since the break-up of the Soviet Union meant a unilateral 
system in the world where the U.S. is dominating and keeping control.  
For the purpose of establishing the contextual framework for my study,  I will take a 
closer look at the assumption that media plays a vital role in a democratic society, and  the 
following is a presentation of different theoretical aspects on this relationship, mainly based 
on descriptions of the role of the press in U.S. society, with emphasis on the particular 
characteristics of U.S. foreign news reporting.  
On the relationship between media and politics in a democratic society 
Elections as such are important elements of a democratic political process. A clear purpose 
of elections is to hold government officials accountable for their performance in office. But 
both elected and appointer government officials must be held accountable between elections 
as well. What role do the media play in that process? The way people come to respond to 
political communications and to perceive political leaders, institutions and issues, are clearly 
vital elements in how the political system works. How do communication through the media, 
in the form of news and public affairs as well as entertainment, affect people’s responses and 
perceptions?  Formerly people received information about politics, the government and 
political performance through the political parties and their own organisations and 
information channels. But the parties own ability to guide people’s political behaviour has 
declined heavily during the past 25 years. People also receive information through different 
interest groups that they belong to. But the mass media is the main source of information 
today for political information and impressions for most people. Even when the decisions are 
partly based on conversations with family and friends the media are often the indirect source 
of information. For the vast majority of the general public, there is a great physical and 
psychological distance from the world of political affairs. That distance between political 
actors and the public, during elections and between them, is bridged by the communications 
of the mass media. According to Walter Lippman, people respond to political matters on the 
basis of “the pictures in their heads of what the world is like / pictures that are largely 
selected and arranged by the media (as referred in Alger 1996: 8). The mass media are 
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increasingly the central way people develop their information on and impressions of 
candidates, government, and so on. According to Alger a democratic process implies two 
essential elements. First of all, democracy means that alternative choices are made available 
to the public. In the marketplace of ideas that constitute a democracy, the choice is at the 
core of the concept. Secondly, the public must have in its hands the information it takes to 
make political decisions in a meaningful fashion. If the public is intended to serve as the 
foundation of the democratic process and hence to indicate basic directions for government 
through their electoral choices and other political participation, then the people must have 
the information to be able to make such decisions in an adequate manner, and act on them in 
an appropriate fashion. This also implies that the people also have an adequate level of 
general education and the freedom to select the option they see most fit to serve their 
interests. (Alger 1996 p.9).  
Information and full access to it is a cardinal principle of a democratic system. 
According to Carl J.Friedrich “.Freedom of the press is considered a cornerstone of 
constitutional democracy”  and he continues “…the emergence of constitutional 
government, and in particular the crystallization of the systems of popular representation as 
we know them, are inextricably interwoven with the growth of the modern press. Without it 
constitutional government is unimaginable.” (Friedrich 1968 : 502 as quoted in Alger 1996 
:10). 
Friedrich even refers to Lincoln’s  Gettysburg address ‘ …that government of the 
people, by the people , for the people shall not perish from the earth’ calling it the most 
eloquent expression of the progressive spirit of democracy. ( Friedrich 1968 p.32 as referred 
in Alger 1996:10). 
According to Barber, democracy requires real, affirmative participation by the 
people. This participation is needed not only to ensure that government action is in 
accordance with the public’s wishes by also for creating and maintaining a harmoniously 
working community, which enables a democracy to sustain itself.  (Alger 1996: 11) 
How can ordinary citizens effectively exert their control of the politicians and how 
can they act to ensure the “government of the people and by the people”?  The answer leads 
to the amount of information the public must have to be able to make effective political 
choices.  
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“ ‘Freedom of the press’ …. is a civil liberty under law, logically justified for the specific 
purpose of …the development of an objectively informed or intellectually vigorous 
democracy” ( G.E.G Catlin 1962: 197, as quoted in Alger 1996:11) Dahl calls it 
“enlightened understanding” and notes some vital particulars essential to the basic principle 
of an informed public. According to him, this principle “makes it hard to justify procedures 
that would cutoff or suppress information which, were it available, might well cause citizens 
to arrive at a different decision [on a candidate or an issue] ; or that would give citizens 
much easier access than others to information of crucial importance.”  (Dahl 1989:112, as 
quoted in Alger 1996: 11).  
In today’s world the media’s role in providing adequate information for people is 
crucial. Particularly is this the case in the U.S. where the political parties have declined 
significantly as reliable sources of information to the public to enable them to make 
reasonable political choices.  
The public as such, e.g. society, is far more mobile and uprooted at this turn of the 
century as ever before. This is true all over the Western World, but applies particularly to the 
U.S. The economy is increasingly dominated by national and international corporations 
characterized by frequent job transfers, frequent changing of homes, constant travel etc. This 
means that a far higher percentage of the public does not keep stable, long-term social 
networks, which help share information on political matters and assist in its interpretation. 
Or to put it in Vance Packard’s words: the U.S. has become “a nation of strangers”, which 
again implies more dependence on the mass media for information and perspective. (Packard 
1972 as referred in Alger 1996:12).  
Another aspect of Western Society at the turn of the twentieth century is that larger, 
developed societies with the full scale of industrialization and urbanization have increasingly 
become mass societies. High mobility and rootlessness as mentioned above are key elements 
of these societies, as well as an “atomized” individual condition.  
And mass societies constitute a mass public, often far removed from the elites for 
whom a lot of the serious newspapers are published.  
According to Mc Nair, for instance the tabloidisation of news as a cultural expression 
of democratic development may reflect the interests and the priorities of the contemporary 
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mass public. A mass public sphere is by definition a populist public sphere in which 
commercial criteria plays a key role. Mc Nair refers to Hartley, who argues that popular 
newspapers can often play a subversive political role. His major example is from Great 
Britain, where the coverage of the royal family by the tabloid press somehow is pro 
democratic in all its cruelty. The portrayal of the royal family as humanly fallible and 
imperfect has roots back to journalism’s radical origin in the struggle against feudalism, 
even if the primary contemporary motivation for such coverage is economic competition ( 
Hartley 1996:201 as referred in Mc Nair 1998:116-117). In Britain the tabloids are often 
owned by foreigners who are not part of the British establishments, and have little or none 
respect for the traditional elite status or class. The position of some of the tabloids may be 
defined as subversive even by the most dogmatic Marxists. According to Mc Nair popular, 
populist journalist can be anti-establishment, as well as sexist, racist and homophobic. In the 
end popular journalism is a contradictory discourse, reflecting the reactionary content of 
popular attitudes as well as their anti establishment prejudices.  
Mc Nair underscores that journalism of this kind is a peculiar British phenomenon. 
According to Mc Nair the United States lack a truly ‘tabloid’ newspaper culture, and with it 
a democratizing irreverence towards elites. He refers Taylor, who remarks that the ‘..lesson 
from America is that, without the tabloids and their spirit of irreverence, the press becomes a 
bastion of conformity dedicated to lofty purposes understood only by the few, an instrument 
for and by the elite’ (Taylor 1991:18 as quoted in McNair 1998:118). 
More on media and politics 
Bernard Cohen has described three roles for the press related to foreign policy: observer, 
participant and catalyst (Cohen 1963 as referred in Davis 1992: 197). 
The press as observer: This is the most obvious role. The press observes and reports the 
event of the policymaking process. Theoretically, reporters stand at the elbows of 
policymakers and report what they observe. These reports are disseminated to all interested 
parties, e.g. other public officials, affected groups and individuals and the general public. As 
observers, the press serves as transmission belt conveying information from various 
participants, who do not communicate directly, in order to inform for future policy-making. 
This process is essential in a democracy where policy-making is a public enterprise and the 
participants include, at least at some level, the voters.  
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The press as participant: The role of the press as participant in a policy making process is 
fulfilled by serving as representative for the public, government watchdog or critic, advocate 
of certain policy positions and actual policymaker. Policymakers and the public may look at 
the press as the voice of public opinion. As watchdog or critic, the press participates by 
watching over policymakers and offering criticism. Since such criticism is heard and 
responded to, the press moves form observer to actual participant in the process. However, 
this role also involves a certain danger that the press might transcend the public’s 
expectations of press behavior towards public officials and lead to public resentment of the 
press’s intrusion.  
Another way the press may act as participant, is to actually advocate policy options. 
Although such advocacy, according to journalistic standards, is consigned to the editorial 
page, more subtle forms can occur in news reporting. Framing the issue in a certain way may 
be one form of position advocacy. The listing of available alternatives and the omission of 
others is another.  
The press as catalyst: News content brings issues to the foreground and affects the public’s 
issue agenda. It may also affect the public’s reactions to the same issues. Issues which 
otherwise have been ignored or minimized become emphasized in public debate.  
(Davis 1992: 198) 
Foreign affairs reporting in U.S. media 
In the field of foreign affairs reporting, Davis emphasizes that U.S. news media seem to be 
“following the flag”. This means that they report on foreign affairs in accordance with the 
priorities of the U.S. government. There is an overweight of coverage on Western European 
affairs, due to the close political and economic ties between the United States and the 
countries of Western Europe. Social customs and political institutions are more similar 
between these countries and the United States, and the ethnic background of most Americans 
is rooted in Western Europe. There is also a substantial coverage of the Middle East in U.S. 
media, due to the traditional close relationship to Israel and extensive involvement in its 
relationship to its neighboring Arab countries. Presently the heavy U.S. involvement in Iraq 
means that coverage of the Middle East has become the highest priority of U.S. foreign news 
coverage over a long period of time.  
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Generally, according to Davis, foreign affairs reporting is primarily and predictably 
coverage of U.S. foreign relations with other nations, and secondarily coverage of countries 
close to the United States such as the Western European nations, Israel and Canada. A third, 
and distinctively subordinate category is coverage of events which do not specifically affect 
the United States ad which occur in other countries than those listed above ( Davis 1992 : 
213). According to this, the coverage of the war, and particularly the peace and elections in 
Bosnia would probably fall under the first category, since the Dayton Peace Accords became 
such a high profiled endeavor for the Clinton administration.  
Davis points out that today the news media has capabilities of world wide reach, and 
international political leaders follow closely the American news. This means that the 
American press plays a role as conduit for information between nations. Davis says there is 
no explicit relation between government and newspapers in the United States. However, in 
foreign affairs reporting, the journalists who work for networks and elite publications 
attempt to discover and convey accurately the thinking of senior administration officials in 
order to boost their own organization’s credibility as a source of accurate news.  
Foreign policy-makers often use the highly credible status of the press with its access 
to large audiences, to communicate messages to foreign governments. This tool is especially 
useful when there are no other forms of communication. Am example is the Iran hostage 
crisis in 1979-1981. The communication between the U.S. government and the Iranian 
students holding the hostages in the U.S. embassy was occasionally conducted exclusively 
through the press. But the press can also become a vehicle for communication with foreign 
governments also in non-crisis situations. (Davis 1992:213)  
This way of using the press raises questions about the conduct of foreign policy. 
Does this role reduce the independence of the press? Does it imply that the press is failing to 
fulfill its role in American politics when concentrating on communicating U.S. government 
policy?  Davis suggests that journalists who follow the lead of the U.S. government may be 
failing its mission to serve the public. This practice may for instance lead to less coverage of 
administration embarrassments, and less critical and challenging reporting on policymakers.  
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First Amendment  
Any media institution in the United States will claim to abide by the First Amendment of the 
constitution, ratified on December 15, 1791 with nine other amendments, known as the “Bill 
of Rights”. The First Amendment reads:  
‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.’ (The Bill of Rights: A Transcription. 
www.archives.gov/national_archives_experience/charters/print_friendly.html )  
 
Thus freedom of press is considered an ideal, which the government should not 
interfere with under any circumstances. In the case of the owners of the International Herald 
Tribune, The New York Times and The Washington Post, tensions concerning the First 
Amendment have been many. The most outstanding examples are described in the following 
presentation. They include issues like the Pentagon Papers and Watergate, both leading to 
major embarrassment for the government, including that President Nixon had to leave office.   
 
 
 
The International Herald Tribune 
 
History 
The predecessor to the International Herald Tribune was the European edition of The New 
York Herald started by James Gordon Bennett in 1887. One of the philosophies of Bennett 
was that it is better to create the news yourself rather than hang around waiting for 
something to report. He had inherited a large fortune, so money was never a problem. While 
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editor of The New York Herald, in 1869 he sent Henry M. Stanley to find the aged 
Livingstone in the heart of Africa. Stanley was worried about the expense, but Bennett told 
him not to worry, and paid whatever the cost, with the very clear message: “Find him!” ( 
Robertson 1987:16). Bennett considered Paris a useful gathering post for news from all over 
the world: Africa, all over Europe, the Near East etc. The rapid technical developments after 
1850 which included transportation such as steamships and railroads, contributed to the 
decision to create an overseas newspaper. The industrialization also created a wealthy 
bourgeoisie that mingled freely with the aristocracy. Rapid and comfortable transportation 
combined with communication by cable created a truly cosmopolitan class. This wealthy, 
cosmopolitan class became the first readers of the overseas edition of the New York Herald. 
(Robertson 1987:18)  
Thus the paper gave a priority to serving this class, for instance through extensive 
reporting on fashionable resorts and hotels all over Europe. At the same time chic hotels and 
restaurants all advertised in the newspaper – advertising and reporting seemed to go hand in 
hand.  
Independence 
The Herald had an impact on the French press. It was a truly independent newspaper, 
reflecting only the views of the owner, himself being a member of the independent, 
cosmopolitan upper middle class that the newspaper served so well. In France the 
newspapers at the time would be owned by interest groups, political parties etc. The Herald 
was in the front line concerning the way it was edited: news were clearly separated from 
editorials and opinion. It was also in the avant-garde when it came to technicalities: nice 
paper, linotypes, photographic illustrations were used instead of drawings, which was the 
most common at the time.  
But what the newspaper did not do, was to analyze what was behind the sunny, 
golden era it described. Thus, the wealthy, cosmopolitan world described by the Herald 
collapsed with the outbreak of the First World War. The Herald survived because it became 
a different newspaper. The newspaper went on to serve Americans stranded in Europe at the 
outbreak of the war, and later American military that came to serve the Allied cause. The 
coming of the American army caused the newspaper to grow enormously. It provided the 
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army with a link to home at the same time as it informed about what was going on with the 
war (Robertson 1989: 109). James Gordon Bennett died in 1916 before the war was over. 
The new owner was Ogden Reid who bought the newspaper in 1924, with Laurence 
Hills as new editor in chief in Paris. Between 1924 and 1929 the circulation of the Herlad 
increased from 12000 to 39000. In 1934 the two American newspapers The Chicago Tribune 
and the New York Herald merged, and became The New York Herald Tribune, European 
Edition, and continued under that name until 1966. It was bought by the Washington Post, 
and a new merger happened in 1967, this time with the New York Times. The new name 
became: The International Herald Tribune, published with the New York Times and the 
Washington Post.  
Editorial policy 
In the thirties the old Herald was unabashedly Republican. At the elections in 1932 it 
supported Hoover against Roosevelt. This reflected the political preference of the mother 
paper, The New York Herald at the time (Robertson 1989:180). Just a few days before 
Germany invaded France in June 1940 the newspaper closed, and did not reappear until Dec 
22 1944.  
During the first years after 1945 it continued to be a very Paris-based newspaper, 
covering everything that happened in Paris in the world of fashion, food, restaurants, culture 
etc. But financial problems put the final end to the Paris Edition of the New York Herald.  It 
reappeared as The International Herald Tribune  (IHT) after the merger first with 
Washington Post then with the New York Times as mentioned above. (Robertson 1989: 353) 
Financially this solution became a success, by 1971 the circulation had risen to 120 
000. The editor now wanted to target the newspaper at the new transnational and 
multinational elites of the European Common Market, rather than at American tourists 
abroad.  
Liberal and Neutral? 
At the elections in 1964 there was a break of the Republican tradition of the paper since the 
front page was saying “We Choose Johnson” (Lyndon B. Johnson was elected). At the 
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elections in 1968 the newspaper prepared an extensive coverage of the elections as usual, but 
at the editorial level for the first time in its history: it did not endorse any of the candidates.  
A commentary made by the British columnist Clive Irving may express the position 
of the IHT in the later years: 
Because the IHT is edited neither as an American province in Europe nor with the blinkered 
vision of any one European national loyalty, it somehow places the world in a far better 
balance than any other paper I know. Though edited by Americans, it also sees America with 
unusual detachment and knowledge… Despite its weaknesses in financial and industrial 
coverage and in retaining an idiomatic American aura in its makeup this is one newspaper 
rescued from death and given an emergent market by luck, judgement and hardnosed 
commercial decisions owing nothing to ancient interest. What a lesson. (Robertson 
1989:393). 
With the technological development from the seventies and up to today the idea of a 
global newspaper became more feasible than ever. At the same time the competition in 
international editing has increased. Examples are the international edition of the Financial 
Times, the Economist’s international edition etc. This competition meant a lot of changes for 
the paper during the 1980ies. Computerized editing systems were installed with the 
continuous investments and updating it requires. Space for business and financial news has 
doubled, and a lot of material poured in from the parent papers the Washington Post and the 
New York Times. The paper continued the tradition set by Bennett – to separate objective 
news reporting from editorial opinion. These are pages that also give space to heavy 
criticism of U.S. policy. Neither criticism nor controversy over American institutions and 
politics is being downplayed. Contrasting points of views are to be found in the pages of the 
IHT. (Robertson 1989: 438) 
The role of the printed press today 
News is business, and media institutions have to survive financially. Throughout the 
twentieth century the competition in the media was enormous, and led to a lot of 
concentration of financial power. The competition from television and the world wide web  
has put an enormous pressure on the printed press, and only the financially most healthy 
have survived (see Herman & Chomsky, Brian Mc Nair). 
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The two owners of the International Herald Tribune in 1996, the New York Times 
and The Washington Post, have both survived the competition and emerged as financially 
very healthy companies. They both appear as large corporations in Fortune magazine’s list 
of the top 500 companies. For example in 1990, The New York Times had a ranking as 
number 227 on this list, whereas The Washington Post was ranked as number 269 of the 500 
top companies of the listing. (Emery & Emery 1992: 530) 
All of the articles selected for analysis for this thesis are written by journalists 
covering international news from the New York Times and Washington Post, and printed in 
the International Herald Tribune. It is therefore relevant to take a closer look at these two 
newspapers as part of the context for the analysis.  
According to the authors Emery and Emery of “The Press in America”, the New York 
Times and the Washington Post are considered the three most pre-eminent American 
newspapers in addition to The Los Angeles Times, called “the trio of highest quality”. 
(Emery & Emery 1992: 541). These authors underline that “the obligations of any 
newspaper to its community are to strive for honest and comprehensive coverage of the news 
and for courageous expression of editorial opinion in support of basic principles of human 
liberty and social progress. Those newspapers that have been the most consistent in 
fulfilling these obligations have been rewarded with public and professional acclaim. Other 
factors that have operated to give a newspaper greater professional recognition are the 
brilliance of its individual leadership and a longstanding publishing tradition.” (Emery & 
Emery 1992: 541) The authors point out that any American newspaper inherently is part of 
the power structure – community, regional and national. This is the structure that for the 
most part controls political, economic, military and social decision-making. This position 
makes it unlikely that these newspapers will fully challenge the structure they are a part of. 
Even though the top three newspapers mentioned cannot be expected to cause significant 
changes in society, they seem to be acting consistently on the side of the public good as that 
is generally defined, and they are therefore often honoured.  
The New York Times 
The New York Times was founded in 1851 and bought in 1896 by Adolph Ochs, the son of a 
German born Jew who had emigrated from Bavaria to Tennesse in 1845 (Diamond 1994: 
39). Since 1896 the newspaper has stayed in the family, and is till published by a descendant 
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of Ochs, today the publisher being Arthur Ochs Shultzberger jr.  The slogan of the late 
Adolph Ochs from 1896 still prevails as editorial policy for the newspaper: 
“To give the News Impartially without Fear or Favour Regardless of any Party, Sect or 
Interest involved.” 
(Salisbury 1980: ii) 8 
According to Emery & Emery the New York Times “has ranked first in all the polls, 
continuing to hold its place in the forefront of American journalism by maintaining the 
tradition of telling the news with completeness and integrity.”(Emery & Emery 1992:541). 
Internationally the Times was staunchly internationalist in outlook, but conservative 
in domestic affairs. Since 1960 it has supported Democratic presidential candidates, and is a 
vigorous defender of individual freedoms against reactionary attacks and illegal use of 
power. (Emery & Emery 1992: 543) 
The Pentagon Papers 
An important event in the history of the New York Times was the publishing of the so-called 
Pentagon Papers. On Sunday 12, 1971 the first report based on the Pentagon Papers was 
published, with the headline: Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study traces 3 decades of growing 
U.S. involvement. This started a series of articles that were based on a secret Pentagon study 
prepared between June 1967 and January 1969, named: “History of U.S. Decision Making 
Process on Vietnam Policy” Only fifteen copies of the study were made, and they were 
classified “top secret – sensitive”. It consisted of two-and-a-half million words bound in 
forty-seven volumes. The disclosure of the study is considered the one single largest 
disclosure of classified documents in the history of the United States. (Rudenstine 1996: 2) 
The reports in the Times caught President Richard Nixon and his aides completely 
off guard, and with a few exceptions, neither Nixon nor his aides seemed to know of the 
existence of the Pentagon papers. President Nixon asked the courts to enjoin the Times from 
publishing further reports from the Pentagon Papers. This was the first time since the 
                                              
8 Today the slogan printed on the first page of the paper is “All the News That’s Fit to Print” (NYT, February 24. 2005, 
p.1) 
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adoption of the U.S. Constitution that the federal government had sued the press to stop it 
from publishing information because of national security.  (Rudenstine 1996:2). The court 
order to enjoin further publication because of national security was the first ever in U.S. 
history. The week after The Washington Post had gotten hold of the Pentagon Papers and 
started to publish parts of the classified history. This forced the government to file a second 
lawsuit, in Washington D.C. this time. Although the judge presiding the case in the New 
York District Court, Murray I.Gurfein was appointed by the Nixon administration, and at the 
start of the case questioned the patriotism of the Times, ended up by denying the 
government’s request for an injunction, concluding that there were no “sharp clash“ between 
the government’s legitimate interest in keeping some defence information confidential and 
the New York Time’s right to publish. In his opinion he also wrote that security is not “at the 
ramparts alone. A secure nation requires a free press, even one that is ‘cantankerous’, 
‘obstinate’ and ‘ubiquitous’.”(Rudenstine1996:3). The district court in Washington D.C. 
reached the same conclusion concerning the Washington Post, and both cases were appealed 
to the Supreme Court. On June 30, only 15 days after the first court case against the NYT, 
the Supreme Court denied the government their demand for injunction, and the two 
newspapers were free to publish the reports.  
This Supreme Court decision is considered very important because the government 
lost its first effort to restrain the press.  
Immediately following the Supreme Court decision, The New York Times and The 
Washington Post resumed publication of the Pentagon Paper.  
The publication of the Pentagon Papers had an impact internally in the Democratic 
Party, and it increased the public’s distrust of the national government, particularly the 
executive branch. This is a distrust that has deepened further over the years. 
Ultimately the episode had a devastating impact on the Nixon administration. The 
dispute was used for all it was worth by Nixon as a means to strike at all those he considered 
political enemies, to intimidate the press, to divide the Democrats and strengthen his own re-
election bid. The Supreme Court decision intensified his feeling that his administration 
needed badly to protect itself from those he believed were conspiring to undermine his 
capacity to govern. With his top aides, particularly Henry Kissinger, he created an 
atmosphere of crisis. In this atmosphere the so-called Plumbers Unit was created, which 
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eventually led to the Watergate break-in and all the following cover-up events. When the 
burglary and the cover-up became public, they led to the eventual undermining of Nixon’s 
political support, forcing him to resign the presidency in august 1974. Thus the Pentagon 
Papers affair led to the unravelling and final disintegration of the Nixon presidency. 
(Rudenstine 1996:5,6) 
According to Rudenstine the Pentagon Papers case was crucible to testing the strength 
and resilience of many of the elements that are critical in a democratic order, revealing how 
two important institutions play a vital role in a democracy without being directly 
accountable from a political perspective: the press and the courts. (Rudenstine 1996: 6)  
The Washington Post 
It is also appropriate to put in a few lines about the other owner of the IHT at the time, the 
prestigious Washington Post. Stilson Hutchins founded it in 1877 as a Democratic 
newspaper. (Roberts 1989:1) From the start it was an instant success, among others because 
it provided close and inside reports from the political life of the capital city, and created a 
readership far beyond the local Washington DC area. From 1989 until 1933 when Eugene 
Meyer bought it at a bankruptcy sale, the newspaper had many owners and had deteriorated 
both economically and editorially. (Like the founder of the New York Times, Adolph Ochs, 
Meyer’s parents were immigrants from Europe of Jewish origin).  
Meyer’s period of ownership (1933-1946) coincided with the New Deal politics of 
President F.D. Roosevelt. It was said of Meyer that he had managed to rescue, revive and 
revitalize the Washington Post by giving it the priceless ingredients of success: “integrity, 
decency and powerful idealism” (Roberts 1989:254). 
The paper was known for its internationalist outlook from the start, and was also 
known for its liberal stance through outspoken and early criticism of Wisconsin Senator 
Joseph R. Mc Carthy in his efforts to arouse anti-communist hysteria.  
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Under the leadership of Katharine Graham who took over the Washington Post 
Company in 1963 (after the owner, her husband Philip L. Graham committed suicide)9 the 
newspaper continued this liberal stance.  
Philip Graham developed a very close relationship to the Kennedy administration. 
According to Roberts this was one of the reasons why the Washington Post’s coverage of the 
Viet Nam war was very slow in developing an independent position. From the beginning of 
the involvement in 1962, the newspaper supported the Viet Nam venture (Roberts 1989: 
351). According to Roberts the close relationship resulted in a “far less critical reporting and 
editorializing than should have been the role of the Capital’s leading newspaper”(Roberts: 
1989: 361).  A Saigon bureau was opened in 1964, but it was not until the end of 1965 that 
any editorials appeared doubting the war.  Katherine Graham who had taken over as director 
in 1963,  admitted that The Post supported Lyndon B. Johnson’s Viet Nam policies a lot 
longer than any other newspaper in the country (Roberts 1989:386). But during 1966-67 the 
tide turned. As a result,  President Johnson had become very angry with Mrs. Graham 
because of the way both The Washington Post and Newsweek (which the Post had bought in 
1966) covered the Viet Nam war. Thus the old ties of friendship with the White House were 
gradually broken (Roberts 1989:392).  
In the 1970s the Washington Post received a lot of attention because of the Watergate 
Crisis, when the publishers and the chief editors fully supported the investigative reporting 
of Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, despite the threats of reprisals from the Nixon 
administration. The affair gave the paper a Pulitzer gold medal and much prestige, while 
Nixon had to resign. 
An important aspect of the growth of the circulation of the Washington Post was the  
intensive coverage of Washington politics. The paper favoured democratic presidential 
candidates regularly, and endorsed Walter Mondale in 1984, after opposing much of the 
Reagan administration’s program.  
                                              
9 Katharine was the daughter of Eugene Meyer who had bought the newspaper in 1933. Katharine Graham’s son Donald 
was named publisher in 1979, and took over the entire Washington Post Company in 1991. The company’s assets include 
several television stations, Newsweek magazine, a local newspaper in Everett, an interest in a news service with the Los 
Angeles Times, and until 2002 a third interest in the International Herald Tribune.  
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Bob Woodward became assistant managing editor and led the Washington Post’s 
investigation of the Iran arms sales scandal in 1986, which revealed diversion of funds to 
support the Contras in their effort to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. The 
Washington Post is considered the liberal intellectual newspaper of today. (Emery & Emery 
1992:545-546)  
            The aim of this presentation of the International Herald Tribune with its origins and 
influential owners has been to give a thorough background for the analysis of the texts 
presented from this newspaper.  The presentation of the newspaper, its owners and their 
intentions with their journalism is an important part of the context for my analysis of the 
coverage of the election in Bosnia.  
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Chapter 4 
On Discourse Analysis 
Some theorietical considerations 
I have chosen to study newspaper texts about a specific issue in a Foreign Relations debate, 
e.g. the debate about the first elections in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Accords were 
signed on November 21 1995.  Discourse Analysis is chosen  as the method for analysis of 
the texts, and the following is a presentation of different aspects of Discourse Analysis, as 
different authors see it both as theory and method.  
According to Hagelund, there is no set way to do discourse analysis. This method of 
analysis consists of a whole set of multidisciplinary approaches which are practiced in 
different ways. As a general term, “discourse analysis “ (DA) can be seen as a general stance 
towards what has been termed the “linguistics, poststructuralist or post-modern ‘turn’ in the 
social sciences” (Hagelund 2003:45). 
To make an analysis possible, Hagelund decided to use concepts and ideas from 
different parts of the literature on discourse, based on what would be useful for the analysis 
of her material, the Norwegian political debate on immigration (Hagelund:2004). 
She sums up her approach to DA in three main points: 
- The importance of being serious about the capacity of language to constitute reality.  
DA involves that the attention for the scope of analysis is directed towards linguistic 
practices and the capacity of these practices to produce certain versions of reality.  
The point of departure for doing discourse analysis evolves around the notion that 
oral and written text is important – also in a sociological context. Both oral and 
written texts show people’s involvement in shaping the world they are talking and 
writing about. It also acknowledges that because we express our experience of the 
world through language, is it impossible to maintain a clear distinction between the 
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world and the language within the language. To many this talk about reality being 
constructed through discourse seems like vague and misty ideas far removed from 
the existence of the physical world. Hagelund finds Potter convincing in his 
arguments for how we all use rhetoric to convince others. (Potter 1996). 
Potter argues that as language users, we all make descriptions. One way of thinking 
about representations is that they more or less reflect something else – mental concepts or 
external realities. Potter presents representations as building sites. 
In the first place because representations launch versions of reality, and that it is 
through a number of such representations that reality appears. Secondly because the 
representations are constructions in themselves, composed of different components and 
rhetoric grasps.  
Representations are action oriented; they are formulated to make something happen. 
At the same time they are epistemologically oriented, they are constructed in such a manner 
that they can be understood and treated as factual representations of reality.  
Different types of discourse analysts approach linguistic construction of reality in different 
ways and from different levels of abstraction.  
For my study of journalistic texts, the focus of analysis is the way they present themselves 
as descriptions of reality, as objective representations of American Policies towards Bosnia 
and the way they argue for the need to keep the deadline of the elections or not.  
Hagelund admits that discourse analyses are difficult to do in concrete empirical 
work; they tend to concentrate on the purely discursive aspects of the analysis. According 
to her,  this implies  a challenge for future analyses: 
 -    Understanding how the production of meaning happens.  
Recognising the difficulty in doing DA as one method.  People work with very 
different types of data under the umbrella of DA. A wide variety of analyses are 
used, including linguistic analysis of sentences, conversation analysis, extensive 
historical analyses. The literature offers different ways of studying how meaning is 
constituted through language, e.g. linguistic ways to construct different versions of 
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reality. Opinions differ as to whether a discourse analysis should be based on one 
approach or if it is legitimate to mix and match different approaches.  
- Being the storyteller – and being conscious of it. 
If the point of departure is that linguistic practices contributes to construct the reality 
they are a part of, this should also apply to the texts produced by the person doing the 
discourse analysis. The fact that it is difficult to draw a clear line between language and 
reality is something the analyst will have to deal with in his/hers own text.  
Neumann points out that discourse analysis as method for social studies should be 
given more space than the case is today. He says that a new literature on method is needed, 
exactly because we need a variety of ways to work scientifically. We just have to accept the 
uncertainty, which is immanent in questioning the difference between reality understood as a 
physical given reality and reality understood as social representation, and also let the tension 
which surrounds this difference undergo scientific research. Discourse analysis is then one 
of several alternatives for those who want to make this their empirical field of research, and 
this should again lead to throwing new light on the assumptions and conditions which 
always are part of political practices. Knowing these assumptions and conditions will lead us 
to a deeper understanding of specific political actions (Neumann 2003:15). 
What is Discourse? 
Neumann looks for the meaning of the term in different dictionaries, where most of the 
definitions will have linguistic meanings. For the purposes of analysing discourse from the 
point of view of the social sciences, Neumann chooses other definitions. Fredrik Barth for 
instance, defines discourse: “ a process reflecting a distribution of knowledge, authority, and 
social relationships, which propels those enrolled in it” (Barth 1993:173 according to 
Neumann 2001:17). 
Foucault who calls it ”Practices that systematically form the objects of which they 
speak ” 
 ( Foucault 1972:49 according to Neumann 2001:17). 
Pecheux has another: A discourse as a particular area of language use may be 
identified by the institutions to which it relates and by the position from which it comes and 
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which it marks out for the speaker. The position does not exist by itself, however. Indeed, it 
may be understood as a standpoint taken up by the discourse through its relation to another, 
ultimately an opposing discourse. (Cited in Macdonnel 1986:3 according toNeumann 
2003:17)  
In other words, definitions of “Discourse” seem to change with time and place. So 
Neumann makes the following summary, which may also serve my purposes:  ‘A discourse 
is a system for generating a set of statements and practices which, through inscription into 
institutions and appearing as more or less normal, have a  constituting function of the 
reality of their bearers and have a certain degree of regularity in a set of social relations.’ 
(Neumann 2001:18, translated by author). 
The material from Bosnia consists only of material, which is written and has been 
printed. These texts are clippings from newspapers and news agency reports. They differ in 
genre, they may be: news reports, commentaries, editorial articles etc., but all of the articles 
can be defined within the framework of news. News in the press represents a type of 
discourse that is written, planned and fixed in a specific manner. The focus of the discourse 
analysis will concentrate on theories and styles of analysis, which account for the structures 
of written texts. This means that the analysis exclude for instance conversation analysis and 
analysis of visual and oral news as they appear in TV and radio.   
News as Discourse  
According to Van Dijk, news reports should be analysed as a particular type of discourse, as 
opposed to the prevailing influence in the social sciences in the study of mass 
communication, where the focus has been more or less exclusively on the economic, 
political, social or psychological aspects of news processes. News reports should be 
accounted for in their own right, e.g. as particular types of language use or text and as 
specific kinds of sociocultural practice (Van Dijk 1988:1,2).  
Most of the articles analyzed for this thesis are news reports. News reports are 
composed and structured in specific manners, and hence the analysis should take into 
consideration these specifics.  
Van Dijk sees discourse, in a wider sense, as a complex unit of linguistic form, 
meaning and action that can be included in the notion of a communicative event or a 
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communicative act. This concept means that discourse, unlike more intuitive and linguistic 
approaches, is not limited to the actual verbal utterance,  that is to the text or dialogue itself. 
Particularly for the analysis of talk, it is obvious that the speaker and the person listening, 
including their personal and social properties and other aspects of the social situation belong 
to this event.  According to this, a conversation, a trial in a courtroom, a classroom can all be 
examples of complex communicative events. These events may again be divided into smaller 
communicative acts: there could be a story within a conversation, the attorney’s presentation 
in the courtroom, an explanation of a particular subject by the school teacher. Some of these, 
for example stories and argumentations, may exhibit properties similar to communicative 
acts or discourse types of other social settings.  
This interactional nature of discourse is less obvious in written or printed discourse: 
the writer, the text and the reader are not participating in a simultaneously identifiable 
situation. Still, it may be appropriate to account for texts in the more dynamic terminology 
of discourse use in production, understanding and action. Empirically we speak of meanings 
expressed by or produced with the utterance, of publication of a text by a writer, or of 
meanings that are assigned to or inferred from a text by a reader. (Van Dijk1988:9).  
These are characteristics which also apply to news discourse. News reports  can be 
studied as a specific type of public discourse. But they should be analyzed as “the result of 
cognitive and social processes of discourse and meaning production by journalists, or as 
related to the interpretation processes and media uses by newspaper readers or TV viewers”. 
(Van Dijk 1988:9).  
News reports also are characterized by specific ways of grammatical use, depending 
on the type of media they represent. There is a difference between the use of language and 
grammar in reports found in for instance Rupert Murdoch’s popular press and the more 
serious newspapers like for instance The New York Times, Washington Post etc. The former 
will tend to use short sentences, a vocabulary based on everyday speech, “pub language”  
and simple grammatical structures. The latter, in Van Dijk’s terms called “quality press”, 
will tend to have long, complex sentences and many nominalizations, (disruption in stead of 
they disrupted for instance). The formal jargon will be borrowed mostly form politicians.  
The syntax of news reports is influenced by the principle to present the actual news 
as the most important, which is a regular, structural property of news reports.  Instead of 
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saying: “Reliable sources declared that Iraq has been attacked by the US Air Force”, a news 
report would use a sentence more like: “Iraq has been attacked by the US Air Force, reliable 
sources declared”.  
According to Van Dijk may an analysis of the grammatical use of language in the 
press  reveal the perspective of the journalist or the newspaper. Sentence syntax expresses 
the semantic roles of participants in en event by word order, relational functions (subject, 
object) or the use of active and passive forms. Van Dijk analyses the headline:  
“Police kills demonstrator”. The police is mentioned first in a subject position, and 
expresses that the police has the role of “agent”.  
The sentence can also be as follows:  “Demonstrator killed by police”. Here,  the police is 
also an agent, but the demonstrator is here in first, subject position, and the police has a less 
prominent role.  
A third version: “Demonstrator killed” may take the role of the police implicit, at the 
same time as the headline becomes syntactically ambiguous: the event described  can be 
interpreted as to believe that the demonstrator was the killer and  associate demonstrators 
with killing. Van Dijk refers research that shows that negative roles of the elite tend to be 
dissimulated by this kind of syntactic downgrading and implicitness.  
The analysis of discourse should include a study of structures of sequences of 
sentences. This means, that the syntax or semantics of a sentence in discourse is described in 
terms of the sentential structures and interpretations of surrounding, usually preceding 
sentences in the same text. The order and function of words, or their underlying semantic 
role, may depend on such a discourse environment. The ideological point of view can be 
expressed not only by sentence structures but also by a textual dependence of syntax and 
semantics.  
The analysis of discourse as a sequence of sentences provides an account of relative 
interpretations: The meaning or reference of words, clauses or sentences is studied as a 
function of those assigned to previous sentences. This aspect of discourse is often described 
in terms of local or sequential coherence. A basic rule of coherence is that sentence A is 
coherent to sentence B. For instance a sentence: “ It was raining yesterday. We did not go 
out” is coherent.  When it is raining; it is wise to stay inside to avoid getting wet. Whereas 
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the sentence: “It was raining yesterday. The interest rate of mortgages has risen by 10%” 
lacks coherence. The rainfall is not likely to influence the mortgage rate. A text is coherent  
if it describes a possible sequence of events. Coherence depends on our knowledge and 
beliefs, what we think is possible in the world.  
Knowledge and interpretation 
But it is not enough just to know the lexical meanings of words and their combinations. 
Knowledge of the world, and hence, a cognitive and social analysis of what people in a 
given culture know, and how such knowledge is used in the interpretation of discourse in 
general, and how it is used in establishing coherence in particular. Research in cognitive 
psychology and Artificial Intelligence has developed more knowledge about this and its 
effect on discourse interpretation. For instance research revealed that knowledge is 
organized in special clusters, so-called scripts, which contain all we know in our culture 
about a specific stereotypical type of episode. And the media rely heavily on socially shared 
knowledge and beliefs in the coherent and comprehensible account of special events that 
require knowledge or beliefs organized in scripts. These can contain topics such as civil war, 
terrorist attack, political meeting or voting.  
Many political scripts involve group-based evaluative beliefs or opinions; they may 
also qualify as social attitudes.  
“… Our subjective understanding of the coherence of a news report may depend on whether 
or not we share a particular knowledge script or socio-political attitude. This may be 
especially relevant in the understanding and evaluation of causes of events and reasons for 
action. With this kind of conceptual instrument, we are better equipped to study 
ideologically based differences in the relevant application of scripts or attitudes in news 
reporting when, for instance, reasons are given for the invasion of Grenada by U.S. troops  
as compared to their non-intervention in other countries in the Americas, such as Chile or 
Paraguay (Van Dijk1988:13). 
Macrostructure 
A semantic macrostructure makes explicit the overall topics or theme of a text and at the 
same time defines what could be called the overall coherence of at text. 
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 “Macrostructures are derived from sentence meanings (propositions) of a text by a set of 
rules in an abstract, linguistic theory, by operations such as selection, generalization and 
construction. In a cognitive theory of discourse processing, these rules operate as tentative 
but effective macrostrategies that enable readers to derive the topic from a sequence of 
sentences.” (Van Dijk 1988:13) 
To be able to do these operations, we depend heavily on our knowledge of the world 
(described as scripts above). For example the following proposition sequence: “U.S. planes 
flew to Iraq. They bombed Basra”. The macroproposition here is “The U.S. attacked Iraq”. 
We know that military attacks involve planes, that planes usually can fly and throw bombs, 
and throwing bombs is a way of attacking. Because we have a shared script of a military 
attack, we are able to comprehend newspaper reports about such attacks.  
Such macrostructures and the cognitive operations in which they are used, are crucial 
to news production processes by reporters and editors and for comprehension, storage, 
memorization and later reproduction by media users. Such macrostructures explain how 
newsmakers continuously and routinely summarize the myriad of source texts (other media 
messages, wires, interviews, reports or press conferences) that are used in the production of 
a specific news report. The theory of macrostructures helps us account for the special 
properties of headlines and leads, which subjectively summarize the rest of the news report. 
Macrostructures also explain why readers usually only remember the main topes, that is, the 
highest level of the macrostructure of the news report. (Van Dijk 1988: 14).  
To be able to organize the overall meaning or macrostructure of a text as a whole, we 
need a schematic superstructure. According to Van Dijk, such a schema can be defined by a 
set of characteristic categories and by a set of rules or strategies that specify the ordering of 
these categories. In this way, people in our culture share a narrative schema – featuring 
categories such as Summary, Setting, Orientation, Complication, Resolution, Evaluation and 
Coda. If one of the obligatory categories is lacking, people can conclude that the story is not 
finished, has no point, or simply is not story at all. According to Van Dijk, experimental 
research has shown that it is very difficult for language users to interpret and establish 
coherence only at the micro level, and construct ad hoc higher levels, in settings where there 
is no macrostructures and superstructures.  
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This means that global structures, both those of thematic content as well as those of 
schematic form, are crucial for theoretical analysis and for the actual production and 
understanding of a text. Such a schema must also produce news reports.  Part of the news 
may have conventional functions that are used as obligatory or optional categories for its 
formal organization. For instance is it well known that there is a Summary category 
composed of Headlines and Lead.  The body of the texts is also divided into schematic 
functions such as Main Events, Backgrounds, Context, History, Verbal Reactions or 
Comments. A special feature of news reports is that both macrostructures (topics) as well as 
the news schema that organizes them do not appear in the text in a continuous fashion. They 
seam to appear in an instalment-type, discontinuous way. The top of the macrostructure of a 
news report generally tends to be expressed first like this: first the headline (the highest 
macroproposition), then the Lead (the top of the macrostructure), and subsequently the lower 
macropropositions of the report, with details of content and the less prominent schematic 
categories towards the end.  For the reader this means that the beginning of the text always 
contains the most important information. There is a significant link between news text 
structures and the strategies of news production and the uses of news reports in mass 
communications context. This is most obvious in news reports in the press, but more 
generally also holds for television news programs, which usually only express the higher-
level macrostructures of a news story.  
Since news reports are derived from a text on the basis of our knowledge and beliefs, 
they may of course be intersubjective: the most important information of a news event for 
one person or group may not be so for another. For instance a news report may be biased: 
unimportant pieces of information may be expressed in the headlines or lead, and important 
information may be placed at the end or omitted all together. (Van Dijk 1988:15-16). 
 74 
News Report Structure 
The general principle of the structure of a news report is that important information must 
come first. This does not only affect the overall thematic or schematic organization of the 
news report, but also the ordering of the sentences in paragraphs describing an episode and 
the ordering within the sentences themselves. This special dimension of relevance 
structuring may be studied at all levels.  
Whereas relevance structuring expresses or signals what is most important, various 
special operations at each level are used to make the text more persuasive. This may be 
phonological operations such as rhyme or assonance, syntactic operations such as 
parallelism, and semantic operations such as comparisons or metaphors. They may use 
words that function as hyperboles (exaggerations, overstatements) or understatements. There 
may be words and sentence meanings that establish contrast or build a climax. These 
structures further contribute to a tighter organization of news information and thus may lead 
to better memorization by the reader and hence to enhanced persuasion. They may also 
activate particular scripts or attitudes, for instance when a demonstration is rhetorically 
framed in terms of violence and the use of comparisons or metaphors borrowed from 
military scripts (attack, defence etc). 
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Critical Discourse Analysis 
For an analysis of the coverage of the preparations for and the elections in Bosnia in 1996 it 
will be useful to make an attempt at an analysis within the framework of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA). The best-known contribution to Critical Discourse Analysis is Norman 
Fairclough. But according to Jørgensen and Phillips (1999: 73) there are several contributors 
to the development of Critical Discourse Analysis. Based on characteristics developed by 
Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271) CDA offers theories and methods in order to pose 
problems and empirically investigate the relationship between discourse practice and social 
and cultural developments in different social contexts (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 72).  
Jørgensen and Phillips suggest five common characteristics among CDA 
contributions that enable us to identify them as belonging to a specific trend of research.  
1. Social and cultural processes and structures share a linguist-discursive character.  
Discursive practices are seen as important forms of social practices that contribute to 
constitute the social world (including social identities and social relations). Social and 
cultural reproduction and change happen partly through discursive practice at an everyday 
level ( through production of texts and consumption processes). The aim of CDA is to show 
the linguist-discursive dimension of social and cultural phenomena and processes of change 
in late modernity.  A diverse number of topics have been subject of discourse analysis: 
studies of organisations, pedagogic, topics in the field of mass-communication and racism, 
nationalism and identity, mass-communication and economy, mass-communication – 
democracy and politics.  
2. Discourse is both constituting and constituted.  
To critical discourse analysts discourse is an important form of social practice that both 
constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices. As social practice 
discourse is in a dialectic relationship to other social practices. Fairclough analyses how the 
discursive practices of the media contribute to create new forms of politics. The analysis 
implies that discursive practices are influenced by forces in society which do not only have a 
discursive character (for instance the structure of the political system or the institutional 
structure of the media). This comprehension of discourse separates the field from more post 
structural contributions, for instance the discourse theories of Laclau and Moffe, who see 
 76 
discourse exclusively as constituting. In CDA, language as discourse is seen both as a type 
of action that implies a possibility to change the world, as well as a type of action within a 
social and historical context, and which is in a dialectic relationship to other aspects of the 
social world.  
3. Language usage should be analysed empirically in its social context.  
CDA does concrete linguistic text analysis of language usage in social interaction. In this 
sense it differs from the discourse theories of Laclau and Mouffe  who do not make 
empirical studies of language usage.  
4. Discourse has an ideological function 
CDA claims that discursive practices contribute to create and reproduce power relations 
between social groups – for instance between classes, men and women, ethnic minorities and 
the majority. These effects are considered ideological effects. CDA is focusing its research 
both on discursive practices that construct worldviews, social subjects, social relations 
including power relations. It is also focusing on the role these discursive constructions play 
in forwarding the interest of specific social groups. The critical aspect of CDA appears as it 
considers it an important task to reveal the way discursive practice maintains the social 
world, including distinctive power relationships.  
5. Critical research 
CDA does not consider itself politically neutral, rather, it sees itself as a critical contribution 
with a political commitment to social change. In the name of liberation, CDA takes side with 
the oppressed social groups. The criticism shall reveal the role discursive practice plays in 
sustaining different power relations. The intention is that the results of CDA should 
contribute in a useful manner to the fight for radical social change.  
(Jørgensen and Phillips1999: 73-76) 
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Fairclough and Critical Discourse Analysis 
The concept “discourse” is defined in two central ways in the texts of Fairclough: One 
definition is: “language use conceived as social practice” (Fairclough 1995b:135) The 
second is: “ways of signifying experience from a particular perspective.” (Fairclough 1995b: 
133)  
According to Jørgensen and Phillips (1999: 146), Fairclough then uses the term 
discourse as an unambiguous determination of meaning within a limited domain. Fairclough 
gives an example by referring to patriarchal discourses vs. feminist discourses on sexuality.  
But the term ‘discourse’ becomes problematic since it is not clear where the limits are 
between one discourse and the other. At the practical level in the analysis one can get the 
impression that “anything at any level could be a discourse”. (Jørgensen og Phillips 
1999:149). 
When CDA is applied on journalism, it is a way to try to understand how journalistic 
texts are composed by different social factors and how they contribute to sustain institutional 
norms and practices. At the same time these kinds of analyses have an interest in surveying 
trends of change in different kinds of journalism. CDA also tries to explain possible trends 
of change.  
Ideology and Hegemony 
The concept of ideology is very central to an understanding of social phenomena and 
change. Fairclough defines ideology as follows: 
“Significations /constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social 
identities), which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive 
practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of 
relations of domination.” ( Fairclough 1992:87)  
It is not easy to reveal the ideology within a discursive practice. The notions may be 
so woven into our minds that they become naturalized and become part of our general 
conceptions. According to Hågvar (2003:23), Fairclough thinks that “people are not aware of 
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the hidden ideological patterns in the discourse”, and claims there is a need for an increased 
critical awareness among the common public, particularly in the institutions of education.  
Inspired by Gramsci, Fairclough defines the concept of Hegemony as follows: 
Hegemony is leadership as much as domination across the economic, political, cultural and 
ideological domains of society. Hegemony is the power over society as a whole of one of the 
fundamental economically-defined classes in alliance with other social forces, but is never 
achieved more than partially and temporarily, as an ‘unstable equilibrium’. (Fairclough 
1992: 92)  
According to Hågvar, CDA should : “…help us understand how sociocultural and 
discursive practices, events and texts are conditioned by power relations and the fight for 
power,   at the same time as it helps us see how the hidden ideology in the relations between 
discourse and society contributes to sustain power and ideology” (Hågvar 2003:24, 
translation by author).   
Fairclough’s Model 
The analysis of any particular type of discourse, including media discourse, should keep its 
focus along two alternating dimensions, which are complementary:  
• The communicative event – e.g. a case of language usage, for instance a newspaper 
article, a film, a video, an interview or a political speech. 
• The ‘order of discourse’ – which is the summary of all types of discourses within a 
social institution or a social domain. Types of discourse consist of discourses and 
genres.  
A genre is a way of using language, which is connected to and constitutes a part of a certain 
social practice like the different genres interview, news or advertising.  
When Fairclough characterize his approach as  critical, it is from a recognition that 
our social practice in general and our use of language in particular are bound up with causes 
and effects which we may not be aware of under normal conditions (Bordieu 1977 as 
referred  in Fairclough1995a:54). Fairclough points out that particularly connections 
between the use of language and the exercise of power often are not clear to people, 
although at closer examination appear to be essential to the exercise of power.  
 79
  Norman Fairclough has developed a three –dimensional framework which may serve 
as a model for critical discourse analysis. The main components of this model are:  
Text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice. (Fairclough 1995a: 59) (See Annex 2) 
Text  
The analysis of the texts includes what Fairclough calls ‘linguistic analysis’. That should 
include analysis of vocabulary and semantics, the grammar of sentences and smaller units, 
the sound system (‘phonology’) and writing system. But it also includes an analysis of how 
the sentences are organised, including the ways in which sentences are connected together 
(‘cohesion’), how interviews are organised and how newspaper articles are structured.  
Both meanings and forms of a text are important to analyse. (Fariclough1995a:57)  
Fairclough sees any text, including clauses and sentences, as having three main categories of 
functions simultaneously: ideational, interpersonal and textual.  
In analysing a sentence in a written text, for instance, Fairclough highlights the articulation 
of three aspects which the analysis should focus on:  
• Ideational function -  how the text articulates particular representations and 
recontextualizations of social practice – including carrying particular ideologies. 
• Particular construction of reader and writer identities (what is highlighted, 
personality or individual aspects of identity, or status or role aspects of identity) 
• A particular construction of the relationship between writer and reader ( e.g. formal 
or informal, close or distant) 
He underlines that analysis of texts needs to be multisemiotic, which should include analysis 
of photographic images, layout and the overall visual organization of the text. (Fairclough 
1995a:58)  
Discourse practice and sociocultural practice  
Included in the term ‘discourse practice’ are production, distribution and consumption of the 
text. In the analysis of ‘discourse practice’ it is important to note that by analysing the 
properties of the text, it also involves the process of production and consumption, which is 
part of the discourse practice. But in Fairclough’s model it is important to separate the 
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analysis of the two since they constitute two different dimensions. The analysis of discourse 
practice concentrates on how the author draws on already existing discourses and genres to 
create a text, and how the receivers of a text apply discourses and genres at hand in their 
consumption and interpretation of a text. TV news is a genre of news that may utilize 
different discourses (e.g. welfare discourse or a neoliberalist discourse) and genres (‘hard-
news’ or ‘soft news’)  
The term ‘sociocultural practice’ may involve a wide range of practices: the 
immediate situational context, the wider context of institutional practices the event is 
embedded within, or the yet wider frame of the society and the culture. Fairclough 
recommends  differentiating  three aspects of social practice: economic, political (concerned 
with issues of power and ideology) and cultural (concerned with issues like value and 
identity). (Fairclough 1995a:62). Winther Jørgensen and Phillips point out that it is not 
sufficient to use discourse analysis to analyze the wider aspects of social practice. 
Sociological theory and culture theory will be necessary.  
One of the central aims of Critical Discourse Analysis is to map the connection between 
language use and social practice. (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips1999:82).   
Elections as discourse 
The type of discourses that evolved around the planned elections in Bosnia in 1996 will be 
the focal point of this study. The main outlet for public discourse in my analysis is the 
International press – represented by the most European of the American newspapers, the 
International Herald Tribune. 
I have chosen to focus on the articles covering the elections in Bosnia in the 
International Herald Tribune from the period leading up to the election: June, July, August 
and September 1996.  
In the terminology of Fairclough, the material can be defined as media discourse 
related to the aspect of social practice defined as  ‘political’ (issues of power and ideology 
are relevant)   
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Three main positions 
The different discourses reflected in the media debate concerning the elections may be 
divided into three based on the positions taken in the debate. This division is inspired by 
Stuart Hall’s identification of three hypothetical positions applying to decodings of a 
televisual discourse. For the purpose of the analysis of the debate over the elections in 
Bosnia, the same division may serve for an analysis of written, mainly news texts. (Hall1980 
(1992) :136-138) 
1) Dominant – hegemonic position 
This will be the position where the message is presented within the dominant code. By 
dominant code is meant when the receiver of the message takes the connoted meaning from 
a news report, and decodes the message in terms of the reference code in which it has been 
encoded. Within this position we may also find a so-called ‘professional code’, in the sense 
that the ‘presenter’ (in our case the journalist) assumes a relative independent position from 
the dominant code, which has already been signified in a dominant, hegemonic manner.  
Hegemonic positions are those generated by political and military elites. The media 
presentation reflects this position by choice of images, selection of sources, who is 
interviewed etc. The dominant definitions are hegemonic precisely because they represent 
definitions of situations and events which are ‘in dominance’, (global) Dominant definitions 
connect events, implicitly or explicitly , to grand totalizations, to the great syntagmatic 
views-of-the world: they take large views of issues : they relate events to the ‘national 
interest’ or to the level of geo-politics, even if they make these connections in truncated, 
inverted or mystified ways.  
The definition of a hegemonic viewpoint is, according to Hall:  
a) it defines within its terms the mental horizon, the universe, of possible meanings, of a 
whole sector of relations in a society and culture, and  
b) that it carries with it the stamp of legitimacy- it appears coterminus with what is 
‘natural’, ‘inevitable’, ‘taken for granted’ about the social order.  
(Hall 1980 (1992) : 137) 
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2) Negotiated position 
Decoding within the negotiated position contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional 
elements: it acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions to make the grand 
significations (abstract), while, at a more restricted, situational (situated) level, it makes its 
own ground rules – it operates with exceptions to the rule. It accords the privileged position 
to the dominant definition of events while reserving the right to make a more negotiated 
application of the term ‘local conditions,’ to its own more corporate positions.  This 
negotiating position of the dominant ideology is full of contradictions, although these come 
through in a visible manner on certain occasions.  
Negotiated codes operate through what may be called particular or situated logics: their 
differential and unequal relation to the discourses and logics of power sustains these logics. 
An example of this position used by Hall, is how a worker responds to the proposal of an 
Industrial Relations Bill, which limits the right to strike, and argues for a freeze of wages.   
At the level economic debate involving ‘national interest’ the decoder may adopt the 
hegemonic definition, and agree that ‘ we must all pay ourselves less in order to combat 
inflation.’ However, this position may have little, if any, relation to his or her willingness to 
go on strike for better pay and conditions or to oppose the Industrial Relations Bill at the 
level of factory-floor or union organization.  
Hall launches the suspicion that the great majority of so-called ‘misunderstandings’ arise 
from the contradictions and disjuncture between hegemonic-dominant encoding and 
negotiated-corporate decodings. The term ‘failure in communications’ derives from these 
mismatches in these levels.  
3) Oppositional position  
It is possible for a viewer (reader) to understand both the literal and the connotative 
inflection given by a discourse, but to decode the message in a globally contrary way. The 
person may detotalize the message in the preferred code in order to redefine the message 
within some alternative framework or reference. For instance a viewer/reader may listen to a 
debate on the need to limit wages, but ‘reads’ every mention of ‘national interest’ as ‘class 
interest’.  
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News frames 
Newspaper articles are narratives, and a lot of studies have been made of typical narrative 
structures and schemata in journalism, emphasizing the syntactic structure of the news text.  
A term, which is receiving more and more attention in media research is the concept 
of news frames. There are many definitions of news frames, but a certain common 
understanding has emerged. Such frames are defined as an “organising theme” (Gamson 
1992 as referred to by Hornmoen 2003:186). They are also “conceptual tools which the 
media and individuals rely on to convey, interpret and evaluate information” (Neuman et al. 
1992:60 as referred to by Hornmoen 2003:186). They constitute a “persistent pattern of 
cognition, interpretation and presentation, of selection, emphasis and exclusion” (Gitlin 
1980:7 as referred to in Hormoen 2003:186). According to Entman  framing includes 
selection and emphasising certain aspects of reality:  
To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in 
a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the 
item described (Entman 1993:52 as reffered to by Hornmoen 2003:187) 
Framing is thus a constructing and organising practice, and frames can be understood 
as a certain pattern which helps journalists to select and present information within rather 
scarce time frames  and limited formats.  
The study of frames does not only focus on the selection of themes in the coverage of 
the news media, rather than focus on the ways in which the themes are being presented, and 
which aspect of an event or a theme is being emphasised. Sentko and Valkenburg identify 
five central news frames, central because they “largely account for all the frames that have 
been found in the news” (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000:95 as referred to by Hornmoen 2003 
:187). 
1) The Conflict-Frame  - this is a type of frame which emphasises conflicts 
between individuals, groups or institutions in order to capture the attention of 
the public. 
2) The Human Interest-Frame: gives a human face or an emotional angle to the 
presentation of an event, a theme or a problem.  
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3) The Economic Consequences-Frame: reports on events, themes or problems 
related to which economic consequences they will have for an individual, a 
group or institution, region or country.  
4) The Morality-Frame puts the event, theme or problem in a context of 
religious axioms or moral decrees. For instance can a newspaper article 
convey the viewpoints of an interest group to raise questions on sexually 
transmitted illnesses.  Such an article may contain moral and social messages 
on how to act. 
5) The Responsibility- Frame presents an event, a theme or a problem in such a 
way that the responsibility for the cause of the problem or the solution of it is 
being ascribed to either the authorities, an individual or a group.  
 
For my analysis it will be interesting to see whether the texts utilize one or several of 
these frames. The use of frames tends to emphasise a particular problem definition. It is of 
interest to see if this is the case of the selected material about the elections in Bosnia.  
Presuppositions 
Presuppositions are propositions that a producer of texts takes for granted or which are 
established already. For instance when a person expresses an opinion in a journalistic text, 
there are always a set of assumptions behind it. According to Fairclough, presuppositions are 
not so much what is present in a text as what is not being expressed through a text, the 
absences from the text. (Fairclough 1995a : 106) For instance the concept “The Third 
World” presupposes a whole range of knowledge about a lot of countries presumably 
belonging to the entity “ The Third World”. If the term “The Third World” is referred to 
connected to the term “crisis”, a whole lot of assumptions come to mind: poverty, peasantry, 
inequality, maybe hunger, war, lack of food and water.  These will be presuppositions that 
are implicit in the term “The Third World”. Another example is “The Soviet Threat” which 
used to be commonplace in British press before the Soviet Union dissolved. The term “The 
Soviet Threat” implies the presupposition that there is a threat from the Soviet Union 
towards the West.  
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Fairclough points out that one of the most common absences in news stories is the 
absence of historical context. News is as a rule constructed as isolated from prior or 
subsequent events – isolated from history. 
According to Fairclough it makes sense to differentiate presence, rather than just 
contrasting what is present and what is absent. One might think in terms of a scale of 
presence, running from ‘absent’ to ‘foregrounded’. Absent-presupposed- back grounded – 
fore grounded.  
Something which is presupposed is in a way present in the text, but as part of the implicit 
meaning. Something which is explicitly present in a text, may be informationally 
backgrounded or informationally foregrounded. (Fairclough 1995a:106). 
The distinction between what is explicit and implicit is very important in discourse 
analysis. Analysis of implicit content may give valuable insights into what is taken as given, 
as ‘common sense’. Generally speaking ideologies are implicit assumptions. Presuppositions 
may function in an ideological manner by referring propositions to a room, which already is 
established, as something given. As part of the intertextual context of the text, they belong to 
a sphere that is “already read” (Hornmoen 2003:190). They don’t invite to any questioning 
of the assumptions about the assertion. Thus presuppositions can constitute the readers in an 
ideological manner as subjects with certain former experiences with texts, assumptions that 
constitute parts of a mutual, apparently non-ideological ‘common sense’. According to 
Fairclough (1992, 2001 as referred to in Hornmoen 2003:191) presuppositions are efficient 
for manipulating others. Their implicit character makes them difficult to identify and 
eventually reject. Producers of texts in the mass media can manipulate the public by 
ascribing circumstances to experiences that they want the public to accept. At the same time 
it cannot be taken for granted that the producer of the text is aware of his/hers own 
presuppositions.  
The character of presuppositions as ‘common sense’ does not make them less 
interesting, for instance when the ‘given’ situation in the text is disputable or controversial.  
(Hornmoen 2003:191).  
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Reported speech – discourse representation 
The distinction between different levels of reported speech or discourse in journalism gives 
an important background for understanding of representations and the constitutions of power 
relations in the selected texts. Fairclough makes a distinction between ‘primary discourse’ 
(representing or reporting discourse), and ‘secondary discourse’ (the discourse represented 
and reported). Referring to Volosinov (Volosinov 1973 as referred to in Fairclough 1995b : 
55) he suggests a typology of discourse representation built around the dynamic 
interrelationship of primary discourse and secondary discourse: in certain styles of 
representation primary and secondary discourse are clearly differentiated, in others  they are 
merged.   The distinction may also be called Direct Discourse (DD) and Indirect Discourse 
(ID). (Fairclough 1995b: 55). DD claims to represent the original utterance word by word in 
the original text, whereas ID just reproduces the text as a paraphrase. In DD the words 
represented are normally attributed to the original quoted source. Conventionally DD is also 
marked by quotation marks , followed by an attribution to the speaker. Thus there is also a 
categorical, orthographic difference between DD and ID: DD  appears between quotation 
marks, ID is without. DD lets another voice – different from the voice of the journalist – be 
represented in the text with the journalist as mediator. This way there is at least two voices 
in the text: the voice of the reporter and the voice of the person reported. The latter is given 
certain autonomy. This is not the case in ID. The reporter speaks on behalf of the reported 
voice. 
According to Waugh (Waugh 1995:138 as referred to in Hornmoen 2003:189) is 
journalistic discourse a mixture of DD and ID in addition to the report of the journalist. The 
report of the journalist is the part of a journalistic text which is performed directly by the 
journalist without being attributed to anybody else.  
Borders between DD and ID may be floating in a journalistic report. The voice in 
journalism may be ambiguous, ‘double voiced’ in the term of Bakthin.(Bakthin 1981 as 
referred to by Hornmoen 2003:189). Farirclough also emphasizes how an ambivalence in the 
‘voice’ is characteristic of indirect speaking or discourse, in the way that we can not be sure 
whether what is being reproduced are the words in the original discourse or not. ID is 
normally not distinguished from the journalistic report for instance by quotation marks, and 
it is therefore normally difficult to distinguish them. So called primary and secondary speech  
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( or the voice of the journalists and the voice of the represented) is not clearly differentiated. 
According by Fairclough, indirect discourse in journalism can both reproduce words that 
were used as sources, and transform them or translate them to discourses more according to 
the reporter’s own voice. Acording to Fairclough: 
“….Reports are rarely even-handed with all the various voices represented. Some 
are given prominence, and some marginalized. Some are used to frame others. Some are 
legitimized by being taken  up in the newsreader’s or reporter’s voice, others are not. Equity 
and balance cannot be assessed by merely noting which voices are represented, and, for 
instance, how much space is given to each: the web of voices is an often subtle ordering and 
hierarchization of voices (Fairclough 1995a:81).  
In a perspective of power it is interesting to differentiate between indirect speech and 
journalistic report. Which voices should we assume are allowed to talk and dominate what is 
called ‘journalistic report’. 
Important questions to ask in an analysis are: How are the different discourser represented 
in the articles? Which voices are present and represented in the articles?  
The importance of represented discourse cannot be decided without reference to how 
it works and is being contextualised. Selection of specific words in the representing 
discourse has an effect on the interpretation of the represented discourse. Fairclough shows 
how the choice of verb for the represented speech frames it and gives certain guidelines for 
how to interpret it.  
For instance is the interpretation of ‘he claimed’ or ‘he warned’ different from ‘he 
said’. In journalism there will always be contextual elements in a report that invites a certain 
attitude from the reader to the represented speech.  
Which actors are represented? 
The attention should be directed towards which processes are represented in the text and 
how they are represented. Which actors, individuals or groups, are presented as responsible 
for the processes, in other words as agents. They may be academics, researchers, politicians, 
celebrities or persons with specific know how; specialists.   
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It is important to differentiate between which participants in the text appear as actors 
and who are referred to as objects, persons who are influenced by the actions of others 
(Hellsping and Ledin 1997:131 as referred in Hornmoen 2003: 191). It is also important to 
observe which processes the different actors are reported to initiate. A certain attention 
should also be paid to the way the public is addressed, which relations are established 
between different actors like politicians, the implicated journalist, the public involved and 
other participants in the text.  
Representations and the study of International Relations 
Hansen analyses the war in Bosnia in a poststructuralist framework, within which she 
develops a method of reading as well as a methodology for research designs and selecting 
texts. She chose the Western debate on Bosnia because it illustrates “the with and depth of 
the theoretical framework and hence the widest empirical scope of the theory: competing 
representations as well as competing policies, constructions of the Other as radical as well as 
non-radical, a transformation of representations and policy over time, the articulation of 
historically pregnant concepts as part of the construction of identity, political dissent as well 
as hegemony, the influence of media and literary non-fiction on foreign policy discourse; 
and it was  a foreign policy issue which was constructed as so important that it mobilised 
responses from Western powers and institutions” (Hansen 2006: 11).  
 The discursive ontology of poststructuralism is deeply intertwined with its 
understanding of language as constitutive for what is brought into being. Language is social 
and political, an inherently unstable system of signs that generate meaning through a 
simultaneous construction of identity and difference. Policy discourse is seen as relying 
upon particular constructions of problems and subjectivities, but it is also through discourse 
that these problems and subjectivities are constructed in the first place.  
 Identity is at the centre of poststructuralist discourse analysis. The assumption 
relevant to the study of foreign policy draws upon the idea that representations of identity 
are linked to a conceptualization of identity as discursive, political, relational and social. 
Saying that identity is discursive and political is to argue that representations of identity 
place foreign policy issues within a particular interpretative framework. The consequence 
being that foreign policy can be formulated as an adequate response.  
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- The emphasis on the political in the poststructuralist concept of identity marks a 
difference for instance to a concept of identity as ‘culture’. Thus it differs greatly 
from the anthropological study of marriage rituals, neither is it part of aesthetic 
analysis of artefacts such as art, architecture, music, literature, nor ‘people’s culture.’ 
- The relational conception of identity means that identity is explained through 
reference to what it is not. For instance when identity is referred to as ‘American’, 
‘European’, ‘Barbaric or ‘underdeveloped’ involves constituting another identity or 
set of identities as being non-American, non-European, civilized or developed.  
- The conceptualisation of identity as social implies understanding it as established 
through a set of collectively articulated codes, not as a private property of the 
individual or a psychological condition. (Hansen 2006:6). 
The concept of ‘The Other’ 
Hansen argues that identity is relational, discursive, political and social. The national ‘Self’’ 
constitutes the ‘Other’ through degrees of difference – these degrees of difference may range 
from the radically different to the familiar. This constitution of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ can be 
taking place through two simultaneous logics – a logic of differentiation and a logic of 
linking – as well as through the articulation of identity in spatial, temporal and ethical terms. 
The different types of texts that foreign policy evolve around, can be structured by a smaller 
number of basic discourses, which again articulate radically different relationships between 
Self and Other. (Hansen 2006:12) 
 Referring to Campbell ( 1992/1998), Hansen claims that states need to articulate 
threats and radical ‘Others’ to construct its identity. Thus a construction of difference is 
turned into ‘Otherness’. Construction of Otherness is present in a lot of American foreign 
and security policy, although not in all of it (Campbell 1992 as referred in Hansen 2006:39). 
Hansen mentions different examples of foreign policies that draw upon ambiguous 
and complex constructions of differences, for instance the concept of ‘Nordic Identity’. This 
was a construction made by Swedish, Danish and Norwegian politicians during the Cold 
War as an identity transcending the nuclear rivalry of the antagonistically opposed 
superpowers USA and the Soviet Union. The ‘Nordic Identity’ would imply policies of 
neutrality, disarmament, development and peacekeeping.  
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 Other examples mentioned by Hansen are: the construction of the Colonial Other as 
exotic and different from the West, still attractive in a mysterious way (Said 1978 as referred 
by Hansen: 40). Romanticism, as represented by the poet Lord Byron, constructed  ‘The 
Other’ as an object of admiration, vitality and passion, qualities that have gone missing in 
Western civilisation (Hansen 2006: 40).  
Basic discourses in the debate over Bosnia 
Hansen analyses the basic discourses in the Western debate over Bosnia. ‘Basic discourses’ 
are identified by texts which ‘construct different Others with different degrees of radical 
difference; articulate diverging forms of spatial, temporal and ethical identity; and construct 
competing links between identity and policy’ (Hansen 2006:52). ‘Basic discourses’ is an 
analytical distinction of an ideal-type kind.  
 Hansen claims that it is useful to settle for a small number of basic discourses within 
a debate. The goal of this would be to identify discourses that articulate very different 
constructions of identity and policy and which thereby separate the political landscape 
between them. The following points could function as theoretical and methodological 
guidelines:  
• Since basic discourses should indicate the main structural positions within a debate, 
they should be based on the reading of a large number of texts, preferably from a 
wide variety of sources, media and genres. The reading should identify the signs 
most frequently articulated, the relationship between Self and Other and the policy 
that is coupled to these concepts and the articulations of spatial, temporal and ethical 
identity. 
• Basic discourses should be built on explicit articulations of key representations of 
identity. Examples are ‘ the Balkans’ and ‘genocide’ in the Western debate on 
Bosnia, ‘civilization’ in debates on the importance of religion and culture for post-
Cold War conflicts, ‘quagmire’ and ‘Vietnam syndrome’ in the American debate on 
Iraq. 
• The analysis should draw on available conceptual histories of the representations that 
are chosen. The point of conceptual history is not just to create a comparison to past 
discourses, but also to conduct a genealogical reading which traces the constitution 
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of the present concept to understand when and how it was formed as well as how it 
succeeded in marginalising other representations (Foucault 1984 as referred by 
Hansen 2006:53).  
• Basic discourses should be composed in such a way that the Others and Selves that 
are being articulated differ both in how the relation of Otherness is constructed and 
their spatial, temporal and ethical constructions of identity, and which Other is 
constructed as the most significant.  
• Because basic discourses articulate very different Selves and Others, and because 
identity and policy are interlinked, it is expected that basic discourses advocate rather 
different foreign policies.   
 
Hansen analyses the basic discourses dominating the Western debate on the Bosnian 
war, and identifies two basic discourses, that she calls ‘the Balkan Discourse’ and ‘the 
Genocide Discourse.’  
The Balkan discourse of the 1990s constructed the Balkans as violent, tribal, hating 
and backward. This type of ‘Otherness’ was thought to have been embodied in the 
Balkans for hundreds if not for thousands of years. The Balkan discourse implied that the 
Balkans would be unable to break these patterns and progress toward more civilized and 
Western forms of behaviour, and therefore the West had neither the capacity nor any 
moral responsibility for intervening to stop the war ( Hansen 2006:96). 
As reports of Bosnian Serb atrocities started to reach Western media, a counter 
discourse was being formed. This basic discourse centred on the construction of the war 
as ‘genocide’, and through that challenged the spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions 
of the Balkan discourse, which had led to a ‘policy of inaction.’ This discourse 
rearticulated the Balkan discourse construction of a uniform ‘Balkan’ to a space of ‘three 
factions’ by separating a multicultural and democratic ‘Bosnian victim’ from a ‘Serbian 
aggressor’ 
(Hansen 2006:96 & 111). The articulation of Serb warfare as ‘genocide’ instituted at 
fundamental Western ethical responsibility for acting in defence of the Bosnian government 
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and population. The ‘genocide’ discourse argued that the West would have to act. This 
discourse led to a construction of ‘Western responsibility’ that was pursued on the basis of a 
traditional security discourse of interests, but through a radical rearticulating of the spatial 
and temporal identities of the ‘Balkan discourse.’ This implied that instead of looking at the 
different war faring parties as equal, the ‘Bosnians’ were constructed as ‘victims’ who were 
not responsible for the outcome of the war or its conclusions. Thus ‘Bosnia’ was separated 
from ‘Serbia ‘ in this discourse, and ‘Bosnia’ was even seen as a place where 
multiculturalism and tolerance existed, almost like in the ‘cosmopolitan’ West. This line of 
thinking again created further support for Western action, not only was ‘Bosnia’ a victim of 
genocide, it was a country whose identity was similar to, in some cases even superior to, the 
one of ‘the West.’ Thus ‘Bosnia’ was relocated from its place in an Orientalized ‘Balkan’ in 
‘ the far corner of Europe’ to Europe’s geographical and cultural ‘heart.’ ‘What is left of the 
Western democracies if they are no longer willing to defend civic society in the heart of 
Europe?’ argued Charles A. Kupchan, a former staff member of the National Security 
Council under the Clinton administration in an article in Los Angeles Times in 1995 (As 
referred in Hansen 2006:113). 
Parts of the following analysis of the media debate on the elections in Bosnia in 1996 is 
inspired by some of Hansen’s concepts: ‘Self’, ‘Other’ and I will make an attempt at 
defining ‘Basic discourses’ represented in the material. .  
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Chapter 5 
U.S. Press Coverage of the Elections in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
For the purposes of this study I will make a discourse analysis of the material I gathered 
between 1 April and 1 October 1996. The selected material consists of  articles from the 
American newspaper International Herald Tribune (IHT), at the time published by the 
Washington Post and The New York Times, and considered the most European of the 
American newspapers. The International Herald Tribune is considered a neutral, 
independent newspaper. Its reporting is balanced, using denotative language. The analysis 
will try to reveal this newspaper’s hidden, subtler ideological and hegemonic tendencies, at 
the same time as it seems to be very open to debate and discussions of central themes, 
particularly concerning U.S. foreign policy.  
Contextual framework 
The New World Order  
An important ideological presupposition when analysing an international debate taking place 
in the early 1990ies is the concept of The New World Order. As a concept of today, it was 
re-launched by the former President George H. W.Bush to describe the new position of the 
U.S. after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The speech given on September 11, 1990 is 
named Towards a new World Order, when he threatens to invade Iraq, after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. Underlying the concept is an understanding that a new global era is 
evolving in which views represented by neo-liberals and idealists have predicted that 
freedom, rights and morality will prevail in the world. With the fast expansion of market 
economy on a global scale hopes for democratic reforms globally are rising. The best-known 
representation of this ideological idealist trend is Francis Fukuyama’s analysis of the global 
situation after the Cold War. On the opposite of this scale do Samuel Huntington and his 
prognosis of future clashes of civilizations mainly represent the views by the Realist School 
in International Relations. In this view, the ‘New World Order’ will not be marked by peace 
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and global understanding, but by new conflict lines primarily along cultural and religious 
‘fault lines’ across the globe. ( Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000:12). At the essence of the concept 
of the New World Order is that the U.S keeps it hegemonic power with an undisputed strong 
influence over other international institutions like the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), OSCE and NATO. With the war on terror and the new 
emerging powers like China and India this is presently changing, but looking back at 1996 
which is the period for this analysis, the New World Order was defined by the U.S. with the 
European powers (EU) and NATO- member countries included as part of the concept of the 
West. (Drezner 2007:36). 
Hegemony – an attempt at clarification  
For the purpose of my analysis it is important to clarify the concept ‘ Hegemony’ as it may 
have several meanings according to who makes the definition.  I choose to distinguish 
different levels of the definitions, and separate them accordingly: 
1) At the global level, my perception is that the premise of The New World Order, e.g 
that the U. S. holds an unchallenged position as the only superpower in the world, 
seems to be an underlying presupposition that is not disputed in my material. What is 
disputed, is the way this power is executed. 
2) The second level of definition of ‘Hegemony,’ is more in line with 
Gramsci/Faiclough one referred above, is where ‘Hegemony’ is defined as leadership 
as much as domination across economic, political, cultural and ideological domains 
of society. Hegemony being a constant power over society by the ‘fundamental 
economically defined classes’ ( Fairclough 1992:92). 
3) Yet a third definition relating strongly to the Gramsci/Fairclough one is the one 
introduced by Hall, in his categorisation of positions in media texts, which he calls 
‘Dominant-hegemonic position’.  Hall gives a more detailed description of what is 
conceived as the ‘dominant code’ above ( see page 80), and  his division of three 
positions within media debates is an important premise for my analysis.  
All three ways of defining ‘Hegemony’ are woven into the presuppositions of the media 
texts for analysis. 
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The Dayton Peace Accords and Elections 
The most important point of departure and a basic part of the context for this study is the 
Dayton Peace Accords and its provisions on elections. The Agreement on Elections as part 
of the DPA is formulated in Annex 3. 10 
The four articles of this Annex sets out the general rules for: 
1. Conditions for Democratic Elections 
2. The role of the OSCE in preparing and supervising the elections 
3. The activities of the Provisional Election Commission (PEC), responsibilities, 
mandate, composition and functioning, privileges and immunities 
4. Eligibility – who is eligible to vote, including refugees and displaced persons. 
5. The creation of a Permanent Election Commission 
 
Of particular interest to the analysis of the media debate related to the elections are the 
provisions set down in Article 1 concerning Conditions for Democratic Elections:  
The Article reads: 
1. The Parties11 shall ensure that conditions exist for the organization of free and 
fair elections, in particular a politically neutral environment; shall protect an 
enforce the right to vote in secret without fear and intimidations; shall ensure 
freedom of expression and of the press, shall allow and encourage freedom of 
association (including of political parties); and shall ensure freedom of 
movement.  
2. The Parties request the OSCE to certify whether elections can be effective under 
current social conditions in both Entities and, if necessary, to provide assistance 
to the Parties in creating these conditions. 
3. The Parties shall comply fully with paragraphs 7 and 8 of the OSCE Copenhagen 
Document, which are attached to this Agreement.  
                                              
10 See full text in Annex 1  
11 The meaning of “Parties” in this text is the Parties which were the signatories to the Dayton Peace Accords : The bodies 
representing  Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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Concerning number 3, the paragraphs 7 and 8 mentioned in the Copenhagen document, give 
more details on the conditions of elections and the rights of voters and candidates, including 
the presence of election observers.  
The core issue in the Election Discourse:   
Were Conditions Met?  
Much of the media discourse in the months leading up to the elections was centred around 
the question whether conditions for holding the elections were met or not. These conditions 
were stated in Article 1 of the Annex 3 of the DPA. The focal points of these conditions 
being that the Parties shall ensure the following conditions for free and fair elections:   
• A politically neutral environment 
• The right to vote in secret without fear of intimidation 
• Ensure freedom of expression and of the press 
• Allow and encourage freedom of association  
• Ensure freedom of movement 
 
The analysis of the media discourse will evolve around the debate about the conditions for 
free and fair elections. The dominating discourse is the Election Discourse, described as one 
of the main Basic Discourses of the debate.  
The main question for the analysis being – how does the press coverage reflect the central 
issue in the debate:  
- Were conditions met for holding the elections on September 14, 1996?  
- How does the expressed position to this question reflect whether the press shows support 
for or shows an independent/critical stand to the policies of the U.S. administration at the 
time?  
Other sub-questions to help the analysis are: 
- Does the article mainly reflect IC/US interests – hegemony and unipolarity? 
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- Is it mainly preoccupied with internal OSCE issues/ problems?  
- Does it mainly reflect Bosnian interests – eg Bosnia’s position in the Balkans/Europe? 
What is the main focus of interest of the Election Discourse – as reflected in the press 
coverage:  
1) Is the main focus international politics/European politics/ Bosnian politics?  
2) If Bosnian politics is the main focus, in what way is it represented: 
a. As a “normal” political process, seen from a Western point of view?  
b. As an “abnormal” process? Included in this focus is a discourse where there 
are a lot of conflicts between the three rivalling Parties in Bosnia, relating to 
the ‘Balkanization’ discourse described below.  
3) Is the main focus US politics? Is the main focus political difference between the main 
parties, Democrats and Republicans? What is the relevance of the up-coming U.S. 
elections? 
 
Which other discourses are represented within the Election Discourse?  
 (eg. Western/U.S. political discourses, Bosnian political discourses,  
 Bosnian Ethnicity Discourse, U.S. Military, Bosnian Military,    
Which discourses are articulated to characterise the different actors in the debate? 
a) Do they fall within the definition of the Basic Discourses as they are described  below 
(page 10).  
(Eg Western, U.S. official, OSCE specific, Balkanization discourse etc.) 
What are the main representations in the material? 
- Which ‘Selves’ and ‘Others’ are represented in the material: 
- Is it only the American ‘Self’ or can also Bosnia be represented as a’ Self’? 
- Serbs are obviously represented as ‘Others’ - can also other groups and 
nations/nationalities be described as ‘Others’? 
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Which positions are represented in the Election Discourse?   
Concerning the latter, I will try to make a three-fold position system of the discourse 
inspired by Stuart Hall’s way of organising positions, as described in Chapter 4.   
Assumptions about the media coverage 
Based on the material at hand (mainly articles from the International Herald Tribune which 
background is further described in Chapter 3), and on the above description of the role of 
media in a democratic society, it may be relevant to propose some assumptions about the 
media coverage related to the role of media in democratic developments in the USA, and in 
our context related to U.S. foreign policy as it was performed by the Clinton Administration 
in 1996.  
I will launch the following assumptions about the media coverage of the elections in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 1996.  
Assumption 1:  
The coverage of the process leading to the elections in Bosnia in 1996 is based on a concept 
that the press has an active role to play in the political landscape – mainly as a 
communicator of information about political decisions.  
Assumption 2 
Considering the high profile of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the prestige put into the 
elections by the Clinton administration, one assumption is that the U.S. media would follow 
up on the thinking of the administration and show their full support for the administration’s 
wish to keep the deadline for the elections no matter what – in other words show loyalty to 
the Clinton administration’s efforts to go through with the elections.  
Position to the elections – definition of codes 
The issue of “position” becomes central to this analysis. In the analysis of the different 
articles I have divided them into three groups according to the attitude (position) towards the 
elections:  positive, neutral and negative. This is a sort of coding, based on the general 
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message the article conveys (attitude, position) concerning the election process and the way 
the preparations are conducted in the period of analysis. The analysis covers a total of 80 
articles from the International Herald Tribune (and a few from the Washington Post and the 
New York Times) during the months June, July, August and September 1996.  
As the analysis of the selection of articles below will show, the definition of the codes 
positive, neutral and negative emerges in the following manner as criteria within the 
elections discourse as it is reflected in the media debate represented by the analysed articles 
in the International Herald Tribune:  
Positive:  
An article of the selected material which reflects a positive coverage of the election process, 
is characterized by:  
-  The majority of the sentences in the article express a positive attitude towards: 
a) Holding the elections according to the Dayton Peace accords  (at the prescribed date, 
Sept. 14, 1996)  
b) The process of preparations for the elections: 
   This process includes:  
-  The role of the OSCE in the preparations,   
- The dominating role of the U.S.A. in the preparations for the elections, including the 
U.S. role within the OSCE 
- More positive than negative towards the shortcomings of the preparations in meeting 
the important conditions defined in the Dayton Peace Accords for free and fair 
elections, according to Article 1 of the Annex 3 of the DPA12 
Neutral:  
                                              
12  The conditions are referred on page ….. See the full text of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Annex 1.  
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An article of the selected material which reflects a neutral coverage of the election process,  
is characterized by:  
- The majority of the sentences in the article express a neutral attitude towards: 
c) Holding the elections according to the Dayton Peace accords  (at the prescribed date, 
Sept. 14, 1996)  
d) The process of preparations for the elections: 
   This process includes:  
-  The role of the OSCE in the preparations,   
- The dominating role of the U.S.A. in the preparations for the elections, including the 
U.S. role within the OSCE 
- A neutral coverage of the shortcomings of the preparations in meeting the important 
conditions defined in the Dayton Peace Accords for free and fair elections , 
according to Article 1 of the Annex 3 of the DPA 
Negative: 
An article of the selected material which reflects a negative coverage of the election process 
, is characterized by:  
- The majority of the sentences in the article express a negative attitude towards: 
e) Holding the elections according to the Dayton Peace accords  (at the prescribed date, 
Sept. 14, 1996)  
f) The process of preparations for the elections: 
   This process includes:  
-     The role of the OSCE in the preparations.   
- The dominating role of the U.S. in the preparations for the elections, including the 
U.S. role within the OSCO. 
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- More negative than positive towards the shortcomings of the preparations in meeting 
the important conditions defined in the Dayton Peace Accords for free and fair 
elections, according to Article 1 of the Annex 3 of the DPA. 
 
All 80 articles in the material were sorted according to this coding, based on the criteria 
listed above. The table below shows the summary of the positions. (See tables in Annex 3 
for the total summary of each month).   
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POSITION TO ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA –  
U.S. PRESS JUNE – SEPTEMBER 1996 
Month Positive Neutral  Negative  Total 
June   5 5 12 22 
July   2 3 15 20 
August   2 0 12 14 
September   4 1 19 24 
Total number 
of articles 
13 9 58 80 
Percentage (%) 16,25 (16) 11,25 (11) 72,5 (73) 100,00 
 
Table 1: Position to elections in Bosnia in articles covering the preparations for and the election in Bosnia & 
Herzegovina in U.S. press June-September 1996 
 
The high percentage of articles negative to the elections should indicate that the assumption 
(Assumption 2) about the U.S. press supporting its government in foreign policies is not 
valid. On the contrary, it indicates that the press was very critical to the way the Clinton 
administration pressed to keep the elections within the deadline set by the Dayton Peace 
Accords. This also indicates a large extent of independence on the part of the U.S. press, in 
spite of the attempts of the administration to make the press more positive.   
The frequency of articles about U.S. policies in Bosnia indicates that Assumption 1 is valid; 
the press sees itself as an actor in the political landscape, it plays an active, democratic role.  
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Chapter 6 
 Analysis of election discourse 
In this chapter I will do an attempt at a Critical Discourse Analysis of a selection of articles 
from my material. The selected articles are picked out among the almost 100 articles that 
constitute the total material from April to October 1996. The material from April and May 
was not complete, and is therefore not part of the material that constituted the basis for the 
table of Chapter 5.  
Each article used in my analysis will have one of the three codes described in Chapter 
5 :  positive, negative or neutral. These codes relate to the over-all impression of the content 
– were they positive, negative or neutral to the issue of holding the elections on 14 
September 1996, to the way the election preparations was being performed, to the U.S. role 
in the elections preparations etc, as described above.   
The majority of the articles I have chosen for analysis are news articles. In the total 
material there are several articles that express opinions, like editorial articles written by the 
editor, or opinions expressed in the opinions columns. For my present analysis I have mainly 
chosen to analyse news articles/news reports. From a discourse perspective they are more 
interesting, since they in theory should be “objective”, when closer analysis very often 
shows that they really are not. News discourse is very often based on presuppositions, 
suppositions that are taken for granted, and the reading public is expected to understand the 
implicit meaning of them without explanation. For the analysis it is therefore important to 
try to detect such presuppositions in the news texts. For instance are ideologies in general 
implicit suppositions, and may appear as a background, something taken for granted in a 
news text.   
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Basic Discourses  
The analysis will also try to detect the main ‘basic discourses’ within the texts.13 The 
following is a presentation and an attempt at definition of the most important basic 
discourses in the material:  
Peace Discourse: This is a discourse that contains many of the other discourses in the 
material. It is a discourse practiced by the International Community ( U.S:, OSCE, EU etc) , 
e.g. all forces who were involved in the process for making peace in Bosnia. This discourse 
represents the Western ‘ Self’ as opposed to the Balkan ‘Other’.  It is a discourse involving 
all aspects of the peace process, not just the election process that is the focus of this thesis. 
Discourses within the Peace Discourse will relate to all aspects of the process of 
implementing the Dayton Peace Accord and include issues like promotion of Human Rights 
and Regional Stabilisation, this last issue including military issues, stability and security.  
Election Discourse:  This is one of the basic discourses within the Peace Discourse. The 
Election Discourse includes all material where the elections and the preparations for the 
elections is the main topic. Included in the Election Discourse are issues like all the 
conditions mentioned in the DPA for holding elections, like a politically neutral 
environment, the right to vote in secret without fear of intimidation, freedom of expression 
and of the press, freedom of association, freedom of movement.  All aspects coming up 
during the process of preparing the elections in Bosnia are included in the Election 
Discourse, this include OSCE internal issues e.g. problems with staff and funding, and 
organisational issues.  
Within the Election Discourse several other Basic Discourses can be detected, for instance: 
U.S. Political Discourse: a discourse that relates mainly to U.S. political issues.  
Clinton’ Election Discourse:  This is a discourse which main focus is Clinton’s re-election 
campaign which was going on at the same time as the preparations for the elections in 
                                              
13 Note that ’Basic Discourses’ are constructions made for analytical purposes, and will as such not be able to cover all 
aspects of the media discourse evolving in the media debate over the elections in Bosnia.  
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Bosnia in 1996. The elections in Bosnia became an important part of Clinton’s re-election 
discourse.  
OSCE-specific Discourse: is a discourse that mainly deals with OSCE internal problems, 
e.g. financial and human resources, internal conflicts, expressed disagreements between 
OSCE-officials etc.  
Human Rights Discourse: a discourse that mainly focuses on the human rights issues 
within the election discourse, of which the most important are the freedom of movement, 
freedom of association, freedom of expression and of the press etc. 
Dayton Discourse: the main focus of this type of discourse was all issues directly related to 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. This discourse may cover issues not directly related to the 
elections, like military issues, stability/ security issues etc. 
Western Discourse: a discourse which presupposes that the West is a unit which lives up to 
the ideals of democracy, human rights, peace etc. and has good intentions in the way it 
conducts the preparations for the elections through the OSCE. 
U.S. Discourse: a discourse that presupposes that U.S. interests are equal or more important 
than other interests, e.g. interests of Europe, the EU, the OSCE, the Bosnian people etc This 
discourse refers to  ‘Washington’ as the political centre from where all important decisions 
come, decisions which also involve other nations, for instance the 56 OSCE member states 
from Europe, Central Asia and North America, including Bosnia & Herzegovina. 
‘Balkanization Discourse’ : A discourse which implies a view of  the Balkans as violent, 
tribal, barbaric, tribal, uncivilised and backward, as opposed to modern economic and 
democratic development,  Ethnic division is included in the discourse, as well as 
nationalism, and leaders who promote division and conflict as opposed to unity and 
cooperation. The term implies a concept of “The Other” as opposed to the Western ‘Self’, 
and implies certain images of a mysterious and more exotic culture than the European, 
located between the West and the East. 
The term ‘Balkanization’ emerged after World War 1, and today still means: ‘inner 
fragmentation and outer accessibility’ (Mc Manner as quoted in Hansen 2006:104-105). 
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The term was first used by journalist Paul Scott Mowrer in 1921, and referred to “ the 
creation, in a region of hopelessly mixed races, of a medley of small states with more or less 
backward populations, economically and financially weak, covetous, intriguing, afraid, a 
continual prey to the machinations of the great powers, an to the violent promptings of their 
own passions.” (As quoted in Todorova 1997:34) 
In the context of the debate on the elections in Bosnia, ‘Balkanization Discourse’ involves 
anything and anybody representing the three Parties in the Bosnian war who actively tries to 
counter the process of preparing the elections the way they were set out in the Dayton Peace 
Accords.  
Bosnia Discourse: this is a discourse that differs from the Balkanization discourse in the 
sense that the main perspective is Bosnian, but with more positive connotations than the 
Balkanization discourse, assuming that the Bosnian government and the Bosnians are pro a 
democratic development and all positive aspects of the Dayton process. The discourse also 
includes an assumption that Bosnia and Bosniaks were the main victims of the conflict, and 
they need assistance in bringing their society back on its feet after the war.  
Media Discourse: the main focus of this discourse is the media as such, being Western 
media or local media.14 
 
 
 
 
                                              
14 Note that there are several issues that are mentioned in the articles and that are relevant to the discussion on the elections 
that have not been defined within the framework of Basic Discourses. Examples of such issues are: military issues, 
stability/security issues, the issue of refugees,  return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).   
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Article 1 (IHT 15 May 1996) 
Headline: “Planning for Bosnian Vote Discrupted” 
”U.S. Official’s Exit Underscores Doubts Poll can be Held on Schedule.”  
 
Article written by journalist John Pomfret (originally for The Washington Post) published in 
The International Herald Tribune (IHT) of 15 May 1996. 
Code : Negative  
Category: News Article 
ARTICLE 1:  BREAKDOWN OF SENTENCES 
No. Text Position/ 
Main Perspective 
Basic discourses 
1.  The sudden resignation of a top American official has 
disrupted planning for next September’s Bosnian 
elections, a key element of the Dayton peace process, 
Western diplomats and Bosnian officials say. 
Negative   
 Western/U.S./Bosnian 
Election discourse/ 
Western Discourse 
2.  The departure announcement by William Steubner, 
chief of staff of the mission of the Organisation of 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
underscored troubles and controversy axed by the 
Vienna based organization assigned to carry out 
Bosnia’s first nationwide vote since 1991, before the 
war. 
Negative 
Western /OSCE/ 
Election discourse/ 
Western Discourse/ 
OSCE-specific 
3.  Steubner’s exit followed an attempt to resign by a 
colleague, Judy Thompson, a Canadian who heads the 
OSCE task force on elections in Bosnia.  
Negative 
 Western/OSCE  
Election discourse/ 
Western Discourse 
OSCE -specific 
4. Earlier this month, she  tendered her resignation, but 
was persuaded to return to the mission, officials said.  
Negative 
Western/OSCE 
Election discourse 
Western Discourse/OSCE specific 
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5. An OSCE spokeswoman said both gave personal 
reasons for their actions.  
Neutral 
Western/OSCE 
Election Discourse 
Western/OSCE specific 
 
6.  But the real explanation officials say, involves a 
disagreement over whether Bosnia will be ready for an 
election by September 
Negative 
Western/OSCE 
Election Discourse 
Western/OSCE specific 
7. According to colleagues, Steubner argued that Bosnia 
will not meet any of the conditions the OSCE has set 
out for it to hold an election, such as relatively free 
media, the right of people to return to their homes and 
vote and, most important, exclusion of the electoral 
process of indicted war criminals, such as Bosnian 
Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.  
Negative 
Western/OSCE 
 
Election Discourse 
Western Discourse 
OSCE-Specific 
Balkanization  Discourse 
8. Steubner is a former U.S: Army major who has worked 
in Bosnia throughout the war.  
Neutral  
U.S./ Bosnia 
Western Discourse 
U.S./ Bosnia specific 
9.  Some Clinton administration officials have said that as 
a supporter of the presumptive Republican presidential 
candidate, Senate Majority leader Robert j: Dole, 
Steubner has used his position to derail the Bosnian 
elections, hurting implementation of the Dayton accord 
an thus President Clinton’s re-election campaign.  
Negative 
Western / U.S specific 
Election Discourse 
Western Discourse 
U.S. specific 
Clinton’s Elections Discourse 
10. This charge is vehemently denied by Steubner and 
several of his colleagues. 
Negative 
Western/U.S. Specific 
Western Discourse / Conflict 
11. The stakes in the disagreement are high, both for 
Bosnia and for the U.S. part of the operation.  
Negative 
Western/U.S. specific 
Bosnia 
Western Discourse/ Conflict 
Bosnia /U.S. specific 
12.  They help explain the acrimonious backbiting that has 
characterized this incident and appears to infect the 
OSCEs operation.  
Negative 
OSCE - conflict 
Western Discourse/ Conflict 
OSCE Specific 
13. Steubner’s supporters worry that if the elections go 
ahead, they will tend to legitimize the forced 
population transfers, called “ethnic cleansing” that 
were carried out mainly by the Serbs during Bosnia’s 3 
½- year war, and thus bring Bosnia another step 
toward ethnic partition.  
Negative  
Western/  
Bosnian / problem perspective 
Election Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
Bosnia Discourse 
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14. Western diplomats generally agree that ethnic partition 
in Bosnia is a recipe for more war.  
Negative 
Western / Bosnian / 
Problem perspective 
Western – Bosnian Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
15. Under the Dayton peace deal, nationwide elections are 
supposed to be held in Bosnia between “six and nine 
months” from the start of the NATO-led peacekeeping 
deployment last December.  
Neutral 
Western/ Bosnian  
Election Discourse 
Western –Bosnian Discourse 
16. U.S. and other Western officials look to the elections 
to trigger a withdrawal of some of the forces and the 
first signal that an end is near for the operation, the 
most significant U.S. engagement in European security 
affairs since the end of the Cold War.  
Positive 
Western/U.S /perspective 
Election Discourse 
U.S. Discourse – Military 
17. The United States has contributed 20.000 troops, 
hundreds of millions of dollars and diplomatic 
leadership to the mission.  
Neutral 
U.S. perspective 
U.S. Discourse 
Military / Diplomatic 
18. When U.S. troops began moving into Bosnia, Clinton 
promised that the soldiers would be home within a 
year of their deployment – Dec. 20. 
Neutral 
U.S. vs. Bosnian 
U.S. Discourse 
Military/ Political 
Clinton Discourse 
19. The Pentagon has since modified that stance, saying 
U.S. troops will begin withdrawing from Bosnia on or 
around that date.  
Neutral 
U.S. / Bosnian 
U.S. Discourse 
Military/ Political 
20. Any delay of the election would probably postpone the 
pullout further, creating political problems for 
Washington.  
Positive 
U.S. 
U.S. Discourse 
Military/ Political 
21. Thus, pressure has been intense on Robert Frowick, a 
career U.S. diplomat who heads the OSCE mission to 
Bosnia, to clarify by next month that the elections will 
be held in September.  
Positive 
U.S / Bosnia 
OSCE 
Election Discourse 
U.S.Political Discourse 
22. In an interview, Frowick acknowledges that pressure 
and argued that the dangers of postponing the vote 
were greater than those associated with holding it in 
September.  
Positive 
U.S. / OSCE 
Election Discourse 
U.S: - OSCE specific 
23. “ We want to make this vote as democratic as we can, 
but people have got to understand that we’re not 
Positive Election Discourse 
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talking about an ordinary situation here at all,” he said.  U.S/OSCE OSCE/ Bosnia 
24. Frowick contended that Bosnia’s  elections are perhaps 
the most complicated in modern history.  
Positive 
OSCE/ Bosnian 
Election Discourse 
OSCE/ Bosnia 
25.  The vote for the leaders of one country, supposedly 
reunited under the Dayton plan, will take place in three 
mini-states – one Serb, one Croat and one Muslim.  
Neutral 
Dayton/ Bosnian 
Election Discourse 
Dayton / Bosnia 
Balkanization 
26.  More than 1200 foreign supervisors will be monitoring 
the voting. 
Neutral 
Western 
Election Discourse 
Western  
27.  But much of the balloting will take place outside of 
Bosnia, by the hundreds of thousands of refugees who 
await true peace so they can return to their homes.  
Neutral  
Western/ Bosnian 
Election Discourse 
Bosnia/ Refugees 
28.  And inside Bosnia, many of those voting will be doing 
so outside their villages – either by choice or because 
they were kicked out of their homes.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election Discourse 
Bosnia / voters 
29.  Bosnia’s nationwide election will have a trial run at 
the end of the month in the once divided city of 
Mostar, and already there are troubles there.  
Neutral 
Conflict 
Bosnian 
Election Discourse 
Bosnia 
Balkanization 
30.  Muslim and Serb leaders are threatening to boycott the 
vote because of a Croat demand that no absentee 
ballots be accepted.  
Negative 
Conflict 
Bosnia 
Election Discourse 
Bosnia 
Balkanization 
31.  Earlier the Muslims had agreed to the Croat demand 
but later changed their minds.  
Negative 
Conflict 
Bosnia 
Election Discourse 
Bosnia 
Balkanization 
32.  Officials divide the OSCE’s problems into two 
categories – logistical and political.  
Negative 
Conflict 
OSCE 
Election Discourse 
OSCE-specific 
33. The election program marks the first time the Vienna –
based organization has take on such a massive 
endeavour, and officials acknowledge that it has 
Negative 
OSCE -problems 
Election Discourse 
OSCE-specific 
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undergone growing pains.  
34. “We were never equipped to handle something like 
this before,” said an American official. “We are in way 
over our heads.” 
Negative 
Western 
OSCE-problems 
Election Discourse 
Western discourse 
OSCE-specific 
35. So far, OSCE officials say, the agency has still not 
opened all its planned 22 field offices, and several of 
the functioning offices lack staff.  
Negative 
Western /OSCE-problems 
Election Discourse 
Western Discourse 
OSCE-specific 
36. Money has also been a problem. Negative 
Western/OSCE 
Election Discourse 
37.  The OSCE has said it needs USD 37 million to 
implement elections and has yet to receive it from 
foreign donors.  
Negative 
Western/OSCE problems 
Election Discourse 
Western Discourse 
OSCE Specific 
38.  An internal report said that given these logistical 
challenges, the organization could not expect to 
schedule the vote until Nov. 1, four days before the 
U.S. elections.  
Negative 
U.S. perspective 
OSCE- problem 
Election Discourse 
Western  
U.S.Political Discourse 
39. That report, according to Joanna van Vliet, a 
spokeswoman for the mission, prompted a shake-up.  
Negative 
Western/OSCE -problem 
Election Discourse 
OSCE-specific 
40. “There have been problems,” she said, but we are 
adjusting to that and finding solutions.” 
Negative 
Western/ OSCE-problem 
Election Discourse 
OSCE-specific 
41. But another source of trouble faces the mission; 
Bosnia’s tattered political spectrum. 
Negative 
Bosnian problem  
Election Discourse 
Bosnia/ political 
Balkanization Discourse 
42. Under the Dayton deal, agreed to in November, 
indicted war criminals such as Karadzic and Ge. Ratko 
Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military commander, are not 
supposed to be holding leadership positions.  
Negative 
Bosnian Problem 
Election Discourse 
Bosnia/political 
Balkanization Discourse 
43. That hasn’t happened. Negative  
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44. Karadzic recently announced that he plans to run for 
another term as president of the Serb area of Bosnia.  
Negative 
Bosnian problem 
Election Discourse 
Bosnia/ political 
Balkanization Discourse 
45. Another condition set by the OSCE for a free and fair 
election in Bosnia is the development of independent 
media.  
Neutral 
Bosnian problem 
Election Discourse 
OSCE/ Bosnia concern 
46. So far that is not happening either.  Negative  
47.  Frowick last week met Croatian President Franjo 
Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic 
and requested that they advocate freer media in the 
sectors they influence in Bosnia.  
Neutral 
OSCE /Bosnian 
Election Discourse 
OSCE/Bosnia/ media 
Balkanization Discourse 
    
 Highlighted quote ( textbox):  
“We want to make this vote as democratic as we 
can.”- Robert Frowick, head of OSCE mission in 
Bosnia.  
  
 
Table 2:  Article 1- Breakdown sentence by sentence. 
Summary: 
In mid-May a particular incident called the attention of the international press. The chief of 
staff of the OSCE mission in Sarajevo, the American William Steubner, resigned. His 
resignation is linked to the attempt at resignation from the Canadian Judy Thompson, head 
of the Elections Department of the OSCE. Both resignations were through OSCE official 
channels attributed to personal reasons, while IHT refers to “officials” saying that the real 
explanation involves “..a disagreement over whether Bosnia will be ready for an election by 
September.” Steubner argues that” Bosnia will not meet any of the conditions the OSCE has 
set out for it to hold an election, such as relatively free media, the right of people to return to 
their homes and vote and, most important, exclusion from the electoral process of indicted 
war criminals, such as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.” 
Mr. Steubner was a former US Army major, who had worked in Bosnia throughout the war, 
and is in the article referred to as a republican, he supports candidate Dole and deliberately 
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seeks to derail the Bosnian election, and thus” hurting implementation of the Dayton accord 
and thus President Clinton’s re-election campaign.” 
Mr Steubner vehemently denied the charges, but he was seriously worried “… that if the 
elections go ahead, they will tend to legitimize the forced population transfers, called ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ that were carried out mainly by the Serbs during Bosnia’s 3 ½-year war, and thus 
bring Bosnia another step toward ethnic partition. Western diplomats generally agree that 
ethnic partition in Bosnia is a recipe to more war.”  The reason for the heavy U.S. 
engagement is attributed to: contribution of 20 000 troops, hundreds of million of dollars, 
and diplomatic leadership to the OSCE mission, being the U.S. career diplomat Mr, Robert 
Frowick. He was struggling to keep the deadline and has to certify that the elections will be 
held by mid-June. He expressed the view that even thought he situation is not perfect,  
postponing the vote is more dangerous than keeping the deadline. The main problems facing 
the planned elections were categorised as logistical and political. The logistical problems 
relate to OSCE-internal problems like lack of personnel and funding. The political problems 
relate to Bosnian political problems, contrary to the provisions set out in the DPA; both 
indicted war criminals Karadzic and Mladic are moving around freely and holding 
leadership positions, and another condition for holding free and fair elections set by the 
OSCE is not being met, the development of independent media.  
Main focus: were conditions met?  
The article is very negative to the main focus of the election discourse, whether conditions 
were met. Mr Steubner represents the view that conditions are not and will not be met within 
the planned deadline for the elections.  
Conflict frame 
I define the article within the conflict frame, conflict is conveyed in the headline, and the 
main message of the text is Mr. Steubner’s opposition and conflicting position to the way the 
elections preparations are conducted.  
Contextual framework:  
IC/US interests – vs. Bosnian interests 
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The overall perspective represented in this article is mainly Western and within this 
perspective U.S. interests are dominating, even when OSCE issues are discussed.  Even 
though the USA is part of the international effort represented by the OSCE to settle the 
peace through organising the elections, the overall perspective of this article reflects U.S. 
interests.  
Election Discourse and the Basic Discourses within  
As Election Discourse, the main focus of interest is also American politics; the US elections 
seem to be just as important as the elections in Bosnia, in other words the U.S. discourse 
overshadows a discourse that represents Bosnian interests.   
Steubner is referred to as supporter of the Republican candidate Dole, and the 
Clinton administration officials who are referred, say that “….Steubner has used his position 
to derail the Bosnian elections, hurting implementation of the Dayton accord and thus 
President Clintons re-election campaign.”(Sentence No. 9)  The representatives of the 
Clinton administration consider the elections in Bosnia a U.S. political issue, their discourse 
is a U.S. discourse.  
Steubner denies the charges that he is actively supporting the Dole-campaign, and his 
supporters lead the issue back to what the election discourse was supposed to be about; the 
elections in Bosnia. They use a Balkanization Discourse when expressing the worry that if 
the election goes ahead, this will tend to legitimize ethnic cleansing and bring Bosnia 
another step towards ethnic partition, which again would lead to more war. 
But another important sequence of the article goes on to explain why the US 
authorities are so keen to keep the deadline – 20 000 US troops are involved, and Clinton 
had promised that they should be home within a year of their deployment. A delay of the 
election would create political problems for Washington. Again, the focal point is American 
politics, not Bosnian, in other words a U.S. Discourse   
The article about Steubner’s resignation can serve as an example of the important 
role American domestic politics played in the US involvement with the OSCE in Bosnia and 
the planned elections.  
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Other parts of the International Community are touched upon in the sequence of the 
article referring to the OSCE. Apparently the OSCE mission in Sarajevo lacks more or less 
everything:  22 planned field offices are unopened, they lack staff and money. US elections 
are again the point of reference, since an internal report has suggested that with this speed, 
the OSCE would not be able to organise elections until 1 November, which would be four 
days before the US elections. Again, the elections in Bosnia become an important U.S. 
discourse.  
Bosnian issues are touched upon as …’a source of trouble facing the mission’…. and 
as ‘Bosnia’s tattered political spectrum’.  According to the DPA indicted war criminals were 
not supposed to run for the elections, but Karadzic had recently announced that he  ’plans to 
run for another term as president of the Serb area of Bosnia.’ 
Bosnian politics is mentioned as “ a source of trouble” for the International 
Community trying to help Bosnia organising the elections, but obviously the Bosnian’s 
themselves will not listen, Karadzic is still on the list running for office.  
When Bosnia is mentioned in the election discourse context, it is represented in a very 
negative manner, through words as:  ‘trouble’ and ‘war criminals’. Clearly these references 
are part of a Balkanization Discourse with all the meaning which is included in the term. 
The main perspective of this article is very U.S. dominated, U.S. internal politics are 
important: (the campaign Clinton vs. Dole), U.S. efforts in brokering the Dayton Peace 
Accords, U.S. intentions and efforts to prepare for and organise free and fair elections , U.S. 
efforts to guarantee security (20 000 troops).  
 The elections in Bosnia according to the article seem to be more or less a U.S. 
endeavour, with a little help from some other member states of the OSCE, and very little 
involvement from Bosnia itself. This reflects the main presupposition that the U.S. is the 
leading actor in the process of preparing the elections , and very little happens unless the 
U.S. gets involved and takes a leading role, reflecting it s natural place as the leading power 
in the New World Order.   
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Dominant –hegemonic position 
In the terms of Stuart Hall the article is definitely within the dominant code, in the sense that 
the main angle and context is U.S politics, directed at a U.S. audience, taking for granted 
that this point of departure is the dominating view of the U.S. hegemonic position within the 
New World Order.   
Main representations in the article:  
Again the International Community and its main representative, the USA dominate the 
voices that are represented in the article:   
References are made to “officials”, “Western Diplomats”, the U.S. diplomat heading the 
OSCE mission, the OSCE spokeswoman. The protagonist or leading character (William 
Steubner) is not interviewed directly in the article, only referred to through “colleagues”, 
“OSCE spokeswoman”, “Clinton administration officials” “Steubners supporters” etc.  
Another voice that comes through clearly is the voice of the Head of Mission Robert 
Frowick.  
Apart from one reference to “Bosnian Officials” there are no Bosnian voices represented in 
the article.   
Addressee 
According to Thwaites, Davis and Mules (2002:17), an addressee of a text is the position it 
constructs as its destination: where it says it is going.  
Since the article is originally published in The Washington Post, the addressee 
presumably is an American audience in the first place. The Washington Post with its 
proximity to the White House, Pentagon and the U.S. administration at large, will have a 
readership among the top U.S. administrators and politicians. An article about problems 
facing one of the most “significant U.S. engagements in European security affairs since the 
end of the Cold War”, will be directed towards central persons in State Department who are 
involved with Bosnia issues.   
But since the article also is printed in the International Herald Tribune which has a 
world-wide coverage, a much larger readership is expected: anybody out there interested in 
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international politics, and maybe U.S. foreign politics in particular. A Bosnian public, 
however, does not seem to be included as “addressees” for this article.  
I would claim that the article is intended to reach U.S. officials in power to do 
something about the situation in Bosnia, and other members of the International Community 
who might have an interest in the situation.  
A dominating U.S. discourse 
Critical Discourse Analysis focuses on how power relations and ideologies are formed 
through language, including power language of the news discourses of media. Article one 
can be considered part of a larger discourse in the context of the New World Order, where 
the hegemonic power relations in the world are set: The United States of America is the most 
powerful, and all others (including the EU, other NATO countries, the OSCE, the countries 
of South East Europe etc) have to listen to and take part in the U.S. discourse, preferably 
also abide by it. Within the U.S. discourse there are many other discourses, different 
viewpoints and opinions, for instance the political discourse defining Democrats and 
Republicans, but the dominating discourse in this article is definitely based on a U.S. 
perspective, and a perspective of the elections taking place in Bosnia ( Bosnia discourse) is 
only mentioned in a few of the clauses of the article.  
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Article 2  (IHT 17 June 1996) 
Headline:  “Alarm over Karadzic Clouds Peace Process” 
The article is written by Daniel Williams from The Washington Post Service and appeared in 
International Herald Tribune on 17 June1996.  
Code: Neutral 
Category: News Article 
 
ARTICLE 2: BREAKDOWN  SENTENCE BY SENTENCE 
No. Text Position/ 
Main Perspective 
Dominating 
discourses/ Basic 
discourses 
1. FLORENCE - Considering that he is a global pariah 
who is virtually confined to his homeland, the Bosnian 
Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, cast a remarkably 
broad shadow on the Bosnian peace process.  
Negative 
Western/Bosnian-conflict 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
2. For two days at the conference in Florence, Mr. 
Karadzic was the focus of intense and sometimes bitter 
debate among delegates to the Peace Implementation 
Council, made up of more than 40 countries and 
organizations involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia.  
Negative 
Western vs. Bosnia 
Conflict 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discoure 
3. Alarm over his continued grip on power colored 
almost every discussion about reaching an enduring 
Balkan peace.  
Negative 
Western vs. Bosnia 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
4. The U.S. envoy John Kornblum, arrived in Belgrade 
over the weekend to pressure President Slobodan 
Milosevic of Serbia to help oust Mr. Karadzic, The 
Associated Press reported.  
Positive 
U.S. vs. Balkan 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
5. Mr. Karadzic is regarded as a prime instigator of 
Serbian resistance to complying with peace accords 
signed last year in Dayton, Ohio, which ended three 
and a half years of war.  
Negative 
Western/Bosnia 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
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6. In large part due to Serbian intransigence, key 
elements of the accord designed to pacify Bosnia have 
yet to be even partially fulfilled halfway through the 
yearlong deployment of a U.S led peacekeeping force.  
Negative 
U.S./West/ vs. Balkan 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
7.  In addition, as an indicted war criminal who continues 
to travel freely in the Balkans, Mr. Karadzic 
epitomized the pitfalls inherent in the unwillingness of 
the United States and other sponsors of the Dayton 
accords to put muscle behind the agreement.  
Negative 
U.S./ West vs. Balkan 
Peace Discourse  
Balkanization Discourse 
8.  Surrender of indicted war criminals is only one 
element that is going unfulfilled.  
Negative 
Balkan 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
9. Others, including permission for the return of refugees 
to their places of origin, free travel throughout divided 
Bosnia and the creation of a free press, are being 
flouted, not only by the Serbs, but also by the Muslim-
led Bosnian government and its Croatian allies.  
Negative 
Balkan  
Dayton Discourse 
Balkanization  Discourse 
10.  “The condition we are facing is simple and at the same 
time fraught with danger,” said Antonio Cassese, 
president of the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague, 
who campaigned for Mr. Karadzic’s arrest. 
Negative 
Western vs. Balkan 
Western Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
11. He added that the credibility of leading powers – the 
United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, 
Germany – was at stake if they did not take action 
regarding the obligations that they had guaranteed.  
Negative 
Western vs. Balkan 
 
Western Discourse 
12. For all their pessimism regarding Mr Karadzic, 
officials nevertheless said they were heartened by the 
conclusion during the conference of an arms control 
agreement that they said would help stabilize the entire 
Balkan region.  
Neutral 
West / Balkan 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
Stability/ Security Discourse 
13. The accord was signed by the Bosnian factions, as well 
as Serbia and Croatia.  
Positive 
Western/ Balkan 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
Stability/ Security Discourse 
14. The agreement set ceilings on the number of weapons 
in five categories: battle tanks, artillery pieces larger 
than 75mm, armoured combat vehicles, combat planes 
and arrack helicopters.  
Positive Peace Discourse 
Stability/ Security Discourse 
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15. Yugoslavia, of which Serbia is the dominant republic, 
remains the leading regional power, with a more than 
two-to-one edge in weapons over Croatia and Bosnia.  
Neutral 
Balkan 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
Stability/ Security Discourse 
16. Under the agreement, Bosnia as a whole would be 
allowed the same number in each category as Croatia, 
but the Bosnian total is split between the Bosnian-
Croat federation and the Serb Republic and would 
allow the federation twice as many weapons a s the 
Serbs.  
Neutral 
Balkan 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
Stability/Security Discourse 
17. While detailed inventories of arsenals remain to be 
conducted, it is thought that the new limits would force 
reductions in the Serbs’ weaponry while allowing the 
federation’s to increase.  
Neutral 
Balkan 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
Stability/ Security Discourse 
18.  In 16 months, each party must be within the limits, and 
the agreement empowers international inspectors to 
monitor progress.  
Neutral 
Western/ Balkan 
Peace Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
Stability/ Security Discourse 
19. Mr. Kornblum, the U.S. envoy who was heavily 
involved in the negotiations, predicted that the accord 
would be a factor in “military stability for the entire 
region.” 
Positive 
U.S vs. Balkan 
Peace Discourse 
U.S. Discourse 
Stability/Security Discourse 
20. The United States is committed to training the mostly 
Muslim Bosnian Army and is trying to collect military 
aid from allies to fund armaments, and Mr. Kornblum 
argued that U.S. training will create a “sense of parity” 
among the Bosnians.  
Positive 
U.S. vs Bosnia 
Peace Discourse 
U.S.- Bosnian Discourse 
Stability/ Security Discourse 
21. The other major business of the conference, which 
ended Friday, was to promote countrywide elections 
by Sept. 14 meant to create a common Bosnian 
Parliament.  
Neutral 
Bosnian perspective 
Election Discourse 
 
22. On that score, the conference overlooked the apparent 
lack of human rights and democratic conditions in 
Bosnia in the name of moving ahead.  
Negative 
West vs. Bosnia 
Election Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
23. Under the Dayton accord, Sept 14 is the deadline for 
holding the vote.  
Neutral ( Factual)  
 
Election Discourse 
Western – Dayton Discourse 
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24. Dayton called for establishment of a neutral political 
environment before the elections, but according to 
ground monitors, no such climate exists, either in the 
Serb Republic or in the sectors controlled by the 
Muslim-led government and the Croats.  
Negative 
West vs. Balkan  
Election Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
25. “There is troubling evidence of a trend not only to 
accept but also to institutionalize ethnic separation,” 
said the report delivered by Carl Bildt, the 
international mediator in charge of overseeing civilian 
affairs in Bosnia.  
Negative 
Western vs. Bosnia 
Election Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
26. U.S. officials did not dispute the reports and 
complaints, but maintained that postponing elections 
would only aggravate them.  
Neutral 
U.S. / Western 
Election Discourse 
 
27. Virtually everyone in Florence agreed that as long as 
Mr. Karadzic remained head of the Bosnian Serbs’ 
republic, reconciliation would never happen.  
Negative 
Western vs. Balkan 
Election Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
28.  There was, however, a yawning gap between 
expressions of dismay at the conference and 
willingness to take steps to get rid of Mr. Karadzic.  
Negative 
Western vs. Balkan 
Election Discourse 
Western Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
29. In the end, conference members concluded it was up to 
Mr. Karadzic to make himself disappear.  
Negative 
Western vs. Balkan 
Election Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
30. “The council made clear to the leadership of the Serb 
Republic that the continuation in public authority of 
Mr Karadzic was unacceptable,” the final communiqué 
said. 
Negative 
Western vs. Balkan 
Election Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
31. “He should remove himself from the political scene.” Negative  Balkanization Discourse 
 
Table 3: Article 2-Breakdown of text  sentence by sentence. 
 
Summary:  
The reported event is a meeting in Florence of the Peace Implementation Council, made up 
of more than 40 countries and organizations involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia.  
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The article refers  the visit of U.S. envoy John Kornblum who had gone to Belgrade the 
week-end before to pressure President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia to help oust Mr. 
Karadzic “ ….the prime instigator of Serbian resistance…” and “…due to Serbian 
intransigence, not even parts of the DPA have been fulfilled “…halway through the yearlong 
deployment of a U.S.-led peacekeeping force.”  The indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic 
keeps on travelling freely in the Balkans, and thus “…epitomizes the pitfalls inherent in the 
unwillingness of the United States and other sponsors of the Dayton accord to put muscle 
behind the agreement.”  
In addition important elements like return of refugees, free travel throughout the divided 
Bosnia, and freedom of press, are being flouted by all Parties.  
At the conference an arms control agreement was signed by both the Bosnians, Serbia and 
Croatia., which was considered a positive step forward in the direction of stability in the 
area. 
The planned elections were the other major business of the conference, and a report 
presented by the High Representative Carl Bildt provided evidence that ethnic cleansing not 
only was accepted but also institutionalised. In spite of other apparent  lacks in the 
compliance with the Dayton Accords, U.S., officials still maintained that postponing 
elections only would aggravate the situation. The final communiqué from the conference 
concluded that Mr. Karadzic was a major obstacle to reconciliation in Bosnia, and it was 
important that he removed himself from the political scene.  
 
Analysis:  
Main context:  
This news report from the conference of the Peace Implementation Council is an example of 
the enormous concern shown by the International Community (IC) concerning the peace 
process in Bosnia. The U.S. is of course a part of this council, represented by the U.S. envoy 
Mr John Kornblum , who is referred to twice in the article. First in the sentence 4,  as 
someone who “arrived in Belgrade over the weekend to pressure President Slobodan 
Milosevic of Serbia to help oust Mr. Karadzic,” and again as a person predicting a positive 
development regarding the arms control agreement,  in sentence 19: “ the accord would be a 
factor in “military stability for the entire region”.  The conference takes place on 14 June, 
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only a few months before the planned elections, and is thus a key barometer of how the 
International Community was evaluating the process., with the ambiguities expressed both 
by the High Representative Carl Bildt and U.S. representatives, still deciding to keep the 
process moving on.  
Negotiated position: 
According to Hall’s division of positions, the article falls into the category “negotiated 
position”, because it contains a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements.   
The article acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic definitions, while at the same 
time sections of the article are critical to some aspects of the hegemonic position defined by 
the U.S. and the rest of the I.C. (the more than 40 countries and organisations involved in 
the reconstruction of Bosnia). For instance is there clear criticism of the U.S. and I.C. of the 
fact that Karadzic is still travelling freely in the Balkans, and of the fact that none of the 
conditions for holding the elections are fulfilled. On the other hand, the reporting of the part 
of the conference that managed to negotiate an agreement of arms control is very positive, 
thus leading me to categorise the article in the “ negotiated position”.  
Conflic frame 
Since the shadow of Karadzic is overshadowing a peace conference, I define it within 
the conflict frame, a frame often chosen by journalists to capture attention for a 
specific problem-  
Prime instigator against compliance – dichotomies: the bad guys vs. the good 
guys 
Even though the article is coded as neutral, the majority of the sentences are within the 
negative definition (18 of 31). The more positive part of the article refers to the section 
discussing the deal on arms control, which obviously is a positive step forward for the 
development towards peace in Bosnia & Hercegovina. But as the headline indicates, 
Karadzic’s shadow is clouding the peace process. And as a ‘global pariah’ as he was referred 
to in the article, Mr Karadzic was the focus of attention of the conference.  ‘Alarm over his 
continued grip on power coloured almost every discussion about reaching an enduring 
Balkan peace’  
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He is considered the ‘prime instigator of Serbian resistance to complying with (the) 
peace accords’ ……..’In large part due to Serbian intransigence, key elements of the accord 
designed to pacify Bosnia have yet to be even partially fulfilled halfway through the 
yearlong deployment of a U.S. led peacekeeping force.’ 
In other words, the bad guys, in the representation of Mr Karadzic, are here leading the 
obstacles which are preventing the peace process, delaying the fulfilment of the peace 
process so that one of the main representations of the good guys, namely U.S. troops, can go 
home.  
The ‘bad guys’ are here representing the Balkanization Discourse, whereas the ‘good 
guys’ led by the U.S. envoy Mr. Kornblum but also include the U.S. peacekeeping troops, 
represent the specific U.S. discourse which is highly present in much of the material.  
This article also conveys criticism of the US and ‘other sponsors of the Dayton accords’ 
(IC)  in sentences five, six and seven where the fact that Karadzic, as an indicted war 
criminal continues to travel freely in the Balkans, ‘epitomized the pitfalls inherent in the 
unwillingness of the United States and other sponsors of the Dayton accords to put muscle 
behind the agreement’.  
Were conditions met? 
Surrender of indicted war criminals is only one element that is going unfulfilled. ‘Others, 
including permission for the return of refugees to their places of origin, free travel 
throughout divided Bosnia and the creation of a free press, are being flouted, not only by the 
Serbs but also by the Muslim-led Bosnian government and its Croatian allies.’ The way this 
is expressed in sentence 9 of the article, it is very negative to the process. I have called this a 
specific ‘Dayton discourse’ within the Peace Discourse, and all three Parties held 
responsible for the lack of compliance, truly within the ‘Balkanization Discourse.’ 
The section discussing the ‘ the other major business of the conference, …’to 
promote countrywide elections by Sept14 meant to create common Bosnian Parliament’ is 
not reported as undivided favourable. The conference overlooked ‘the apparent lack of 
human rights and democratic conditions in Bosnia in the name of moving ahead’. According 
to the Dayton Peace Accords, before elections there should be a neutral political 
environment, and referring to ‘ground monitors’, ‘no such climate exists, either in the Serb 
Republic or in the sectors controlled by the Muslim-led government and the Croats.’ 
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(Sentence 24.)  Underscoring the serious situation, the report from High Representative Carl 
Bildt, about institutionalising ethnic cleansing adds to the negative perspective.  
 
Within the Election Discourse of these paragraphs the Balkanization Discourse 
dominates and the main actors within this discourse are blamed for aggravating the situation.  
Still the U.S. representatives maintain that the process must go on, ‘maintaing that 
postponing the elections would only aggravate them.’ (Sentence 26.) 
 
Peace Discourse including Western Discourse vs. Balkanization Discourse 
U.S. politics is not so much at the forefront in this article as in article 1. The interest in 
making the peace plan and the elections work seem to be shared by all the 40 nations of the 
Peace Implementation Council, although the U.S. perspective is strongly represented 
through the reported speech of Mr John Kornblum.  
The voices represented are thus the U.S. through Mr Kornblum, the rest of the 
International Community through the Peace Implementation Council and representatives 
such as the president of the UN war crimes tribunal, Antonio Cassese and the High 
Representative, Carl Bildt.  
Bosnia and Bosnian interests are represented in a very negative manner. The 
Balkanization Discourse is dominating all references to Bosnia and other Balkan actors. The 
main focus of interest is Mr Radocan Karadzic, the former Bosnian Serb leader. In the article 
he is the main representative of the ‘Other’ , epitomizing all that is negative and bad and 
making problems for the process and the good intentions of the Western/U.S. ‘Self’.  
Mr Karadzic’s name is mentioned 12 times in the article. He is characterised as the main 
reason why the peace process is not proceeding. According to the article, he literally threw a 
‘broad shadow’ over the peace conference (1st sentence) 
He was the focus of ‘intense and sometimes bitter debate’ (2nd sentence), the strong U.S. 
envoy Mr Kornblum had to go to Belgrade to talk to another strong man, president Slobodan 
Milosevic of Serbia to ask for help to oust Mr Karadzic, (4th sentence). 
He is regarded the ‘prime instigator to Serbian compliance with peace accords.’ (5th 
sentence) 
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He ‘epitomized the pitfalls inherent in the unwillingness of the United States and 
other sponsors of  the Dayton accords to put muscle behind the agreement.’ (7th sentence). 
He puts the ‘credibility of leading powers – the United States, Russia, France, the United 
Kingdom, Germany –‘ at stake ‘if they did not take action regarding the obligations that 
they had guaranteed.’ (sentence 9). 
Virtually everyone present in Florence agreed that as long as he ‘remained head of the 
Bosnian Serb’s republic, reconciliation would never happen’ ( sentence 27). 
The article pints at a ‘yawning gap between expressions of dismay at the conference and 
willingness to take steps to get rid of Mr Karadzic’ (sentence 28) 
As a conclusion, the conference members meant ‘it was up to Mr. Karadzic to make himself 
disappear’ (sentence 29) 
Although the council managed to make it clear to ‘the leadership of the Serb republic that 
the continuation in public authority of Mr Karadzic was unacceptable’, according to the 
final communiqué. ( sentence 30) 
‘He should remove himself from the political scene’ (sentence 31). 
 
Main representations: 
As mentioned already, U.S. politics is not as much to the forefront of the scope of interest in 
this article as in Article 1. In this article the broader interest of the international community 
is at the forefront. But how are Bosnian interests represented?  
Bosnian interests as a country struggling for peace and democratic development are not 
represented in the article at all. Bosnia is represented through the opposite of peace and 
democracy, namely through Mr Karadzic, hardly a representation to be proud of. The 
representation of Bosnia in this text is as passive, as a  ‘patient’, receiving help from the 
actors, the international community led by the USA.  
 
Addressee: 
As in Article 1, also since the article originally was printed in the Washington Post, the 
Addresses for this article will be the same audience: primarily an American audience, 
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hopefully powerful politicians in the proximity to the government institutions in Washington 
D.C. through the International Herald Tribune, a more mixed audience is reached, 
international intellectuals who want to and need to have knowledge of international politics. 
Included in this audience may also be some Bosnians, but they do not constitute the main 
addressee for this article either although Bosnian Muslims would be pleased by the content.   
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Article 3 (IHT 23 July 1996) 
Headline: “2 ‘Lone rangers’ in Diplomacy: Holbrooke and 
Germany ‘s ‘008’ 15- U.S. mediator in Spotlight for success on Karadzic “ 
Article written by Michael Dobbs, Washington Post Service, published in the International 
Herald Tribune on 23 July 1996.  
Code: Positive 
Category: News Article 
ARTICLE 3:  BREAKDOWN SENTENCE BY SENTENCE 
No. Text Position / 
Main Perspective 
Dominating 
discourses/Basic 
Discourses 
1. BELGRADE – having spent much of the night 
negotiating with obdurate Bosnian Serbs, Richard C. 
Holbrooke, Washington’s special envoy, was not in 
the mood to be kept waiting by CNN.  
Neutral 
U.S.vs.Balkan 
U.S. Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
2. When a producer in New York told him his live 
interview was being delayed a few minutes to make 
way for another update on the TWA airlines disaster, 
he launched into one of his celebrated rages.  
Neutral 
U.S.  
Media Discourse 
U.S. Discourse 
3. “You don’t understand,” he growled over the satellite 
hookup.” We have to be back in Washington for 
meeting at the White House, I must report to the 
secretary of state.  
Neutral 
U.S.  
U.S. Discourse 
4.  Our aircraft has a fixed slot time. If we don’t get this 
slot, we will have to overnight in Shannon, Ireland.” 
 U.S. discourse 
5. The architect of November’s peace agreement for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina looked ostentatiously at his 
watch.  “We have to leave this building in precisely 
seven minutes.” 
Positive U.S. discourse 
                                              
15 The part of the article matching the part of the title “Germany’s ‘008’ was not included in the material, and is not part of 
the analysis. To keep the correct reference the title is kept as it was in the original material, see page 136. 
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6. The outburst evoked howls of laughter from members 
of the U.S. negotiating team, gathered in the control 
room of Belgrade television to watch their boss tell 
CNN how he had arranged the removal from poser of 
the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic.  
Positive 
U.S. vs. Bosnia 
U.S. discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
7.  This was vintage Holbrooke.   U.S. discourse 
8. The notion of a fixed “slot time” at Belgrade airport – 
at this time one of the world’s most underused air 
facilities - was preposterous.  
 
U.S. vs. Balkan 
U.S. discourse 
9. But what did that matter, as long as the threat of a 
walkout was credible to the CNN producers in New 
York?  
Neutral Media discourse 
10. With a minute or so to go to air time, CNN caved in. Neutral Media discourse 
11. Mr. Holbrooke would go first, at top of the hour, 
relegating news of the air disaster to second place.  
Positive 
U.S. 
Media discourse 
 
12. Chalk up another – albeit minor – negotiating triumph 
for one of the most accomplished practitioners of 
shuttle diplomacy since Henry A. Kissinger was 
secretary of state.  
Positive 
U.S. 
U.S. Discourse 
Political Discourse 
13. Mr. Holbrooke  retired from the State Department in 
February to spend more time with his new wife, Kati 
Marton, and to work for a Wall Street firm.  
Neutral /factual 
U.S, 
U.S. discourse 
14. (Some officials at the State Department suspect that his 
goal is to become secretary of state in a second Clinton 
administration.)  
Neutral U.S. discourse 
Political Discourse 
15. But last week, the 55-year –old diplomat was back to 
his old tricks, shuttling furiously between Balkan 
capitals, twisting the arms of assorted strongmen, 
giving interviews as he dive in and out of presidential 
offices and surviving on three to four hours of sleep a 
night.  
Positive 
U.S. vs. Balkan 
U.S. Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
16. In sweeping historical terms, there was not that much 
to show for this frenetic activity.  
Neutral  
17. Under intense pressure both from the West and the 
Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, Mr Karadzic 
agreed to step down as leader of the Bosnian Serbs.  
Positive 
U.S. vs. Balkan 
Western Discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
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18. He will be replaced by politicians who are no less 
nationalistic than he is.  
Negative 
Balkan 
Political discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
19. There was no mention in the agreement of the Bosnian 
Serbs’ military leader, General Ratko Mladic, who, 
like Mr. Karadzic, has been indicted for genocide by 
the war crimes tribunal at The Hague.  
Negative 
Balkan 
Political discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
20. And Bosnia still seems headed for ethnic partition.  Negative 
Bosnian 
Balkanization discourse 
21. In tactical terms, however, Mr. Holbrooke’s mission 
was a success.  
Positive 
U.S.vs. Bosnia 
U.S.Discourse 
22.  Mr. Karadzic’s resignation enables Washington to 
claim that the minimal conditions have been met for 
“free and fair elections” on Sept.14.  
Positive 
U.S vs. Bosnia 
Elections discourse 
23. It lessens the embarrassment for the Clinton 
administration, which has been campaigning for 
months to win the ouster of General Mladic and Mr. 
Karadzic.  
Positive 
U.S. vs. Bosnia 
Election discourse 
U.S. discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
24. The political heat is now off the United States to 
organize an operation to capture the two men, which, if 
it went wrong, could have adversely affected Mr. 
Clinton’s re-election chances.  
Positive 
U.S. vs.Bosnia 
U.S. political 
Election discourse 
U.S. discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
25. In short, Mr. Holbrooke has proved himself 
indispensable yet again.  
Positive 
U.S. 
U.S. Discourse 
26. He has succeeded where other failed. Positive 
U.S. 
U.S. discourse 
27. The way he orchestrated public and private pressure 
against the Bosnian Serbs, taking one step at a time, 
was reminiscent of his tactics during the months 
leading up to the Dayton peace accord. 
Positive 
U.S. 
U.S. discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
28. Then, as now, he sought to “lock in” any progress by 
going public before anyone could have second 
thoughts.  
Positive 
U.S. 
U.S. discourse 
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Table 4:  Article 3- Breakdown of text sentence by sentence 
 
Summary 
The U.S. diplomat who brokered the Dayton Peace Agreement, Richard C. Holbrooke, 
leaves for the Balkans to “talk to the Serbs” to put a pressure on them to make Karadzic step 
down. He manages to get such a promise, and the election campaign can start. The report 
opens by describing Holbrooke as he manipulates the CNN to make his story the top 
headline story by looking ostentatiously at his watch and claiming an airplane would be 
leaving at a very specific time, and he would have to leave the building in seven minutes… 
The article applauds the accomplishments of the diplomat, by ‘ chalking up another – 
albeit minor – diplomatic triumph for one of the most accomplished practitioners of shuttle 
diplomacy since Henry A.  Kissinger was secretary of state.’  
It is implied that Holbrooke’s ambition is to become the next Secretary of State. His 
frenetic shuttle diplomacy resulted in the promise of Mr Karadzic to step down as leader of 
the Bosnian Serb Party ( SDS), thus enabling Washington to claim that the minimal 
conditions have been met for ‘free and fair elections on Sept. 14.’  According to the article, 
this lessens the embarrassment fro the Clinton administration, which for months had been 
campaigning for the ouster of General Mladic and Mr. Karadzic. However, there was no 
mention of General Mladic as part of the result of Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy. The 
article is very preoccupied with Clinton’s chances of re-election, which have improved 
thanks to Holbrook’s heroic efforts. 
 
Analysis:  
Context: 
According to the timeline for the elections, the election campaign was supposed to start on 
July 14. But as the title of Article 2 implies, the ‘dark shadow of Karadzic’ was still 
preventing it. As long as Karadzic as an indicted war criminal appeared on the list of the 
Bosnian Serb Party  (SDS), this was so much against   the Dayton Peace Agreement, that the 
U.S. ambassador in charge of the OSCE in Sarajevo, Mr. Frowick, postponed the elections 
until Karadzic had stepped down as party leader and candidate for the SDS. The pressure on 
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the Clinton administration to make Mr. Karadzic step down was felt very strongly by the 
OSCE mission in Sarajevo and particularly heavy on Mr, Frowick’s shoulders. With Mr. 
Holbrooke’s shuttle diplomacy this pressure was now relieved, and the preparation for the 
elections could go on as planned.  
Positive code: The article is coded as positive, because the majority of the sentences (13 out 
of 28) are characterized as positive (see the definitions of the codes on page 99-10). 
Perspective:  
The article reflects a U.S. sphere of interest. By visiting Belgrade in a hurry, talking to 
Milosevic and Karadzic, Holbrooke manages to make them agree to make Karadzic step 
down. In doing so, Mr Holbrooke is saving Clinton’s face, and paving the way for the 
elections to go on as planned – ‘the minimal conditions have been met for “free and fair 
elections”’. At the same time this act ‘lessens the embarrassment for the Clinton 
administration, which has been campaigning for months to win the ouster of General Mladic 
and Mr Karadzic. The U.S. sphere of interest is underlined by the following sentence (No. 
24) : ‘The political heat is now off the United States to organize an operation to capture the 
two  men, which, if it went wrong, could have adversely affected Mr. Clinton’s re-election 
chances.”  
Election Discourse as U.S. Discourse 
The article is part of an elections discourse, in the sense that elections are mentioned, but 
only as Clinton’s re-election. Whoever thought this was about elections in Bosnia, would 
have to look elsewhere. I have therefore categorized most of the articles as part of a basic 
discourse type called ‘U.S. Discourse’, see definition pages 104-106.  Some of them are 
purely media discourse, while others are Political Discourse within the U.S. Discourse.  
Were conditions met?  
The reason why Holbrook had to undertake his speedy diplomatic mission was of course to 
save the Dayton Peace Accords and the scheduled elections. The whole operation is meant to 
limit the effect of the acknowledged fact that one of the main conditions of the DPA was still 
disturbing the preparations for the elections, and jeopardizing the U.S. intentions. But 
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through his successful mission, Washington is now able “to claim that the minimal 
conditions have been met for “free and fair” elections on Sept. 14”.  
Dominant – hegemonic position 
In the terms of Hall, this article can be defined within the dominant – hegemonic 
position. It is very positive to the U.S. definition of the situation towards Bosnia, and the 
problems of Bosnia seem to be solved in the best way by Americans. 
Responsibility frame 
The article is defined within the responsibility frame, focusing on the main representative for 
U.S. responsible politics towards Bosnia, Mr. Holbrooke.  
Representation - A tale of a hero 
The main actor in this article is Mr Richard C. Holbrooke. In fact he is presented as a hero. 
This is the tale of the hero who managed to talk some sense to the hardliners in Belgrade, 
who was the main actor in the brokering of the deal that led to the Dayton Peace Accords. 
The article refers to the manner he manipulates the CNN as ‘vintage Holbrooke’ (sentence 
No. 7). He is referred to as ‘one of the most accomplished practitioners of shuttle diplomacy 
since Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state ‘ (sentence No. 12). 
The article shows some ambiguity concerning how important his latest success was, 
but leaves us with the definite impression that his furious shuttle between Balkan capitals, 
‘twisting the arms of assorted strongmen, giving interviews as he dived in and out of 
presidential offices and surviving on three to four hours of sleep a night’ still was a major 
accomplishment that apparently only Mr. Holbrooke could manage.   
The ambiguity is also shown concerning the importance of the result of Holbrooke’s 
efforts. The fact that Mr Karadzic agreed to step down as leader of the Bosnian Serbs, will 
probably have the result that ‘he will be replaced by politicians who are no less nationalistic 
than he is.’ ( Sentence No.18) And in sentence 20: ‘Bosnia still seems headed for ethnic 
partition.’  
But Holbrooke saved the face of his President, and helped pave the way for the 
elections to be held within the deadline, 14 September 1996. In this context he becomes a 
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hero. So the main actor in this discourse, Mr Richard Holbrooke, represents America, the 
“good guy” who lets nothing stop him, travels all the way from Washington D.C to Belgrade 
with the sole ambition to talk sense to the “bad guys” ( Milosevic and Karadzic) and makes 
them obey!  
Holbrooke has proved himself ‘indispensable’; he has ‘succeeded where others 
failed’( sentences No 25 & 26). ‘The way he orchestrated public pressure against the 
Bosnian Serbs, taking one step at a time, was reminiscent of his tactics during the months 
leading up to the Dayton peace accord.’ (Sentence No.27) The true American hero is back 
on the scene, cleaning up the mess after all the other failures ( e.g. Europeans, other 
members of IC). And the final sentence that further proves the geniality of this man: ‘Then, 
as now, he sought to “lock in “ any progress by going public before anyone could have 
second thoughts.’ (Sentence No. 28):.And seen through the eyes of the media community, 
represented by the journalist writing the piece, the assumption that Holbrooke is a true hero 
is underlined by such a deliberate way of using the press.  
The representation of the peace process in Bosnia is as an American project. The Bosnians 
are not represented in the article at all, apart from in the shape of everybody’s main enemy, 
Mr Karadzic, and as one of the incarnations of the Balkanization Discourse.  
 
Addressee: 
The addressee for this article will be the same as for the former two articles: originally 
written for the Washington Post and printed in the International Herald Tribune. The hope 
would be that a positive article like this one would have a positive effect on the environment 
surrounding the White House in Washington D.C. , boosting the president’s image as still 
the leading figure in the peace process in Bosnia.  
And through the worldwide distribution of the International Herald Tribune the same 
positive image of president Clinton would not hurt either.  
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Article 4  (IHT 23 August 1996) 
Headline: “Bosnian Serb Switches from Purges to 
PoliticsWill election Legitimize Cleansers?” 
Article written by John Pomfret , Washington Post Service, published in The International 
Herald Tribune on August 23, 1996  
Code : Negative   
Category: News Article 
ARTICLE 4: BREAKDOWN OF SENTENCES 
No. Text Position/  
Main representation 
Dominating 
discourses/Basic 
discourses 
1. VIENNA-The last time Almira Huntic remember 
seeing Vojkan Djurkovic , the Bosnian Serb militia 
commander had just extorted her life savings of $ 600, 
she said, sold her house out from under her and was 
promising that the would not kill her and her mother – 
just expel them from their home.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Bosnia discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
2. Mr Djurkovic and his gang of gunmen ultimately 
banished Miss Huntic and about 30.000 other Muslims 
and Croats from around the east Bosnian city of 
Bijeljina, according to Western aid officials.  
Negative 
Western vs. Bosnian 
Bosnia discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
3. They looted and auctioned off the exiles’ houses, and 
made themselves very rich men. 
Negative 
Bosnian 
Bosnia discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
4. Mr. Djurkovic, in a recent interview, referred to his 
campaign of expulsions as “the Djurkovic model.” 
Negative 
Bosnian 
Bosnia discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
5. “If not for me, they would have ended up like the 
Muslims in Srebrenica,” he said, referring to the 
massacre of thousands of Muslims by Bosnian Serb 
forces.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
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6. “I won my battle against them, but I saved their lives.” Negative 
Bosnian 
Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
7. Now Miss Huntic and thousands of refugees which 
were expelled from Serb-held territory in Bosnia are 
locked in another battle with men like Mr. Djurkovic 
who have laid down their weapons and launched 
political campaigns instead.   
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
8. This one will be fought not on the streets but in the 
ballot boxes on Sept,.14, the day set for Bosnia’s 
nationwide elections.  
Neutral 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
9. The class could not be clearer.  Negative Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
10. On one side are Miss Huntic’s hopes that Bosnia’s 
elections, as envisaged by the Dayton peace accord, 
will set the stage for her eventual return home.  
Positive 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Dayton discourse 
11. On the other is Mr. Djurkovic’s wish to use the 
elections to ensure that none of his victims come back 
and to legitimise his version of “ethnic cleansing.”  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
12. In the words of a senior UN official he is seeking to 
“anoint himself with the holy water of the vote.” 
Negative Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
13. Mr. Djurkovic and others like him seem set to win 
again.  
Negative Election discourse 
14. After organizing and carrying out the bulk of the 
ethnic purges in Bijeljina as the local head of the 
ominously titled Office of Population Exchange, 
Western officials say, Mr Djurkovic has changed hats, 
from mobster to politician.  
Negative 
Western vs. Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
15. He is running for the post of deputy mayor.  Neutral Election discourse 
16. His party is somehow ironically named the Serb 
Refugee Democratic Party.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
17. Nothing prevents Mr. Djurkovic from running. Negative Election discourse 
18. Although Western aid officials said they had amassed 
substantial documentation linking him to widespread 
ethnic purges and the brutalization of scores of 
Negative Election discourse 
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Muslims, he has not been indicted by the international 
war crimes tribunal in The Hague.  
Western vs. Bosnian Balkanization discourse 
19. Western officials said he had been the representative 
of the Serbian paramilitary leader, Zeljko Raznatovic, 
known as Arkan, one of the most violent of the 
Belgrade-based Serbian mercenaries operating in 
Bosnia from 199 to 1995.  
Negative 
Western vs. Balkan 
Bosnia discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
20.  But only people indicted by the tribunal are banned 
from the ballot.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
21.  “It just shows how perverted this whole election 
process is,” said an American official working with the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
which is coordinating the vote.  
Negative 
Western vs. Bosnia 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
22. “This election will take a guy like that and legitimize 
him.” 
Negative 
Western vs. Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
23. Miss Huntic is one of  641.010 Bosnian refugees 
living in 55 countries abroad who have registered to 
vote along with more than a million people in Bosnia.  
Positive 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
24. But she will not vote for Mr. Djurkovic.  Negative Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
25.  Miss Huntic said she would vote for Muslim 
candidates who were refugees like her and who had 
not dared to return to Bjiljelina since Mr. Djurkovic 
kicked them out three years ago.  
Positive 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
26. “What happens if my candidates win,” said Miss 
Huntic, who is in a refugee center on the outskirts of 
Vienna.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
27. “Will NATO drive them to their offices in a tank.” Negative 
West vs. Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
28. Miss Huntic’s question cuts to the heart of one of the 
issues bedevilling the Western organizers of Bosnia’s 
elections and the NATO commanders backing them 
up.  
Negative 
West vs. Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
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29.  Election officials believe there is high probability that 
Muslim refugees, like those from Bijeljina and other 
towns in eastern Bosnia, will succeed in electing 
Muslim politicians in areas seized by the Serbs. 
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
30. But how will the victors be able to go to work if the 
town hall is occupied by Serbian gunmen like Mr. 
Djurkovic?  
Negative  
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
31.  A NATO spokesman said this week that the alliance 
had no intention of escorting politicians to work. 
“That’s not our job,” the spokesman said.  
Negative 
Western  
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
32. But few, if any, Muslims would dare venture into the 
heart of Serb-held territory without an escort.   
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
33.  “We would not allow Muslim politicians to come 
back,” Mr. Djurkovic said.  
Negative  
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
34. He added that he recently started a private protection 
agency that Western aid officials believed would be 
used to keep Muslims from returning home.  
Negative 
Western / Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
35.  The Dayton peace plan saw the elections as a way to 
cement ties between the Muslims and the Croats, and 
between their federation and the Serbs.  
Positive 
Western /Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
36. But instead of uniting Bosnia and helping refugees like 
Miss Huntic go home, the elections will strengthen Mr. 
Djurkovic and his brand of criminal nationalism, 
Western officials said.  
Positive 
Western vs. Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
    
37. The ramifications of this scenario do not bode well for 
Bosnia.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
38. The Muslim led government signed the Dayton peace 
agreement only because it guaranteed refugees, mostly 
Positive Dayton discourse 
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Muslims, the right to return home.  Bosnian Bosnian discourse 
39. If that right were stymied by the election, numerous 
Western official predicted, then there would be more 
war in Bosnia. 
Negative 
Western vs. Bosnian  
Election discourse 
Bosnian diacourse 
Balkanization discourse 
40. “The Muslims will fight because they have no other 
option,” said a long serving senior UN official in 
Bosnia.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
41. Referring to the Muslims’ right to return home, he 
said, “if that right evaporates, they will attack.” 
Negative 
Bosnian 
Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
 
Table 5: Article 4 – breakdown of text sentence by sentence. 
Summary:   
The main focus of the article is the perspective of a young female Bosnian Muslim refugee, 
Miss Huntic, who was expelled from her house in Bijeljina and is presently living in Vienna. 
Mr. Djurkovic and his gang was the main perpetrator of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ she was a 
victim of, and  Mr Djurkovic is now running as candidate for the post of deputy major in her 
former home town. The opposite situation of the two Bosnians is the focal point of the 
article, discussing both the fact that persons like Mr. Djurkovic can run freely as a candidate 
of the elections, and that Miss Huntic even though she had a possibility to vote as a refugee, 
the Muslim candidate she votes for will not have the possibility to take office as long as 
persons like gunmen like Mr. Djurkovic will occupy the town hall.  Or ‘ Will NATO drive 
them to the office in a tank?’ is her rhetoric questions, to which NATO –officials say no.  
The fear expressed in the article is that the elections will strengthen nationalists like Mr. 
Djurkovic instead of helping refugees like Miss Huntic go home. The article refers Western 
officials expressing the fear that if the elections don’t contribute to guarantee the right of the 
refugees to return, war will break out in Bosnia again  
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Analysis:  
Dramatic context: clashing interests  
The article presents a rather dramatic plot, visualising one of the central conflicts in 
the Bosnian context: the conflict between the persecuted Bosnian Muslims who had 
to leave all their belongings and homes behind and become refugees in foreign 
countries, and the persecutor, in this case represented as a Bosnian Serb militia 
commander, belonging to one of the most notoriously violent paramilitary gangs of 
the war, Arkan’s men. Miss Huntic, representing the victims of ethnic cleansing, and 
Mr Djurkovic, representing the cleansers.  
Negative code: 
The article is coded as negative because almost a large majority (33 out of 41) of the 
sentences in the article expresses a negative attitude towards the elections.  
Change of perspective: 
As an exception to the other articles in the selection for analysis where the perspective is 
mostly Western or more precisely a U.S. perspective, the main perspective of this article is 
Bosnian. The main actors interviewed are Bosnians, representing two sides of the conflict: 
Ms Almira Huntic is Bosnian Muslim interviewed in a refugee camp in Vienna, and Mr 
Vojkan Djurkovic, a former Bosnian Serb militia commander, now running for the local 
elections in the home town, Bijeljina in Eastern Bosnia. This was also the former home town 
of Ms Huntic, from where she and her family had been expelled by exactly Mr Djurkovic 
and his men during the war.  
The journalist uses the two characters to visualize two important perspectives in the 
election discourse: the perspectives of the ‘cleansed’ and of the ‘cleanser’.  ‘The clash could 
not be clearer. On one side are Miss Huntic’s hopes that Bosnia’s elections, as envisaged by 
the Dayton peace accord, will set the stage for her eventual return home. On the other is Mr. 
Djurkovic’s wish to use the elections to ensure that none of his victims come back and to 
legitimize his version of “ethnic cleansing”. In the words of a senior UN official, he is 
seeking to “anoint himself with the holy water of the vote”. (Sentences No. 9 through12). 
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The two Bosnian characters , Miss Huntic and Mr Djurkovic, are the main actors in 
the article, presented as agents in the terms of Van Dijk. (Van Dijk 1988:9) They are the 
driving forces behind the development of the story in this article. The Western perspective in 
this article is represented by anonymous voices, referred to as Western diplomats, Senior UN 
officials, Western officials, Western organizers of elections, NATO spokesman etc.  In other 
words, presented as less important, not in the first subject position.   
Were conditions met? 
The dramatic contrast in the main plot of the article is that the villain, Mr Djurkovic, is 
running for the local elections in the hometown, Bijeljina. According to the Dayton 
everything is fine: Miss Huntic is allowed to cast her vote for a candidate running in her 
home town, even if she is living abroad. And there is no provision against Mr Djurkovic 
being a candidate for the elections; he is not on the list of war criminals indicted by the 
tribunal in Hague. In the words of one of the anonymous persons expressing views in the 
article, an American official working for the OSCE:  “It just shows how perverted this whole 
election process is,”……”this election will take a guy like that and legitimize 
him.”(Sentences No. 21 & 22). This American election official is criticising the planned 
election. This is a criticism of the result of the Dayton, which looks good on paper, but when 
it comes down to the grass roots level like in this instance, dose not work for the best of the 
people of Bosnia. In other words, this is not just a criticism of a situation whether the 
conditions set down in the DPA were met or not, this is a criticism of the way Dayton was 
functioning, a basic criticism of the procedure.  
The second important issue in the article relates to the provision in the DPA on 
“freedom of movement.” Miss Huntic is worried about what happens if her preferred 
Muslim candidates (also refugees like her) would win. How are they going to be able to 
enter the Town Hall of Bijeljina if it is occupied by “Serbian gunmen like Mr Djurkovic?” ( 
Sentences No. 26 & 27 and 30) 
And NATO does not give much relieve, a NATO spokesman says that the alliance 
has no intention of escorting politicians to work. “That’s not our job”, he is quoted as 
saying.  
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( Sentence No. 31) And since Mr Djurkovic says that “We would not allow Muslim 
politicians to come back,” it is believed that …“few, if any, Muslims will dare venture into 
the heart of Serb-held territory without an escort.” ( Sentences No. 32 &33).  
The conclusion, again referring to Western officials, will be that the elections 
according to the Dayton peace plan, which was meant to cement the ties between the 
federation of Muslims and Croats and the Serbs, will strengthen Mr. Djurkovic and his brand 
of criminals. According to the article, Western officials also predicted that if the right of 
Muslims to return home will be stymied by the elections, there would be more war in 
Bosnia.  
Bosnian perspective – Bosnian Discourses 
In this article the Bosnian perspective and a Bosnian Discourse and the Balkanization 
Discourse dominate completely. This is a way the journalist tries to visualise how the 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord works for the people it is meant to help, the 
Bosnians. Through using representatives from the opposing groups, we are taken to the core 
of the problem: the possible return of Muslim refugees who have been expelled from their 
homes, and the hard-line Bosnian Serb militiaman who has turned politician.  
This is at the core of a specific Bosnian discourse, and visualizes central problems of the 
Balkanization Discourse.  
Addressee 
This article is also part of the Washington Post Service printed in the International Herald 
Tribune, and as such most likely also directed towards the political elites in Washington,  as 
a warning about how high level politics may function on the ground.  
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Article 5  (IHT 31 Aug/1 September 1996)  
Headline: “Dole Presses Clinton to Delay Vote by 
Bosnians” 
 
Article written by William Claiborne, Washington Post Service, published in the 
International Herald Tribune on Saturday- Sunday August 31 to September 1 1996.  
Code : Negative 
Category: News Article 
 
ARITCLE 5:  BREAKDOWN SENTENCE BY SENTENCE 
No. Text Position / Main 
representation  
Dominating 
discourses/Basic 
discourses 
1. SAN LUIS OBISPO, California – Bob Dole has urged 
President Bill Clinton to postpone presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Bosnia- Herzegovina, 
saying that under present conditions, the Sept. 14 
balloting will be a “fraud with the American stamp of 
approval. “ 
Negative 
U.S. vs. Bosnia 
Election discourse 
U.S. discourse 
2. Mr. Dole, the Republican presidential nominee, called 
the planned elections “ a sham in the making.” He said 
opposition candidates had been intimidated, refugees 
had been unable to return to their homes, and war 
criminals were roaming free.  
Negative 
U.S. / Bosnian 
Election discourse 
U.S. /Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
3. He also said that there had been little progress toward 
development of independent media ant that freedom of 
movement had not been established within Bosnia.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Human Rights Discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
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4. “Elections held under these circumstances will only 
serve to unfairly legitimise national extremists, 
entrench ethnic divisions and condemn Bosnia and its 
people to authoritarianism and partition, ” Mr. Dole 
said Thursday in a letter to Mr. Clinton that the Dole 
campaign release on the next-to-last day of a weeklong 
vacation and campaigning trip to California. 
Negative 
Bosnian  
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
Balkanization Discourse 
5. Municipal elections in Bosnia were postponed 
indefinitely this week by the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe..  
Neutral/ fact Election discourse 
6.  However, the Clinton administration has said that 
presidential and parliamentary elections should 
proceed as scheduled.  
Positive 
U.S. / Bosnian 
Election discourse 
7. “I cannot conceive of a single compelling national 
interest for pressing forward on Sept.14,” Mr Dole 
said.  
Negative Election discourse 
8. “Indeed to the contrary” I believe that putting 
American prestige behind such a process only serves 
to undermine our leadership and makes a mockery of 
our commitment to democratic principles, while 
making it more difficult for U.S. troops in Bosnia to 
accomplish their goals.  
Negative 
U.S. vs. Bosnia 
Election discourse 
U.S. discourse 
9. I cannot comprehend why the United States supports 
holding election sunder such circumstances.” 
Negative 
U.S. 
Election discourse 
U.S. discourse 
10. Mr. Dole said U.S. policy towards Bosnia was “in 
need of serious alternations.” 
Negative 
U.S. vs Bosnia 
Political discourse 
U.S. discourse 
11.  Mr. Dole did not refer to the Bosnian elections in a 
campaign speech to several thousand enthusiastic 
supporters here. 16 
  
12.  But he reiterated his campaign promises that he would 
never relegate decisionmaking in critical matters 
affecting U.S. foreign policy to he United Nations or 
any of its organizations.  
  
                                              
16 Sentences from 11 through 15 in this article do not touch the topic of Bosnia and are therefore not part of the analysis.  
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13. Mr. Dole’s campaign also released a letter he wrote to 
Vice president Al Gore in which he sharply criticized  
Mr. Gore’s speech Wednesday night at the Democratic 
National Convention.  
  
14.  Recalling that Mr. Gore had referred to him as one half 
of a “Two headed monster.” 
  
15.  Mr. Dole said the comment was a “sad statement that 
certainly did nothing to restore civility to our political 
discourse.” 
  
 
Table 6: Article 5 – breakdown of text sentence by sentence. 
Summary: 
In a campaign speech in California, the Republican presidential nominee, Bob Dole, has 
urged President Bill Clinton to postpone presidential and parliamentary elections in Bosnia-
Herzegovian, saying that under present conditions, the Sept 14 balloting will be a” fraud 
with the American stamp of approval”.Mr. Dole, called the planned elections a “sham in the 
making”. He said opposition candidates had been intimidated, refugees had been unable to 
return to their homes, and war criminals were roaming free. Ha also said that there had been 
little progress toward development of independent media and that freedom of movement had 
not been established within Bosnia.  
 “Elections held under these circumstances will only serve to unfairly legitimize 
national extremists, entrench ethnic divisions and condemn Bosnia and its people to 
authoritarianism and partition.” ( Sentence No.4) In a letter to Mr Clinton, Mr. Dole 
expresses his concern saying that he cannot see …” a single compelling national interest for 
pressing forward on Sept. 14 “ “Indeed to the contrary, I believe that putting American 
prestige behind such a process only serves to undermine our leadership and makes a 
mockery of our commitment to democratic principles, while making it more difficult for U.S. 
troops in Bosnia to accomplish their goals. I cannot comprehend why the United States 
supports holding elections under such circumstances.” He added that U.S. policy toward 
Bosnia was “in need of serious alteration.” ( Sentences No. 7 through 10). 
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Analysis  
Context  
The clear context of this article is U.S. domestic politics and the up-coming U.S. elections 
where Senator Robert J. Dole is the Republican opposition candidate to the Democrat Bill 
Clinton. As in the first article, the main issue reflected in the article is U.S. foreign politics, 
of which politics in Bosnia is an important part.   
 
In the lead paragraph Mr Dole urges president Clinton to postpone  “presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina” saying that under present condition, “…the 
Sept. 14 balloting will be a ‘fraud with the American stamp of approval’.” 
The presupposition here would be that it is in the power of the President of the 
United States to decide whether or not to hold elections in a remote country in the Balkans, 
in this case in Bosnia – Herzegovina. The article also represents the view that the issue of 
elections in Bosnia is a central issue in the domestic elections campaigning in the U.S. The 
fact that the Republican presidential candidate was against holding the elections on the 
prescribed date was used as an argument from Clinton’s supporters against all others who 
were in doubt about the elections – they would be accused of supporting the Republicans. 
Making these elections work had become an important element of Clinton’s own re-election 
campaign.  
Were conditions met? 
In the second paragraph Mr. Dole mentions several of the conditions from the DPA that are 
not met, as he calls the elections “ …a sham in the making”. He said “…opposition 
candidates had been intimidated, refugees had been unable to return in their homes, and 
war criminals were roaming free.” He also said that there had been little progress toward 
development of “..independent media and that freedom of movement had not been 
established within Bosnia”.  
“Elections held under these circumstances will only serve to unfairly legitimize national 
extremists, entrench ethnic divisions and condemn Bosnia and its people to authoritarianism 
and partition.” 
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Dole here points out some very central issues and important conditions set down in 
the Dayton Peace Agreement that still had not been met two weeks before the elections.  
Criticism dismissed as political opposition?  
As objective facts, these statements are true. But for the team preparing for Clinton’s and the 
Bosnian Elections, this kind of criticism would be considered hostile and similar to Article 1, 
easy to refer to as coming from a political enemy, in this case the spear head of the political 
enemy, the presidential candidate of the opposition. Thus his criticism is easy to dismiss, and 
also looses its effect even though it may objectively be true.  
In Dole’s letter to Clinton as referred in the article, Dole claims that the present 
policy “,,,serves to undermine our leadership and make a mockery of our commitment to 
democratic principles, while making it more difficult for U.S. troops in Bosnia to accomplish 
their goals. I cannot comprehend why the United Stets supports holding elections under such 
circumstances.” ( Sentence 8). 
This is very harsh criticism of the Clinton Administration, claiming that they 
contribute to making a mockery of American commitment to democratic principles by 
insisting on keeping the deadline for these elections.  
Conflict frame 
This article can clearly be categorized as part of a conflict frame, Dole representing the 
complete opposite and total criticism of Clinton’s Bosnia politics.   
Dominant – hegemonic position 
In the terms of Stuart Hall, however, the article can be defined within the dominant, 
hegemonic position, since its point of departure definitely is U.S. politics and its connoted 
dominant position in world politics, taking for granted that the opinions of a political 
candidate representing the political opposition in the U.S. will also have repercussions in 
international politics, in this case in Bosnia.  
A dominating U.S. discourse 
The U.S. discourse dominates this article. The majority of the articles are within the main 
election discourse, and within this discourse the main basic discourse is a U.S. discourse. 
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This discourse works two ways: In the first place, it is a discourse related to the up-coming 
U.S. elections, in this case represented by the opposition candidate, and reflects again how 
an important foreign policy issue like the elections in Bosnia becomes a central element in  
domestic U.S. politics. In the second place, U.S: policies towards Bosnia is a foreign policy 
issue, which is based on a relationship between the two countries, a relationship which in the 
U.S: discourse is reflected as a relationship where the U.S. is the ‘Big Uncle’, the helper, the 
provider of services like democracy, foreign aid, support for arms, and Bosnia is at the 
receiving end, dependent on the support from the U.S. 
 In terms of identity, this reflects a U.S. ‘Self ‘ being the dominating, powerful, 
but also generous and helpful towards the ‘Other’, here represented by Bosnia, being 
the victim and the dependent part in the relationship.  
Addressee: 
The addressee for this article is an American public of prospective voters, who are inclined 
to change their opinion or possibly vote differently after reading the article. Even though the 
subject matter relates to foreign policy, the topic to consider for the addressee is domestic, 
U.S. politics in the run-up to U.S. elections, in which the Elections in Bosnia had become a 
hot topic.  
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Article 6 (IHT 30 August 1996) 
Headline: “Bosnian Elections” 
The article is en editorial from The New York Times, printed in the International Herald 
Tribune on 30 August 1996. 
Code: Negative 
Category:  Editorial 
ARTICLE 6: BREAKDOWN SENTENCE BY SENTENCE 
No. Text Position / Main 
representation 
Dominating 
discourses/Basic 
discourses 
1. Campaign intimidation and fraudulent voter 
registration in Bosnia have reached the point where 
minimally acceptable conditions for national elections 
on Sept. 14 no longer exist.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnia discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
2. The voting should be postponed 30 days and more 
active steps taken by NATO forces and civilian 
election supervisors to remedy the worst abuses by mid 
October.  
Negative Election discourse 
Bosnia discourse 
Western discourse 
3 On  Tuesday the chief international election supervisor 
in Bosnia, Robert Frowick, postponed voting for 
municipal officers also scheduled for Sept 14, citing a 
pervasive pattern of misconduct.  
Negative 
West vs. Bosnia 
Election discourse 
Bosnians discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
 
4. The same problems taint the national, regional and 
presidential elections, which he did not reschedule.  
Negative Election discourse 
5. They threaten to turn what was supposed to be an 
exercise in democracy into a ratification of ethnic 
bullying.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
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6. For a time it looked as if the election process could be 
cleaned up enough to go ahead on schedule.  
Neutral Election discourse 
7. That would have met the timetable spelled out in the 
Dayton peace agreement and allowed new Bosnia-
wide institutions to being functioning well before 
NATO troops and civilian monitors are scheduled to 
withdraw in December.  
Positive 
Western vs. Bosnia 
Election discourse 
8. But such optimism is no longer sustainable.  Negative  
9. The Serbian, Croatian and Muslim nationalist parties 
now entrenched in their respective parts of Bosnia 
have fatally compromised the credibility of a mid-
September vote.   
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
10. Party-controlled newspapers and radio and television 
stations are fanning ethnic hatreds and spreading 
slanders against rival groups.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
11. Thugs are breaking up opposition rallies and 
threatening opposition candidates and their supporters.
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
12. In Bosnian Serb areas, some of the same individual 
and groups that directed the war seem to be 
dominating the electoral process.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
13. Bosnian Serb leaders like Radovan Karadzic , though 
ostensibly sidelined, see the elections as a way to ratify 
their wartime conquests and are eager for them to go 
forward quickly.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
14. Party activists loyal to Mr. Karadzic, working in 
conjunction with the government of Slobodan 
Milosevic in Serbia, have coerced Bosnian Serb 
refugees into registering to cast their votes in formerly 
Muslim towns, hoping to overwhelm the votes likely 
to be cast by Muslims evicted from these same 
localities.  
Negative 
Balkan7Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
15. Bosnia’s president, Alija Izetbegovic, seems to fear 
that honest elections could dilute his Muslim 
nationalist party’s monopoly of power in government 
controlled areas.  
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
16. His government has blocked the operation of the 
independent broadcasting network designed by 
international authorities to allow independent 
Negative Election discourse 
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candidates to be heard.  Balkanization discourse 
17.  It will take until mid-October to create the minimal 
conditions for an internationally credible election to 
proceed.  
Negative Election discourse 
18. Mr. Frowick’s civilian election supervisors and NATO 
troops should use this time to rerun the voter 
registration process under much tighter international 
control.  
Neutral 
Western  
Election discourse 
Western discourse 
19. They should guarantee physical protection to 
opposition rallies, using armed NATO troops if 
necessary.  
Positive 
Western vs. Bosnia 
Election discourse 
Bosnia discourse 
20. NATO should also provide physical protection for the 
establishment and operation of an independent 
broadcasting network under international control.  
Positive 
Western vs. Bosnia 
Election discourse 
Media discourse 
21. If Bosnia’s voters freely return ethnic fanatics to 
office, that is their choice. 
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
22. But citizens should be able to choose from a wide 
spectrum of candidates in a climate free of intimidation 
and coercion. 
Negative 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
23. The United States and the international community, for 
their part, should not have to defend the credibility of 
an election that Bosnians can see for themselves has 
been shamelessly manipulated.  
Negative 
Western vs. Bosnia 
Election discourse 
Western discourse 
Balkanization discourse 
24. The Dayton agreement provides for the use of NATO 
forces to produce secure conditions for, among other 
things, the conduct of free and fair elections.  
Neutral 
Western vs. Bosnia 
Election discourse 
Western discourse 
Dayton discourse 
25 NATO’s main job – disengagement of the warring 
armies – has been accomplished.  
Positive 
Western 
Peace discourse 
26. It would not unduly add to the burden or risk of the 
troops to ask them now to provide security for 
candidates and voters.  
Positive 
Western vs. Bosnia 
Election discourse 
Western discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
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27. There is unlikely to be long-term peace in Bosnia 
without credible elections.  
Positive 
Bosnian 
Election discourse 
Bosnian discourse 
 
Table 7: Article 6 – breakdown of text sentence by sentence  
Summary: 
The author of this editorial article claims that “…campaign intimidations and fraudulent 
voter registration in Bosnia have reached the point where minimally acceptable conditions 
for national elections on Sept. 14 no longer exist.” The author wants the elections postponed 
at least 30 days and more, and active steps should be taken to remedy the worst abuses.. 
Municipal elections have already been postponed, due to misconduct, but the same problem 
applies to national, regional and presidential elections.   
 An optimism which was there for a while concerning the election process, is no 
longer sustainable. The Serbian, Croatian and Muslim nationalist parties have themselves 
compromised any credibility in a vote in mid-September. Media is spreading ethnic hatred,  
thugs break up political meetings and threaten opposition candidates, nationalist Serbs who 
were active during the war are dominating the electoral process.  
 Bosnian Serb leaders like Radovan Karadzic, though ostensibly sidelined, see the 
elections as a way to ratify their wartime conquests and are eager for them to go forward 
quickly.  On the other hand  has Bosnia’s president, Alija Izetbegovic, has blocked the 
internationally funded independent broadcasting  network to allow independent candidates 
to be heard.  The author of the editorial suggests mid-October as a possible new date for 
minimal conditions to be created to allow the elections to take place, and suggests that this 
time should be spent rerunning the voter registration, guarantee physical protection to 
opposition rallies using NATO troops, protect the establishment of an independent 
broadcasting network etc. if the Bosnian voters freely return ethnic fanatics to office, that is 
their free choice. But the U.S. and the International community should not have to defend 
the credibility of elections that have been ‘shamelessly manipulated.’ 
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Analysis: 
Perspective:  
The main perspective of this article is definitely also a U.S. perspective, at the same time as 
it is balanced and not as narrow-mindedly focused on purely U.S. interests as some of the 
other articles analysed here. The main focus of the editorial is the election in Bosnia, not the 
U.S, election coming up. A Bosnian perspective is present in this article.  
 Main representation: 
Although the framework represented in this article is mainly International Community/ U.S. 
interests, Bosnian interests are also represented to a large degree, in the sense that the 
editorial is worried about the situation for the Bosnian voters, shows truly concern for the 
democratic process in Bosnia. The U.S. is of course one of the actors contributing to this 
process, but unlike several of the other articles, the main focus of the editorial are the 
elections and the end result of the electoral process for the Bosnians.  
Election discourse:  
The Bosnian perspective is also represented as the most important issue related to the 
elections discourse, the up-coming U.S. elections are not mentioned at all.  
Bosnian politics, with all its “campaign intimidation and fraudulent voter registration”  is 
the central theme of the editorial. All important aspects of the issues that are hampering the 
election process are mentioned, including the difficult media situation, with “party-
controlled newspapers and radio and  television stations “…that are “fanning ethnic hatreds 
and spreading slanders against rival groups”. And the blame is distributed even-handedly, 
all groups are mentioned as having “fatally compromised the credibility of a mid-September 
vote. “The article mentions that “in some of the Serb areas some of the same individuals and 
groups that directed the war seem to be dominating the electoral process.” Karadzic and 
Milosevic get the obligatory criticism, this time for coercing “…Bosnian Serb refugees to 
cast their votes in formerly Muslim towns, hoping to overwhelm the votes likely to be cast by 
Muslims evicted from these same localities.” But Alija Izetbegovic is also criticised for 
having “…blocked the operation of the independent broadcasting network designed by 
international authorities to allow independent candidates to be heard.” 
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The author is at the end worried about the U.S. and the international community having to 
“…defend the credibility of an election that Bosnians can see for themselves has been 
shamelessly manipulated.” 
But not to defend U.S. interests as such, but for the benefit of the Bosnian voters , who 
deserve “free and fair elections” . 
Thus the author is not against holding elections at all, the conclusion of the article 
is:”…there is unlikely to be long-term peace in Bosnia without credible elections.” 
It is the timing which is wrong, and the suggestion is that the elections be postponed, if only 
by 30 days.  
Were conditions met? 
The whole argument of this article rests on the proposition that hardly any o the conditions 
for holding elections on September 14 were met.  The nationalists are controlling all political 
parties, there is no freedom of press, no freedom of movemnt or association, the conditions 
for holding free and fair elections as they were established in the Dayton Peace Agreement 
are not present, and the author is therefore suggesting that the elections are postponed.  
Responsibility frame 
If I should frame this article,  I think it belongs in the Responsibility frame. It involves a 
clear request and suggestion to the responsible authorities (the Clinton Administration) to  
postpone the elections. 
Negotiated position 
The article is clearly opposing the current political trend, but is at the same time accepting 
the “rules of the game”, meaning that the U.S. and NATO have to control the situation in 
Bosnia. At the same time the article manages to keep a Bosnian perspective, and I therefore 
suggest it to be categorised as an article taking the negotiated position, decoding the 
hegemonic position while at the same time seeing the position of the less powerful in this 
case the Bosnians. 
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Addressee 
Being an editorial originally printed in The New York Times, we may imagine the addressee 
being the liberal, reflecting urban intellectual that the New York Times presumably is trying 
to reach. Thus a critical editorial of an important foreign affairs issue as the Bosnian 
Elections were at the time, would not be surprising. Since the editorial is very balanced and 
to the point, it becomes even more convincing to the expected addressee. In former articles 
opposition to holding the elections was ascribed to Republicans trying to hamper Clinton’s 
re-election. This cannot be ascribed to this editorial, and again making it more convincing 
and credible. Publishing in the International Herald Tribune may be a way of showing the 
world that unbiased opposition also exists in the United States.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The press coverage of the preparations for the first elections in Bosnia after the Dayton 
Peace Agreement is the main focus of the thesis. The analysis covers articles from the U.S. 
press during the period May to end of September 1996. The main bulk of articles is from 
June through September, and was printed in the newspaper International Herald Tribune.  
The articles are mainly news articles, and were for analytical purposes coded in three 
categories: positive, negative or neutral. These codes reflect the main attitude and position 
conveyed in the articles, whether they were positive, negative or neutral to holding the 
elections on the  prescribed date 14 September according to the Dayton Peace Accords. The 
coding also relates to the position conveyed in the articles towards  the process leading up to 
the elections.  
The analysis of the total number of articles (N=80) from different U.S. newspapers, 
shows that the majority (73%) of the articles about the elections in Bosnia in the period June 
to September 1996 conveyed a negative attitude.  
One assumption about the media coverage of the elections was that it would be based 
on a concept that the press has an active role to play in the political landscape - mainly as a 
communicator of information about political decisions. It is not unusual that the media is 
even thought of as a vehicle for foreign policy makers, in the sense that important messages 
are conveyed through the press. To a certain degree this assumption is confirmed in the 
analysis, even though the U.S. administration may not have been too pleased all the time 
with the way the U.S. press conveyed their decisions. The main bulk of articles were very 
critical towards the handling of the pre-election process.  
Another general assumption about U.S. foreign news reporting is that it would stay 
loyal to the policies of its government. According to Davis, U.S. media normally “follows 
the flag”, they report on foreign affairs in accordance with the priorities of the U.S. 
government( Davis 1992:213). But both the result of the analysis of the total number of  
articles in the material and the closer analysis of the selected articles show that this 
assumption about foreign news reporting is not necessarily true. On the contrary, the results 
indicate that U.S. foreign news reporting may show journalistic independence and be critical 
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to the politics performed by the U.S. administration in a given situation. This way it lives up 
to the cherished ideal of independence of the press.  
The discourse analysis of selected articles from the International Herald Tribune 
underlines the conclusion above. Although the selection of articles for analysis is not merely 
within the defined negative code, the over all message conveyed is critical to the way the 
pre-election process was handled, both by the U.S. government, the OSCE and other 
representatives of the international community involved.  
One of the main indicators for the analysis was how the press coverage reflected the  
question:  
- Were conditions met for holding the elections?  And 
- How did the expressed position to this question reflect whether the press showed 
support for or had an independent/critical stand towards the policies of the U. S. 
administration? 
The majority of the articles conclude that all conditions were not met, even though they may 
have been positive or neutral to holding elections. In those cases the pragmatic position of 
keeping the deadline was considered more important than meeting the conditions. The 
majority of the articles, as mentioned above, showed an independent, critical position to the 
policies of the Clinton administration.  
Almost all the articles are defined within an Election Discourse. At the same time 
most of the analysed articles represented a very clear U.S. perspective, although the subject 
matter dealt with the war shattered country of Bosnia. Related to this is also the fact that 
national U.S. politics seemed to matter more than foreign political concerns. Keeping the 
deadline and preparing for the elections in Bosnia was in most of the articles considered an 
important part of the preparations for the U.S. elections scheduled for November the same 
year, where president Clinton was the candidate for the Democratic Party.  The mixing of 
national U.S. politics and international politics is a general feature reflected in almost all of 
the analysed press material.  
Within the election discourse several other basic discourses are represented. One 
important such basic discourse is the so called Balkanization discourse which reflects the 
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Western position as democratic, well meaning, helpful towards Bosnia, the Western ‘Self’ as 
opposed to the Balkan ‘Other’ . This ‘Other’ represents everything that is counteracting 
modern economic and democratic development: violent, tribal, barbaric, uncivilised and 
backward.  
Although the press was critical to the way the Bosnian policies of the U.S. 
administration was conducted at the time, the position of the U.S. as the dominant actor 
within the New World Order was never challenged. This reflects a presupposition that the 
U.S. is the leading power in the world, and has an implicit and defined power to act in 
international politics accordingly. This reflects one of the definitions of ‘hegemony’ in the 
thesis. Another definition is related to Fairclough and Gramsci, where hegemony is defined 
as ‘leadership as much as domination across economic, political, cultural and ideological 
domains of society.’  A third definition is the one used by Hall in the categorisation of 
positions of the press, where a  dominant- hegemonic position is in acceptance of the social 
order as it is,  considering it a legitimate order.  
In the analysis I have tried to categorize the articles according to the positions 
proposed by Stuart Hall: dominant - hegemonic position, negotiated position, oppositional 
position. Regardless of the attitude towards the elections conveyed by the articles, most of 
them fall within the dominant-hegemonic position according to these categories. That means 
that the articles reflect an acceptance of the power structure that they describe – their 
representations  may agree  or disagree with the main actors ( Bill Clinton, Dole, the head of 
the OSCE mission etc) but they convey a general acceptance of the structures as they are 
represented in U.S. and world politics.  
Although the IHT appears to be an objective and balanced newspaper, a general 
critical position to the U.S. administration’s way of handling the elections issue in Bosnia 
comes clearly through even in the news articles. This is shown through the negative angling 
of the article, the direct and indirect voice representation, and how the general tone and 
message of the article is conveyed.  
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The overall conclusion of the analysis in the thesis is that the type of foreign news 
reporting represented by the International Herald Tribune, to a large degree is independent 
and shows a critical position to the U.S. administration. The examples of the reporting 
concerning the first elections in Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Accords in 1996 underlines 
the conclusion that the press represented here has shown independence to its government’s 
positions on the issue of the elections. Thus the ideals of an independent press contributing 
actively to the system of checks and balances of the U.S. structures  is confirmed through the 
study of the press coverage of the elections in Bosnia in 1996.  
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Abbreviations 
 
ABiH – Armija Bosne I Hercegovine – Army of Bosnia-Hercegovina 
CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis 
FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
HDZ – The Croat Nationalist Party 
HVO - Hvratsko Vjece Obrane – the Croat Defence Council  
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons 
IHT – International Herald Tribune 
JNA – Jugoslav Narodne Armije – Yugoslav People’s Army 
MSA – Mutual Security Administration (subscription paid by U.S. State Department) 
NYT – The New York Times 
OHR – Office of the High Representative 
OSCE- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PEC – Provisional Election Commission 
RS – Republika Srpska – the Bosnian Serb Republic 
SFRY – Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
SDA – Stranke Demokratske Akcije –  Party for Democratic Action  
SDP – Social Democratic Party  
SDS – Stranke Demokratske Srpskije – Bosnian Serb Party 
NIOD – Nederlands Intituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie –  
Nederland’s Institute for War Documentation 
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees  
WP – The Washington Post 
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Figure 1: Norman Fairclough: A framework for critical discourse analysis of a 
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